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You don't solve the problem by assaulting the messenger... who brings bad news; you
don't destroy the thermometer that tells you.., a... fever exists; you don't cure
malnutrition by throwing out the scales that identify ... underweight babies.'

I.

INTRODUCTION

Educators and policymakers have long been concerned about
low levels of American academic achievement. 2 And with good reason.
In recent studies by the U.S. Department of Education, twenty-three
percent of American twelfth graders were unable to read at even the
most "basic" level; 3 more than one-third of all high school seniors
lacked basic competency in mathematics; 4 and fifty-seven percent of
5
high school seniors lacked basic knowledge of American history.

1.
Ronald L. Flaugher, The Many Definitions of Test Bias, 33 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 671, 672
(1978).
2.
See NAT'L COMM'N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., A NATION AT RISK: THE IMPERATIVE FOR
EDUCATIONAL REFORM 5 (1983) [hereinafter A NATION AT RISK] (stating that the "educational
foundations of our society are... being eroded by a rising tide of mediocrity"); CTR. FOR EDUC.
REFORM, A NATION STILL AT RISK: AN EDUCATION MANIFESTO 1 (1998) (noting that the low levels
of achievement by American students have remained steady since 1983 when A Nation at Risk
was released), available at http://edreform.com/pubs/mani-fest.htm (last visited April 10, 2001);
DIANE RAVITCH, NATIONAL STANDARDS IN AMERICAN EDUCATION: A CITIZEN'S GUIDE, at xxi, 5253, 59-97 (1995); TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, MAKING THE GRADE: REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION POLICY
(1983); William J. Bennett, The Case for Education Reform, at http://www.empoweramerica.org/ea/servlet/dispatcher/Articlewebcmd (June 28, 1999) (arguing that education reform is
necessary to raise levels of academic achievement).
3.
NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., The Condition of Education
2000: Reading Performance of Students in Grades 4, 8, and 12 (2000) (summarizing data from
the
1998
National
Assessment
of
Educational
Progress),
available
at
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2000/coe2OOO/section2/s_tablel3-2.html (last visited July 5, 2001); see also
U.S. Teens "Average" on Multination Exam, CNN.com, at http://www.cnn.com/2001/fyi/teachers.ednews/12/04/students.tests.ap/index.html (Dec. 4, 2001) (reporting that U.S. fifteen-yearolds rank fifteenth among the world's thirty-two most developed nations in overall literacy).
Diane Ravitch has noted that in high-poverty schools the number of high school seniors unable to
read at a basic level tops seventy percent. Diane Ravitch, Education: See All the Spin, WASH.
POST, Mar. 23, 1999, at A17.
4.
James S. Braswell et al., Nat'l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, The Nation's Report Card:
Mathematics 2000 26 (2001), available at http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcardpdflmain2000/2001517a.pdf; Roger Doyle, Can't Read, Can't Count: Up to One-Third of American High
School Seniors Aren't Ready for the Real World, SCI. AM., Oct. 2001, at 24, 24 (citing data from
the 2000 mathematics portion of the National Assessment of Educational Progress). American
students also fare poorly in mathematics and science as compared to students in other nations.
Thus, the Third International Mathematics and Science Study ("TIMSS") ranked American
students nineteenth out of twenty-one nations in math and sixteenth out of twenty-one nations
in science. Office of Educ. Research & Improvement, U.S. Dep't of Education, Highlightsfrom the
Third
Internaional
Math
and
Science
Study
(1999),
available
at
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs99/1999081.pdf; RAVITCH, supra note 2, at xxii, 84-85 ("[I]nternational
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Perhaps even more troubling than the generally poor state of
academic achievement among all American high school students is the
persistent educational gap between black and Latino6 students, on the
one hand, and white students, on the other. 7 On a wide variety of
measures (including test scores, grade point averages, and high school
tests reveal beyond doubt that American students have not learned what their peers in other
countries have learned."); U.S. Teens 'Average" on MultinationExam, supra note 3.
5.

NAEP, 1994 U.S. HISTORY REPORT CARD: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL ASSESSMENT

OF EDUCATIONAL PROGRESS (1996), availableat http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreported/ushistory/findbasic.asp (last visited Apr. 5, 2001); CHESTER E. FINN, JR. & DIANE RAVITCH, EDUCATION
REFORM 1995-1996, at 7 (1996) (discussing the NAEP data).
American college students also demonstrate high levels of historical illiteracy. A study of
college seniors at America's top colleges in 2000 found that forty percent could not identify the
half century in which the American Civil War was fought; two-thirds could not identify George
Washington as the American General at Yorktown; only twenty-nine percent could correctly
identify the term "Reconstruction" as referring to the readmission of the Confederate states to
the union and the protection of the rights of black citizens; and only twenty-three percent could
correctly identify James Madison as the "Father of our Constitution" (as compared to ninety-nine
percent who could correctly identify "Beavis and Butthead" and ninety-eight percent who could
correctly identify "Snoop Doggy Dog"). See Center for Survey Research and Analysis at the
University of Connecticut, Elite College History Survey, at http://www.csra.uconn.edu/reports/history.pdf and http://www.csra.uconn.edu/reports/hisLqstnr.htm (last visited May 15,
2001) (reporting the results by a survey conducted for the American Council of Trustees and
Alumni); see also David S. Broder, Neglecting History, WASH. POST, July 2, 2000, at B7
(describing the results of the survey).
6.
In this Article, I use the terms "black" and "African-American" interchangeably. I also
use the terms "Latino" and "Hispanic" interchangeably to refer to those U.S. residents of
Mexican, Cuban, Puerto Rican, Dominican, or Central or South American ancestry. See generally
Latino Officers Ass'n v. City of New York, 196 F.3d 458, 460 n.1 (2d Cir. 1999) (Cabranes, J.)
(explaining the origins of the terms "Hispanic" and "Latino"). Although Hispanics can be of any,
or mixed, race, see UNITED STATES CENSUS, THE HISPANIC POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
POPULATION
CHARACTERISTICS
(2001),
available at
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hispanic, for purposes of this Article they are treated as a separate
classification. Accordingly, I use the term "white" in this piece to refer only to those whites who
are not of Hispanic origin. I use the term "minorities" here to refer to African-Americans and
Latinos collectively. Although Asian-Americans are also considered minorities for most purposes,
I do not include them in the term in this Article because, unlike African-Americans and Latinos,
Asian-Americans do not, on average, underperform academically vis-a-vis their white peers. For
purposes of this Article, then, I use the term "minority" as short-hand for "non-Asian minority"
and the term "white" as shorthand for "non-Hispanic white," in order to avoid the awkwardness
of those phrases.
7.
In recent studies by the U.S. Department of Education's National Assessment of
Educational Progress, 43% of black high school seniors and 36% of Latino high school seniors
were unable to read at an even basic level, compared to 17% of white high school seniors. See
Doyle, supra note 4. Sixty-nine percent of black high school seniors and 56% of Hispanic high
school seniors lacked basic proficiency in mathematics, compared to 26% of white high school
seniors. Id.; see also RAVITCH, supra note 2, at 63, 72 (noting that the racial achievement gap has
narrowed somewhat over the past several decades, but is still substantial); ABIGAIL THERNSTROM
& STEPHAN

THERNSTROM,

GETTING THE ANSWERS

RIGHT:

RACE,

CLASS,

AND ACADEMIC

ACHIEVEMENT (forthcoming 2003) (discussing the achievement gap); Felicia R. Lee, Testing Gap:
Black, White and Gray Matter, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1999, at B1 (noting the "persistent"
achievement gap between non-Asian minority students, on the one hand, and white and Asian
students on the other).
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and college graduation rates), black and Latino students consistently
8
lag behind white students at the same educational level.
In an attempt to address. the problem of low academic
achievement in general-and the minority achievement gap in
particular-politicians 9 and education reformers1 ° have pushed for
uniform academic standards and increased accountability. The
movement in favor of educational standards and -regular academic
assessments seeks to hold students, teachers, and administrators
accountable by rewarding academic achievement and by exposing
academic failure to public criticism as well as to corrective and
remedial action. Reformers argue .that only by testing all students,
and by attaching consequences to the results of such tests, can we
encourage teachers to focus on a uniform core curriculum, motivate
student learning, and raise levels of student performance.11
Proponents of this new accountability also contend that any serious
attempt to close the minority achievement gap must necessarily
include a testing regime to provide the public and policymakers with
comparative data and to provide incentives to raising achievement
2
levels in even the most disadvantaged communities.
8.
Jodi Wilgoren, Report Calls for New Focus on Aid for Minority Students, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 17, 1999, at A30 (reporting that, for decades, African-American and Latino students have
trailed white students and Asian-American students academically and that the gap in
achievement is evident in grades, test scores, graduation rates, and levels of academic
attainment); see also STEPHAN THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK AND
WHITE: ONE NATION INDIVISIBLE 360 (1997) (discussing the black-white academic gap).
9.
During the 2000 presidential campaign, both Al Gore and George W. Bush pressed the
need for accountability through testing, with Bush proposing to make improvement on statewide
tests a condition of federal funding. See Andrew Goldstein, Who's the Education President?,
TIME, Nov. 6, 2000, at 82, 82; Patrick Healy, Candidates Take on Education Goals May Be the
Same But the Methods Are Different, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 4, 2000, at A12.
10. See generally RAVITCH, supra note 2; High Standards:Giving All Students a Fair Shot,
ACHIEVE POLICY BRIEF (Achieve, Inc., Washington, D.C.), Fall 2000, at 2 (arguing that uniform
educational standards and tests with consequences will improve the academic achievement of all
students and help to level the playing field between educationally rich and educationally poor
communities),
at
http://www.achive.org/dstore.nsflookup/High%20standards 2OPolicy/20
Brief/o/$file/High/20Standards/2OPolicy/20Brief.pdf; Ctr. for Educ. Reform, at http://www.edreform.com (last visited Mar. 1, 2001); Thomas B. Fordham Foundation, Standards, Testing &
Accountability, at http://www.edexcellence.net/topics/standards.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2001).
11. Achieve, Inc., supra note 10, at 2 ("[T]ying consequences to results creates incentives for
schools to raise performance and encourages students to work hard."); Thomas B. Fordham
Foundation, supra note 10.
12. Testing. Setting the Record Straight, ACHIEVE POLICY BRIEF (Achieve, Inc., Washington,
D.C.), Summer 2000, at 5 ('Tests based on common standards ...do a better job than the current
system in fostering equity by providing common expectations for all students.... Without
consequences tied to test results, there would be little incentive for schools to deal with current
gaps in achievement."), at http://www.achive.org/dstore.nsf/Lookup/Testing-Setting/2Othe%20Record%2OStraight/$file/Testing-Setting%20the%2ORecord%2OStraight.pdf;
William
L.
Taylor, Standards, Tests, and Civil Rights, EDUC. WK., Nov. 15, 2000, at 56 ("Standards and
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Generally speaking, the new accountability takes the form of
academic assessments that a student must pass in order to advance to
the next grade level or receive a high school diploma. Typically,
students who fail these assessments are provided remedial help and
additional chances to pass the exam. 13 Despite the good intentions
behind such reform efforts, in the short term a disproportionately
large number of African-American and Hispanic students have failed
14
such tests, both on the first try and after multiple attempts.
Because of the high failure rates of minority students on
standardized academic assessments, some testing critics argue that
requiring students to pass a mandatory exam in order to move to the
next educational level will entrench current inequalities. 15 Others go
further, arguing that the tests are themselves "biased" against
African-American and Latino students and that the tests, therefore,
fail to measure accurately what students from these communities
actually know. 16 For one or both of these reasons, many groups that
accountability expose the sham that passes for education in many heavily minority schools and
provide measurements and pressure to prod schools to target resources where they are needed
most.").
13. See infra notes 76-78 and 104-07 and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., Abigail Thernstrom, Testing and Its Enemies: At the Schoolhouse Barricades,
NAT'L REV., Sept. 11, 2000, at 38, 40 (noting that in one administration of the Massachusetts
Comprehensive Assessment System "[eighty] percent of non-Asian minority students failed the
tenth-grade math assessment [and that] [flifty-seven percent flunked English"); see also GI
Forum v. Tex. Educ. Agency, 87 F. Supp. 2d 667, 679 (W.D. Tex. 2000) (explaining that on the
Texas Assessment of Academic Skills, the gap between the passing rate of Hispanic and black
students, on the one hand, and white students, on the other, shrinks when cumulative pass rates
are examined but that, nevertheless, the gap on cumulative administrations of the exam still
reveal "significant statistical differences" sufficient to satisfy a legal showing of adverse impact).
15. See, e.g., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, HIGH STAKES: TESTING FOR TRACKING, PROMOTION,
AND GRADUATION 4 (Jay P. Heubert & Robert M. Hauser eds., 1999) (arguing that the use of
high-stakes tests to make determinations regarding promotion or graduation serves only to
reinforce current educational inequalities); Linda M. McNeil, Creating New Inequalities:
Contradictionsof Reform, 81 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 728, 732 (2000) (arguing that standardized
educational tests mask current inequalities and do nothing to level the playing field between
educationally rich and educationally poor communities); see also Richard Whitmire, Controversy
Sharpens over High-stakes Testing, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, May 22, 2000, (describing
arguments that high-stakes tests create a racist roadblock to social advancement).
16. See, e.g., David M. White, Culturally Biased Testing and Predictive Validity: Putting
Them on the Record, 14 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 89, 90 (1979) (arguing that the minority test
score gap is caused by "cultural bias" in the tests which masks minority test-takers' true
knowledge and abilities); Hagit Elul, Note, Making the Grade, Public Education Reform: The Use

of Standardized Testing to Retain Students and Deny Diplomas, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
495, 517 (1999) (arguing that racial and ethnic disparities in test results are due to test
measurement errors, not actual achievement gaps); Lawrence Feinberg, Florida Tests Literacy:

37%of Juniors Fail;One Juniorin Three Fails Fla. High School Literacy Test, WASH. POST, Apr.
2, 1978, at Al (describing charges by the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and the
NAACP that Florida's statewide graduation exam is "culturally biased" against minorities);
David Gonzalez, Testing Worth, and Patience, of Teachers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1998, at B1
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purport to represent the interests of minorities and organizations that
oppose standardized testing argue that tests which produce
17
disproportionate racial or ethnic results are discriminatory.
As a logical outgrowth of this view, a number of commentators

and special interest groups have advocated using disparate impact
theory-which has its roots in the law of employment
discrimination&--to mount legal challenges to a variety of facially
neutral testing regimes with disproportionate demographic
outcomes.1 9 The legal hook for such challenges is Title VI of the Civil
(reporting claims that New York's teacher exam is "culturally biased" against black and Hispanic
teachers); Peggy Walsh-Sarnecki, Race Plays Big Role in MEAP Scores; Expert Finds that White,
Black Students Give Different Answers, DETROIT FREE PRESS, May 18, 2001, at 1A (describing
claims that Michigan's statewide academic assessment is biased against minorities); J. Steven
Warner, Letter to the Editor, PALM BEACH POST, Feb. 9, 2001, at 17A (arguing that a passage on
the reading comprehension portion of the Florida statewide assessment was "culturally biased"
because it described a two-parent nuclear family).
17. See infra notes 115-28 and accompanying text (describing claims by representatives of
the NAACP and various Latino advocacy groups that high-stakes tests are discriminatory); see
also Georgia N. Alexakis, Test Prep: What Bush Can Learn from a Tryout of School Reform in
Massachusetts,WASH. MONTHLY, Mar. 1, 2001, at 29, 34-36 (describing claims that mandatory
testing is discriminatory); Fair Test Examiner, ParentsFile OCR Complaint (Winter 1999-2000)
(applauding a claim filed with the U.S. Department of Education by Chicago parents alleging
that Chicago's policy of requiring students to pass a test before being promoted discriminates
against black and Latino students), at http://www.fairtest.org/examarts/winterOO/ParentsFile-OCRComplaint.html (last visited Aug. 3, 2001).
18. For a thorough discussion of the principles underlying "disparate impact" law in the
employment context, see Pamela L. Perry, Two Faces of Disparate Impact Discrimination,59
FORDHAM L. REV. 523 (1991), and Steven L. Willborn, The Disparate Impact Model of
Discrimination:Theory and Limits, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 799 (1985).
19. See generally Arthur L. Coleman, Excellence and Equity in Education: High Standards
for High-Stakes Tests, 6 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 81 (1998) (arguing that the availability of the
disparate impact model for addressing claims of discrimination in testing promotes the creation
and implementation of fair and equitable tests); Preston C. Green III, Can Title VI Prevent Law
Schools from Adopting Admissions Practices that Discriminate Against African-Americans?, 24
S.U. L. REV. 237 (1997) (promoting the use of disparate impact lawsuits to enjoin educational
institutions from relying on test scores with disproportionate racial results); William C. Kidder,
The Rise of the Testocracy: An Essay on the LSAT, Conventional Wisdom, and the Dismantlingof
Diversity, 9 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 167 (2000) (favoring the disparate impact model as a way to root
out so-called biased tests); James S. Wrona, Eradicating Sex Discrimination in Education:
Extending DisparateImpact Analysis to Title IX Litigation, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 1 (1994) (advocating
disparate impact lawsuits against tests with different average outcomes for men and women);
Elul, supra note 16, at 506 (arguing in favor of disparate impact litigation to challenge highstakes educational assessments); Daniel J. Losen, Note, Silent Segregation in Our Nation's
Schools, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 517 (1999) (arguing in favor of disparate impact litigation to
eliminate tests used to "track" students by ability); Andrea L. Silverstein, Note, Standardized
Tests: The Continuation of Gender Bias in Higher Education, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 669 (2000)
(arguing that disparate impact litigation should be mounted against the use of tests on which the
average male test-taker outperforms the average female test-taker); see also GI Forum v. Tex.
Educ. Agency, 87 F. Supp. 2d 667 (W.D. Tex. 2000) (concerning unsuccessful lawsuit brought by
the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund against the Texas Education
Agency, arguing that the Texas Assessment of Academic Skills has an unlawful disparate impact
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Rights Act of 1964,20 which prohibits recipients of federal funding from
discriminating on the basis of race or ethnicity.2 1 Although Title VI
does not by its terms provide for disparate impact litigation,
regulations promulgated to implement the statute explicitly forbid
federally funded entities from using "criteria or methods of
administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to
discrimination. '22 In other words, Title VI's implementing regulations
prohibit institutions that receive federal assistance-including most
American schools and colleges--from implementing policies that have
a disproportionate adverse impact on minorities.
In practice, this means that the federal government may
withdraw funding from any educational institution that employs tests
with disproportionate demographic outcomes. Until recently, it also
meant that private parties could bring federal lawsuits against schools
23
that employed such tests.

on black and Hispanic students); Ronald Brownstein, Call for Academic Standards Could Face
Test from Civil Rights Law, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1997, at A5 (describing a 1994 investigation by
the Clinton Administration's Department of Education into the State of Ohio's graduation exam);
Kenneth J. Cooper, StandardizedExam Faces Test in Texas: Trial Gauges Discriminatory Effect,
WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 1999, at A19 (describing the GI Forum case in Texas, and citing
complaints filed with the U.S. Department of Education against similar exams in North Carolina
and Nevada).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).
21. Title VI provides that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race,
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance." Id.
22. 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2) (2001) (emphasis added).
23. Disparate impact lawsuits against educational tests have met with mixed results.
Compare Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 980, 983 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding unlawful under Title
VI the use of so-called IQ tests to identify students to be placed in "dead end" classes for the
educable, mentally retarded on the ground that the use of the test resulted in a
disproportionately high number of minority students being placed in these classes), Cureton v.
NCAA, 37 F. Supp. 2d 687 (E.D. Pa.) (holding unlawful an NCAA rule requiring that incoming
student athletes have achieved a minimum score on the SAT [820] or ACT [68] in order to
compete in intercollegiate athletics on the ground that it results in an unjustified disparate
impact on African-Americans), rev'd on other grounds, 198 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 1999), Groves v. Ala.
State Bd. of Educ., 776 F. Supp. 1518, 1526-33 (M.D. Ala. 1991) (holding unlawful Alabama's
practice of requiring a minimum score on the American College Testing Program's ACT
examination for admission to undergraduate teacher training programs where reliance on a
particular cutoff score had a disparate impact on black students), and Sharif v. N.Y. State Educ.
Dep't, 709 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that New York's reliance upon SAT scores to
award scholarships violated Title IX's prohibition against sex discrimination because of the test's
disproportionate impact on female students), with Debra P. v. Turlington, 730 F.2d 1405 (11th
Cir. 1984) (allowing the State of Florida beginning in 1983 to deny diplomas to students who fail
to pass a state exam, irrespective of the disparate impact on black students); GI Forum, 87 F.
Supp. 2d at 667 (upholding the State of Texas's high school graduation exam from a disparate
impact challenge).
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In April 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court dealt a blow to private
disparate impact lawsuits against educational tests. In Alexander v.
Sandoval-a case that on its face had nothing to do with education
policy-the Court rejected a disparate impact challenge to a state
driver's license exam, offered only in English, holding that Title VI
does not provide a private right of action for claims of disparate
24
impact.
Nevertheless, the disparate impact regulations promulgated
under Title VI remain in force, thus allowing the federal government
to withdraw funding from institutions (like school districts) that
utilize tests or other policies that result in disproportionate racial or
ethnic outcomes. Moreover, supporters of the disparate impact
approach argue that private lawsuits based on the disparate impact
theory may still proceed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In addition,
supporters of the disparate impact approach have called upon
Congress to amend Title VI to permit explicitly private lawsuits
against federally funded institutions that maintain policies or
practices that affect some racial or ethnic groups differently than
25
others (including schools that use standardized graduation exams).
The fundamental normative question raised by these
developments is whether the disparate impact model of discrimination
is appropriately applied in the educational testing context. This
Article answers that question in the negative, arguing that doctrines
born of employment law should not be transported reflexively to other
antidiscrimination statutes. 26 In particular, I argue that it is improper
to use the disparate impact model to determine whether primary and
secondary educational assessments are discriminatory. Because
standardized tests used by primary and secondary schools can just as
easily be understood as a tool for remedying educational inequality as

24. 532 U.S. 275 (2001). Prior to Sandoval, it had been widely assumed that private parties
could bring disparate impact lawsuits for injunctive relief pursuant to Title VI's regulations. See
Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983) (White, J.) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(Brennan, Blackmun & Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
25. See, e.g., David Dante Troutt, Behind the Court's Civil Rights Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
29, 2001, at A4; Press Release, ACLU, Two Supreme Court Rulings Expand Police Powers and
Limit Civil Rights Enforcement (Apr. 24, 2001) (quoting Steven Shapiro of the ACLU as stating
that "Congress must act once again to ensure that victims of discrimination can have their day in
court"), available at http://www.aclu.org/news/2001/nO42401c.html; Telephone Interview with
Chris Anders, ACLU (May 3, 2001) ("I anticipate that there will eventually be legislative efforts
to amend [Title VI in light of Sandoval].... [T]he ACLU would certainly support such efforts.").
26. Cf. Latimore v. Citibank Fed. Sav. Bank, 151 F.3d 712, 712-14 (7th Cir. 1998) (Posner,
J.) (rejecting the application of Title VII's burden-shifting framework to claims of lending
discrimination, and noting that the "wholesale transportation" of discrimination theories and
standards of proof from one statutory context to another "display[s] insensitivity to the thinking
behind the standard").
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a tool for exacerbatinginequality, educational policymakers should be
permitted to use their discretion in deciding whether and how to
employ these tests absent intentional discrimination. In other words,
because testing regimes necessarily impose both costs and benefits on
minority test-takers and communities, I argue that they are
inappropriate targets of the disparate impact doctrine.
To be sure, concerns regarding a test's disproportionate burden
on certain communities may be socially and politically relevant. In
determining whether or how to implement a testing regime,
may reasonably consider the
politicians and policymakers
consequences that such a regime will have on various constituencies
and whether a policy that results, at least initially, in a large number
of minority students failing to receive diplomas is politically or socially
advisable. Ultimately, however, the issue should remain a policy
determination, and schools that utilize academic assessments with
consequences should not be penalized for doing so in the absence of
evidence that the tests were imposed for a discriminatory purpose.
In short, the federal government should not pursue policies to
withdraw funding from schools that employ high-stakes educational
assessments absent a showing of intentional discrimination, and the
law should not be interpreted or amended to permit private, disparate
27
impact lawsuits challenging educational assessment policies.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows: Part II
discusses the movement in favor of statewide educational assessments
and, in particular, describes the tests employed by Texas and
Massachusetts to determine whether students receive a high school
diploma. Part II also examines the test score gap between AfricanAmerican and Latino students, on the one hand, and white students,
on the other, and describes how this test score gap has fueled charges
that such tests "discriminate" against minority students. Part III of
27. Thomas A. Lambert, who has written against the use of private litigation to enforce
Title VI's disparate impact regulations, has argued that disparate impact claims may properly be
adjudicated by the federal agencies charged with enforcing Title VI. See Thomas A. Lambert, The
Case Against Private DisparateImpact Suits, 34 GA. L. REV. 1155, 1186 (2000) (arguing "in favor
of an enforcement approach that permits 'agency nullification' of the disparate impact
regulations in order to avoid overdeterrence of disparity-causing decisions"). These agencies,
Lambert argues, are well suited to weighing the costs and benefits of a given policy and will be
able to screen out claims of disparate impact that also have an overall beneficial outcome. See id.
(arguing that if enforcement of the disparate impact regulations is limited to agency action, then
"administrative agencies could perform a screening function, picking out the bad disparitycausing actions for prosecution but allowing the good ones.., to slide by"). I do not share
Lambert's faith in Washington bureaucrats. To the contrary, I argue here that, at least as far as
the education context is concerned, the costs and benefits of educational reforms should be
balanced at the local level by local educators, policymakers, and parents through the regular
democratic process.
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this Article discusses various theories of discrimination and outlines
the standards of proof that apply in a disparate impact case brought
by an employee against an employer under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Part IV considers claims of discrimination in
standardized educational testing-in particular, Title VI's prohibition
on intentional discrimination by educational institutions and the legal
framework for challenging the educational tests on grounds of
disparate impact. Part V reviews the arguments for and against the
use of disparate impact theory in the educational testing context. Part
VI concludes that, absent proof of an intent to discriminate,
educational institutions should not be punished for implementing
strict accountability programs and should not have to bear the risk of
losing federal funding or have to battle costly lawsuits simply because
they administer high-stakes tests that reveal a minority performance
gap.
II. EXIT EXAMS AND THE TEST SCORE GAP
In this section, I briefly describe the accountability and testing
movement in the United States and outline one of the major critiques
of standardized achievement tests: the argument that standardized
tests are racially and ethnically discriminatory. Part II.A sketches the
history of the American testing movement, while Part II.B explains
the argument in favor of requiring students to pass an exam as a
condition of promotion or graduation. Part II.C describes the current
testing landscape and discusses the gap between the scores of the
average black or Hispanic student and the average white student,
using the Texas and Massachusetts systems as illustrations of the
national phenomenon. Part II.D discusses the level of public support
for high-stakes graduation tests. Finally, Part II.E describes how the
test score gap has fueled charges that state accountability
programs-and high school graduation exams in particular-are
"culturally biased" and "discriminatory."
A. Background
For more than a century, 28 standardized tests have been used
as an objective measurement of academic performance. The tests that
28. The State of New York first offered a high school Regents Exam in 1879 as a standard
for colleges to use in evaluating high school graduates. Raymond Hernandez, Pataki Defends
Tougher Graduation Tests, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1999, at B5. Students bound for college took
college prepatory exams in various subjects, and the state awarded Regents Diplomas to those
who passed eight or more such tests. Somni Sengupta, Tough New Regents Exams Are Unveiled
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are the focus of this Article-those tests administered in primary and
secondary schools for the purpose of making promotion and
graduation decisions-are commonly referred to as "achievement
tests" or "academic assessments." Unlike so-called "aptitude" tests
(such as most employment tests) that seek to predict an individual's
future performance or chance of success in a particular setting, 29
achievement tests are intended to measure what test-takers have
learned after completing a particular course of study. 0
In the 1970s, education reformers popularized the idea of using
standardized achievement tests to make promotion and graduation
decisions. 31 Then, as now, the idea behind requiring all students to
in New York, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1998, at B5. In the 1970s, New York began allowing students
to take basic competency exams in order to earn local high school diplomas. James Dao, Passing
of Regents' Exams to Be Required for Diploma, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1996, at Al. Currently, all
students must take the Regents Exam in order to earn a diploma. Id. Students who do not pass
the Regents Exam can earn an equivalency diploma by passing a less stringent test of basic
skills. Id.
29. The SAT is an example of an academic aptitude test. See generally NICHOLAS LEMANN,
THE BIG TEST: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN MERITOCRACY (1999) (describing the
history and development of the SAT).
30. See HOWARD B. LYMAN, TEST SCORES AND WHAT THEY MEAN, 22-23, 150-51 (1998).
Standardized tests can be scored in two basic ways: by reference to norms or by reference to some
outside criterion. CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, ACTION PAPER: THE NEW GENERATION OF
STANDARDIZED TESTING (2000), at http://edreform.com/pubs/testing.htm. Norm-referenced tests
measure the relative performance of a particular school or child. Id. These tests are the most
common standardized tests and include the Iowa Test of Basic Skills ("ITBS"), the SAT, the
California Test of Basic Skills ("CTBS"), the California Achievement Test ("CAT"'), and the Terra
Nova. Id. Because norm-referenced tests are designed for the purpose of making relative
comparisons, they do not directly provide information about a test-taker's actual mastery of the
material tested. Id. For example, a score in the 90th percentile on a norm-referenced test tells us
only that the student performed better than ninety percent of those tested, not that the child has
actually mastered the material tested. Id.
Criterion-referenced tests, by contrast, are those tests which are linked to particular
standards. Id. These tests are designed to measure whether (and how well) the test-taker has
mastered a particular skill or area of knowledge. Id. Examples of criterion-referenced exams
include state bar examinations, medical licensing exams, airline pilot tests, and high school exit
exams. Id. The publishers of these types of tests must identify successful and unsuccessful levels
of performance and then establish a cutoff score that defines a passing grade. Id.
31. NAT'L GOVERNORS ASS'N, HIGH SCHOOL EXIT EXAMS: SETTING HIGH EXPECTATIONS 1
(1998); RAVITCH, supra note 2, at 47-50; Rachel F. Moran, Sorting and Reforming: High-stakes
Testing in the Public Schools, 34 AKRON L. REV. 107, 111 (2000).
There has been a debate in recent years among education reformers as to whether national
or statewide standards and tests are best. In 1991, the U.S. Department of Education developed
voluntary national reading and math tests to be administered in the fourth, eighth, and twelfth
grades. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Cooper, Exams Opposed over Potential Harm to Minorities, WASH.
POST, June 12, 1991, at A21. Some political conservatives objected to the proposal on the ground
that national tests would erode local control over schools. RAVITCH, supra note 2, at xvi-xvii
(describing conservative claims that national standards and tests represented "a dangerous step
toward federal control of education"); Cooper, supra. Political liberals, meanwhile, also opposed
the plan based on suspicions that such tests would reveal disparate racial and ethnic results. See
Cooper, supra; see also RAVITCH, supra note 2,- at 19 (describing liberals' fears that meaningful
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pass a uniform exam was to: (1) ensure that all students receive a firm
foundation in the basics (particularly reading, writing, and
mathematics); (2) raise student achievement levels; and (3) permit the
public to hold students, teachers, and schools accountable for their
32
performance.
The movement in favor of exams with consequences--or "highstakes tests" as they have come to be called33--enjoyed modest success
in the early 1970s. 34 But the testing movement soon encountered

resistance from those who argued such testing would unfairly penalize
students who were educated under de jure segregation or who were
otherwise victims of intentional discrimination. 35 Such concerns
standards would cause poor and minority children to fail or drop out of school). In 1998, a
coalition of liberal and conservative groups convinced the House of Representatives to pass a bill
prohibiting the U.S. Department of Education from using appropriations to develop national
standards tests. For the Record, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 1998, at M10 (providing roll call of vote on
bill passed in House of Representatives concerning national testing), 1998 WL 2467206.
Currently, the only federal achievement test is the National Assessment of Educational
Progress ("NAEP"), which is used exclusively to generate research data and is not tied to any
consequences. Moran, supra note 31, at 112. Throughout the 1990s, the campaign for
standardized testing with consequences focused on the states. Id. at 113; see also Thomas B.
Fordham Foundation, supra note 10 (noting that, although standards can be set at the local,
state, or national level, in the late 1990s and the early part of the twety-first century, the
standards movement has been spearheaded at the state level).
On January 8, 2002, President George W. Bush signed into law the "No Child Left Behind
Act of 2001" which requires all states to set high standards of achievement and create a system
of accountability to measure results. The law requires that, at a minimum, states test every child
in grades three through eight in reading and math. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L.
No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002).
32. See CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, supra note 30; Achieve, Inc., supra note 12, at 5; Thomas
B. Fordham Foundation, supra note 10.
33. As defined by Professor Perry A. Zirkel, "high-stakes tests" are standardized
examinations that have "dramatic and direct [educational] consequences" for the test-taker.
Perry A. Zirkel, Tabular Analysis of the Case Law Concerning High Stakes Testing, 143 EDUC.
REP. 697 (2000); see also GREGORY J. CIZEK, FILLING IN THE BLANKS: PUTTING STANDARDIZED
TESTS TO THE TEST 10 (1998) (describing the difference between high-stakes tests and low-stakes
tests), available at http://www.edexcellence.net/library/cizek.pdf; NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
supra note 15, at 51 n.1 (defining "high-stakes tests" as those which can lead to adverse
consequences for the individuals taking the exams).
34. See Jay P. Heubert, High-Stakes Testing: Opportunities and Risks for Students of Color,
English-Language Learners, and Students with Disabilities, in THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE:
MOVING THE YOUTH AGENDA FORWARD (M. Pines ed.) (forthcoming, n.d.) (noting that state
minimum
competency
tests gained popularity during
the
1970s), available at
http://www.cast.org/ncac/index.cfm?i=920 (last visited Apr. 5, 2001). Florida, for example,
instituted a graduation exam requirement during the 1977-1978 school year. See NAT'L
GOVERNORS ASS'N, supra note 31, at 1.
35. See, e.g., Anderson v. Banks, 520 F. Supp. 472, 500 (S.D. Ga. 1981) (holding that a
school diploma policy must be evaluated in light of the past de jure segregation in the school
district and prohibiting the imposition of the diploma sanction on those who spent their primary
years in the dual system), rev'd in part on reh'g, 540 F. Supp. 761 (S.D. Ga. 1982), appeal
dismissed sub nom. Johnson v. Sikes, 730 F.2d 644 (11th Cir. 1984); Debra P. v. Turlington, 474
F. Supp. 244, 269 (M.D. Fla. 1979) (enjoining Florida's testing regime for four years in order to
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stalled initial efforts to establish statewide standardized exams with
36
high-stakes consequences.
During the 1980s, however, many state policymakers became
concerned that large increases in educational spending had rendered
only modest returns.3 7 Such concerns were fueled in part by a series of
reports published in the early 1980s detailing the decline in American
education in general and the gap between white and minority
students in particular. In the most widely heralded report, A Nation at
Risk, the President's National Commission on Excellence in Education
warned that the "educational foundations of our society [are] ...being
eroded by a rising tide of mediocrity that threatens our very future as
a Nation and a people. ' 38 In support of this conclusion, the
Commission pointed to the increase in the number of functional
illiterates, particularly in minority communities; 39 a decline in SAT
and other achievement test scores among all racial groups; and a
significant increase in the demand for remedial education at the
college level. 40 In response to these problems, the Commission
recommended, among other things, implementation of performance
standards and assessments for students and teachers at all levels of
41
primary and secondary school.
"purge the taint of past segregation"), affd in part, vacated and remanded in part, 644 F.2d 397
(5th Cir. 1981); see generally Moran, supra note 31, at 111 (explaining that in the 1970s "[tihe
United States had only recently embarked on efforts to desegregate the schools and to undo past
inequities in education based on race" and that "[a]s a result, denying a diploma to students who
could not pass an exit examination seemed to punish the victims of past discrimination for
having attended inferior schools").
36. Moran, supra note 31, at 111; see also NAT'L GOVERNORS ASS'N, supra note 31, at 1
(noting that throughout the 1970s, requirements for graduation continued to be controlled by
local school districts).
37. The failure of increased spending to improve academic outcomes has been documented
by noted education scholar Chester Finn. See CHESTER E. FINN, JR., WE MUST TAKE CHARGE:
OUR SCHOOLS AND OUR FUTURE 2 (1991) (noting that in 1989 America spent 29 percent more
real dollars per pupil in the public schools than it did in 1980, yet academic test scores remained
level and graduation rates rose only slightly); see also THERNSTROM & THERNSTROM, supra note
7 (arguing that the problem of poor academic achievement cannot be explained as a problem of
underfunding).
38. A NATION AT RISK, supra note 2, at 1.
39. The Commission found that approximately thirteen percent of all seventeen-year-olds
were functionally illiterate by the simplest tests of everyday reading, writing, and
comprehension and that functional illiteracy among minority youth was as high as forty percent.
Id. at 8.
40. Id. at 8-9.
41.
Standardized tests of achievement (not to be confused with aptitude tests) should be
administered at major transition points from one level of schooling to another and
particularly from high school to college or work. The purposes of these tests would be
to: (a) certify the student's credentials; (b) identify the need for remedial intervention;
and (c) identify the opportunity for advanced or accelerated work. The tests should be
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The findings and recommendations of A Nation at Risk
received widespread publicity and generated a national discussion
about education reform. According to Diane Ravitch, the noted
historian of American education, A Nation at Risk gave birth to
hundreds of state-level task forces charged with recommending new
ways to raise academic standards, and breathed new life into efforts to
42
enact educational accountability regimes.
B. Purposes of High-Stakes Assessments
Proponents of accountability through high-stakes tests argue
that meaningful education reform can only be achieved through a
43
tripartite strategy of standards, assessments, and consequences.
According to this school of thought, academic standards should be
established to define what basic material students should know at
various points in their educational careers. 44 Students should then be
tested on the material outlined in the standards so that educators,
policymakers, and the public at large may assess whether students
and schools are meeting the standards. Finally a system of rewards
and punishments-the key aspect of any accountability programmust be established in order to provide the proper incentives for
schools and students to commit to teaching and learning the
45
material.
Jay Heubert and Robert Hauser have summarized the three
components of standards-based reform:
[S]tandards-based reform[s] ... are premised on the idea of setting clear, high standards
for what children are supposed to learn and then holding students-and often educators
and schools-to those standards. The logic seems clear: Unless we test students'
knowledge, how will we know if they have met the standards? And the idea of
accountability, which is also central to this theory of school reform, requires that the

administered as part of a nationwide (but not Federal) system of State and local
standardized tests. This system should include other diagnostic procedures that assist
teachers and students to evaluate student progress.
Id. at 28
42. RAVITCH, supra note 2, at 53 (citing A Nation Responds); see also William J. Johnson,
EDUCATION ON TRIAL: STRATEGIES FOR THE FUTURE 4 (William J. Johnson ed., 1985) (noting that
one year after publication of A Nation at Risk no less than 275 task forces had been formed to
study the problem of low academic achievement and to present specific proposals for local
reform).
43. Thomas B. Fordham Foundation, supra note 10.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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test results have direct and immediate consequences: a student who does not meet the
standard should not be promoted, or awarded a high school diploma. 46

Reformers often argue that requiring all students to master the
fundamentals in core subjects will help to equalize educational
outcomes and ensure that all of a state's graduates are competent in
basic subjects. 47 Only by setting uniform standards, reformers argue,
can we ensure that students from diverse racial and socioeconomic
backgrounds receive a common education and are afforded equal
48
educational opportunities.
Accountability advocates contend that the second component of
reform--standardized
tests--provides
an important tool for
policymakers and the public to evaluate and compare the performance
of various students, schools, and districts over time. 49 Standardized
tests provide information to teachers and students regarding the state
of academic achievement, draw attention to struggling schools and
students in need of help, and identify educational programs and
pedagogical methods that work. 50 Such tests also help to determine
how scarce resources should be spent and can spur targeted spending
51
increases.
Finally, reformers argue that, in order to be effective, academic
assessments must be accompanied by both a carrot and a stick. By
attaching consequences to test scores--rewards for improvement,
remedial assistance for struggling schools and students, and penalties
for repeated failure--high-stakes exams motivate teaching and
learning. The theory behind this approach is that if students and/or
teachers are penalized for repeated failure, school districts and
teachers will have a greater incentive to teach the material outlined in
46. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 15, at 13. Although they acknowledge the "logic"
of the pro-testing argument, Heubert and Hauser nevertheless oppose the use of standardized
tests as the sole basis for making high-stakes decisions. Id.
47. Achieve, Inc., supra note 12, at 5.
48. See, e.g., RAVITCH, supra note 2, at xxiii, 26 ("Standards establish the principle that all
students should encounter the same educational opportunities and the same performance
expectations, regardless of who their parents are or what neighborhood they live in."); Achieve,
Inc., supra note 12, at 5.
49. CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, supra note 30 ("Over time, trends in test scores reveal how
much progress schools have made in their efforts to maintain high scores or raise inadequate
scores."); Elliot W. Eisner, The Uses and Limits of Performance Assessment, PHI DELTA KAPPA
ONLINE, at http://www.pdkintl.org/kappan/keis9905 (last visited Jan. 10, 2001) ("One of the
motivations behind the standards movement is the desire to hold schools accountable, and that
accountability is facilitated if schools, classrooms, and students can be compared.").
50. CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, supra note 30.
51. Id.; Alexakis, supra note 17, at 29 (noting that accountability measures, including highstakes testing, can increase political support for targeted spending increases, much in the same
way that adding a work requirement to welfare payments increased political support for those
benefits).
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state standards and students will have a stronger incentive to learn
it.52 By shining a spotlight on schools that lag behind, threatening
state receivership or potential closure for those that fail to improve,
and rewarding schools that demonstrate results, states can ensure
that schools no longer ignore or make excuses for deficient academic
53
performance, particularly in poor and minority communities.
C. Public Opinion
High educational standards and high-stakes exams enjoy
consistent and widespread public support.5 4 Indeed, for several
decades, Gallup polls have indicated public support of over seventy
percent for standardized tests as determinants of promotion or
graduation.5 5 Gallup's findings are not an aberration. A 1999 survey
sponsored by National Public Radio and the Kennedy School of
Government found that ninety-three percent of those polled favored or
strongly favored "making students meet adequate academic standards
to be promoted or graduated." 56 Similarly, in 1994, Public Agenda
found that eighty-eight percent of those polled thought that students
should not be allowed to receive a high school diploma unless they had
demonstrated the ability to read and write English well, while eightytwo percent endorsed "very clear guidelines on what students should
57
learn."
Parents, in particular, have consistently expressed the view
that testing promotes accountability and leads to improvement in the

52. RAVITCH, supra note 2, at xiv (citing JEAN JOHNSON & STEVE FARKAS, GETTING BY:
WHAT AMERICAN TEENAGERS REALLY THINK ABOUT THEIR SCHOOLS 35 (1997)) (noting that, in
polls, students state "unequivocally that they would work harder if more were expected of
them"); see also Heubert, supra note 34 (summarizing the argument that tests will improve
incentives).
53. Achieve, Inc., supra note 12, at 4 (arguing that without tests, inequities between
between rich and poor will likely persist beneath the radar); Alexakis, supra note 17, at 29.
54. CIZEK, supra note 33, at 1 ("Results of opinion surveys from 30 years ago and those
conducted today reveal broad and durable support for even more achievement testing. Contrary
to assertions that tests are foisted upon the public by self-serving politicians, the evidence is
clear that consumers of U.S. education favor testing.").
55. Gallup Organization, Education: A Vital Issue in Election 2000, (Oct. 2, 2000), at
http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases (last visited Mar. 1, 2001).
56. Public Agenda Online, Education: Major Proposals, at http://www.publicagenda.org/issues/major-proposals-detail2.cfm?issue-type=education&proposal-graphic=mp3.gif
(last visited Feb. 3, 2002).
57. See RAVITCH, supra note 2, at 171 (citing a 1994 Public Agenda survey); see also Diane
Ravitch, Editorial, Who Says Parents Oppose Standards-BasedReform?, RECORD, Feb. 19, 2001,
at L03 (noting that teachers endorse standards-based reforms by a margin of seventy-three to
nineteen percent and that support for standards-based reform is strongest among teachers in
urban schools and among black and Hispanic teachers), 2001 WL 5238721.
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educational system. 58 And surveys indicate that support for highstakes exams transcends race and class. In a 2000 survey conducted
by the Business Roundtable, two-thirds of African-American parents
and two-thirds of white parents stated that they favored graduation
exams; support for such exams was even higher among Hispanic
parents, eighty-two percent of whom favored such tests. 59
D. The Education Reform Landscape and the Test Score Gap
Currently, most states administer some form of standardized
educational test on a regular basis, 60 and twenty-eight states either
require students to pass a graduation exam before receiving a diploma
61
or are in the process of instituting such a program.
Not surprisingly, accountability regimes and testing practices
vary widely from state to state. Some states, such as Florida, adopted
exam requirements in the 1970s. Other states, like Alaska, have

58.

See June Kronholz, State High School GraduationTests Favored by Most Parents, Says

Poll, WALL ST. J. INTERACTIVE ED., Sept. 13, 2000 (noting that "[m]ost parents think their
children should have to pass statewide tests in order to graduate" and that eighty percent of the
public supports the use of high-stakes tests in which students are given "several" attempts to
pass
such
exams),
at
http://interactive.-www.wsj.com/archive/retrieve.cgi?id=SB968804416727439474.djm; see also CIZEK, supra note 33, at 1 (discussing the consistent public support
for high-stakes tests); PUB. AGENDA, SURVEY FINDS LITTLE SIGN OF BACKLASH AGAINST
ACADEMIC STANDARDS OR STANDARDIZED TESTS (2000) (noting that eighty-two percent of parents
say their school district's effort toward higher academic standards is "careful and reasonable"), at
http://www.publicagenda.org/aboutpa/pdf/standards-backlash.pdf.

59. Kronholz, supra note 58; see also Most Latinos Back TAAS Exit Exams Despite Bias
Fears, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, July 24, 2000, at 11. Consistent with these survey results
is evidence from some states that the school districts which are most supportive of high-stakes
graduation exams are those poorer districts which are most likely to have high short-term failure
rates. Alexakis, supra note 51, at 29 (reporting that it is the primarily white, affluent
Massachusetts suburbs that have complained about the Massachusetts graduation test while
blue collar, racially mixed communities tend to support the exam); Rick Klein, MCAS Criticism

Rising in Suburbs Contrast with View from UrbanAreas, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 3, 2000, at Al.
60.

Every state except Iowa has established academic standards in at least some subjects.

Jodi Wilgoren, State School Chiefs Fret over U.S. Plan to Require Testing, N.Y. TIMES, July 17,
2001, at Al. Forty-eight states (all but Iowa and Nebraska) have statewide testing programs,
most of which are aligned with the academic standards. Achieve, Inc., supra note 12, at 3;
Thernstrom, supra note 14; Wilgoren, supra.
61. See COUNCIL OF CHIEF STATE SCH. OFFICERS, KEY STATE EDUCATION POLICIES ON K-12
EDUCATION: 2000, at 16 (2000) (listing twenty-eight states that either currently require
graduating students to pass an exit exam or that are in the process of developing or instituting

exit exams); Margaret E. Goertz & Marc C. Duffy, Assessment and Accountability Across the Fifty
States, CPRE POLICY BRIEFS, May 2001, at 5, available at http://www.cpre.org/publications/rb33.pdf ("[B]y 2008, students in 28 states will have to pass a state examination to
graduate"); Scott S. Greenberger, Standardized Tests Pose Questions for States, BOSTON GLOBE,
Oct. 8, 2000, at Bi (reporting that, as of October 2000, twenty-four states required students to
pass graduation exams as a condition for receiving a diploma).
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62
passed statewide accountability and testing programs only recently.
While most state graduation exams are tests of basic skills, designed
to ensure that all graduates have mastered certain core
competencies, 63 some state exams seek to raise the bar by testing
64
students on their mastery of more rigorous academic content.
Despite such differences, however, state accountability and
assessment policies share some important characteristics. To begin
with, most accountability regimes are, in effect, contractual
arrangements between states and localities whereby the state agrees
to: (1) provide increased financial resources and technical assistance;
(2) relax the state regulatory burdens; and (3) increase local autonomy
and flexibility. In exchange for these benefits, localities essentially
agree to allow the state to conduct regular testing of all students and
regular evaluations (based on test scores and other factors) of each
school and/or district.6 5 The results of these assessments are made
available to the public and are used by the state to reward schools or
districts that have improved their performance, and to assist students
and schools that are struggling by providing remedial education for
the students 66 and targeted financial assistance, peer reviews, and
67
school improvement planning for the schools.

62. Florida implemented its first high school exit exam during the 1977-1978 school year.
Alaska's testing regime took effect in 2000. NAT'L GOVERNORS ASS'N, supra note 31, at 1.
63. Id. at 3 (noting that most existing high school graduation tests measure basic
competency rather than mastery of more rigorous standards); CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, supra
note 30 ("While it's important to keep in mind that the quality and rigor of each test can vary
from state to state, the evidence suggests that these tests are not excessively difficult and
primarily measure the acquisition of basic skills and knowledge appropriate to each grade
level.").
64. Massachusetts, for example, employs a test, which seeks to measure mastery of rigorous
academic subjects as well as core competencies. See REACHING HIGHER, (Mass. Insight Educ.,
Boston, Mass.), Spring 2001, at http://www.massinsight.com/meri/pdf-files/Reaching%20Higher%202001.PDF. Some testing advocates argue that the implementation of "tests worth teaching
to" will raise standards and improve the quality of instruction. See, e.g., Anemona Hartocollis,
New Reading Test Was Worth All the Anxiety, Experts Say, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1999, at B1
(explaining the view of some experts that, by raising the bar for what children should know, New
York's reading test is a test worth teaching to); William C. Symonds, How to Fix America's
Schools, BUS. WK., Mar. 19, 2001, at 67 (explaining that, while not all tests are created equal,
the use of sophisticated tests that require students to use complex problem-solving skills can
actually improve teaching); see also RAVITCH, supra note 2, at 25-26 (arguing that national
standards improve student achievement by clearly delineating what should be taught and what
must be learned to succeed).
65. See Susan H. Fuhrman, The New Accountability, CRPE POLICY BRIEFS, Jan. 1999, at 12, available at http://www.cpre.org/Publications/rb27.pdf (last visited June 21, 2001).
66. See NAT'L GOVERNORS ASS'N, supra note 31, at 4. Tutoring and extended learning time
are the most common forms of remediation. Id.
67. See id.; Fuhrman, supra note 65, at 2, 5.
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Unlike the older generation of standardized tests, most of the
newer tests do not rely exclusively on multiple-choice questions.
Instead, they combine a variety of formats, including short-answer
questions and essays. 68 Because the goal of the tests is to measure and
improve student performance, all of the states that administer highstakes exit exams allow students multiple opportunities to master the
69
material and pass the exams.
In recent years, the educational accountability systems in place
in Massachusetts and Texas have received much public attention and
scrutiny. Those exams-and the racial and ethnic academic gap that
they reveal-are emblematic of statewide testing regimes throughout
the country and provide a window into state testing policies for
purposes of analysis.
1. Texas
The Texas accountability system 70 was enacted in response to a
series of court challenges to the constitutionality of the financing of
the Texas educational system. 71 Under this accountability system, the
state establishes academic standards that all students and schools are
required to meet. In order to assess performance on state educational
standards, Texas tests all students annually in grades three through
eight. 72 Texas law requires that all public school students, in addition
to completing the required high school curriculum, pass an exit-level
examination of academic skills in order to receive a high school
73
diploma.
The current exit-level Texas Assessment of Academic Skills
("TAAS") assesses tenth grade students in reading, writing, and
68. See Achieve, Inc., supra note 12, at 4.
69. NAT'L GOVERNORS ASS'N, supra note 30, at 2. In Massachusetts, for example, students
are allowed to retake the exit-level exam five times during the eleventh and twelfth grades. See
Scott S. Greenberger, MCAS Retest Plan Approved, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 24, 2001, at B4;
REACHING HIGHER, supra note 64. Some states even allow students to retake the exam after
their scheduled graduation date. Georgia, for example, grants certificates of performance to those
students who have met all of the requirements for graduation other than passing the exam.
These students have unlimited opportunities to take the exam, and, upon passage, are awarded
regular diplomas. See NAT'L GOVERNORS ASS'N, at 64.
70. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 39.021-39.185 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
71. In 1989, the Texas Supreme Court held that the state's public financing system violated
the Texas Constitution. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989).
72. In 2003, Texas will expand its testing program to include all students in grades three
through eleven. See More Difficult TAKS to Replace TASS in '03, HOUSTON CHRON., June 20,
2001, at 22 [hereinafter More Difficult TAKS], 2001 WL 23608957.
73. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 39.025 (2000); 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 101.7 (Testing
Requirements for Graduation), available at http://lamb.sos.state.tx.us/tac/index.html (last visited
May 13, 2002).
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mathematics. 74 During the 2002-2003 school year Texas will replace
the TAAS exam with the Texas Assessment of Knowledge and Skills
("TAKS") and will begin requiring students in the eleventh grade to
pass exit-level tests in English/language arts, mathematics, social
75
studies, and science in order to graduate.
Texas law requires that local school districts provide failing
students with remedial help in the specific subject area where the
student encountered difficulty. 76 Under the TAAS system, students
who do not pass the exit-level exam on the first try are provided seven
additional opportunities to pass the exam before the end of their
senior year. 77 Under the new TAKS system, a student who does not
pass the exit-level exam on the first administration of the test may
continue to take the test until he passes. Even those who have been
denied diplomas can continue to take the exam and will receive a
78
diploma upon passing.
In addition to measuring the performance of individual
students, Texas evaluates institutional performance through a variety
of measures, including TAAS scores and dropout rates, as well as
attendance rates, rates of improvement in TAAS sores compared to
other like institutions, and SAT and ACT participation levels and
results. 79 A subset of this information is used to rate individual
districts and schools as "Exemplary," "Recognized," "Academically
Acceptable," and "Academically Unacceptable" and to reward schools
and districts that perform well80 and to provide assistance (up to and
including receivership) to consistently underperforming schools.8 1
74. Beginning in 2003, Texas will replace the TAAS with the Texas Assessment of
Knowledge and Skills ("TAKS"). The TAKS exam reflects a change in Texas's curriculum
standards and will cover more subjects than the current exam. See More Difficult TAKS, supra
note 72.
75. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 39.025.
76. See 19 TEX. ADMIN CODE § 101.11 (Remediation), available at http://lamb.sos.state.tx.us/tac/index.html (last visited May 13, 2002); see also GI Forum v. Tex. Educ. Agency, 87 F.
Supp. 2d 667, 673 (W.D. Tex. 2000).
77. GIForum, 87 F. Supp.2d at 673.
78.

TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 39.025.

79. See
2001
TEXAS
ACCOUNTABILITY
MANUAL,
tx.us/perfreport/account/200lmanual (visited June 13, 2001).

at

http://www.teas.state.-

80. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §39.072 (Vernon Supp. 2002); 2001 TEXAS ACCOUNTABILITY

MANUAL, supra note 79, § III. In 2001, for example, a campus was rated "Exemplary" if at least
90% of students overall and 90% of students in each of several demographic subgroups (black,
Hispanic, white, and economically disadvantaged) meeting minimum size requirements passed
the state's reading, writing, and mathematics exams and if the dropout rate was 1% or less for
students overall and within each group. Id.
81. Schools that perform poorly receive visits from a peer review team in the following
school year and must develop and implement an improvement plan to address areas of poor
performance. If the district or campus receives the lowest rating over two or more consecutive
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In addition, Texas keeps records on how various demographic
groups perform on the exam. If one subgroup fails to meet minimum
performance standards, a school or district will receive a low
accountability rating.8 2 This approach helps schools and districts
appreciate the academic needs of various demographic subgroups so
that they can work toward closing the academic achievement gap.
Such record keeping also allows the state to allocate resources where
they are most needed in a way that will help eliminate the gap.8 3
The passing score for TAAS was originally set at sixty percent
and was later raised to seventy percent.8 4 'In deciding upon a passing
score, the Texas Education Agency ("TEA") was aware of projections
that minority students would not fare as well on the exam as their
peers.86 Nevertheless, the TEA determined that the test should be
imposed as an objective measurement of mastery in order to eliminate
the inconsistent and subjective teacher evaluations of students, which
members of the TEA believed harmed minority students by allowing
inflated grades to mask gaps in learning.8 6
As predicted, between the first administration of TAAS in 1994
and the spring 2001 administration of the test, white students
consistently outperformed black and Latino students on all portions of
the exam.8 7 For example, on the 2001 TAAS, 89% of white students
passed all portions of the exit-level exams administered that year, as
compared to 68% of African-American students and 70% of Latino
students.88 This gap was evident not only in overall pass rates on the
2001 exit exam, but also in each of the three core subject
years, the level of state intervention increases. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 39.131 (Vernon
Supp. 2002); 2001 TEXAS ACCOUNTABILITY MANUAL, supra note 79, § VIII.
82. See GIForum, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 674.
83. Achieve, Inc., supra note 12, at 5.
84. See GIForum, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 673.
85. Id. ("When it implemented the TAAS test, the TEA projected that, with a 70-percent cut
score, at least 73 percent of African Americans and 67 percent of Hispanics would fail the math
portion of the test; at least 55 percent of African Americans and 54 percent of Hispanics would
fail the reading section; and at least 62 percent of African Americans and 45 percent of Hispanics
would fail the writing section. The predictions for white students were 50 percent, 29 percent,
and 36 percent, respectively.").
86. Id.
87. Id. at 675 ("(I]n every administration of the TAAS test since October 1990, Hispanic and
African American students have performed significantly worse on all three sections of the exit
exam than majority students."); see also TEX. EDUC. Agency, STUDENT PERFORMANCE REPORT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 16-17 (2000) (reporting pass rates by subject and race), available at
http://www.tea.state.tx.us/student.-assessmentlresearchers.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2002).
88. STUDENT ASSESSMENT Div., TEX. EDUC. AGENCY, TEXAS ASSESSMENT OF ACADEMIC
SKILLS,
PERCENT MEETING MINIMUM
EXPECTATIONS
SPRING 1994-SPRING
2001,
at

http://www.tea.state.tx.us/student.assessment/reporting/results/swresults/spring/glOall.html
(last visited Aug. 5, 2001).
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areas-reading, writing, and mathematics. Thus, 96% of white
students passed the reading portion of the 2001 exam, as compared to
83% of African-American students and 83% of Latino students.
Ninety-four percent of white students passed the 2001 writing exam,
as compared to 85% of African-American students and 83% of Latino
students. Pass rates on the 2001 mathematics portion of the exam also
reflected the racial achievement gap: 94% of white students passed the
mathematics exit exam, as compared to 79% of black students and
83% of Hispanic students.8 9 Cumulative pass rates also display a
similar pattern. The 1998 data show cumulative failure rates of 17.6%
for black students and 17.4% for Latino students, as compared to a
6.7% cumulative failure rate for white students. 90
But there is some good news as well. Although AfricanAmerican and Hispanic students in Texas still lag behind their white
peers, they are beginning to close the achievement gap. 91 In the eight
administrations of the exit-level TAAS between 1994 and 2001, the
pass rate for black students rose by 40%; during the same time period,
the pass rate for Latinos rose by 36%.92 The black-white gap on the
test shrunk from 36 percentage points on a single administration of
the test in 1994 to 21 percentage points on a single test administration
in 2001; the gap between Hispanic students and white students also
shrunk from 36 percentage points in 1994 to 19 percentage points in
2001.93 Thus, while those black and Latino students who are unable
(after seven attempts) to pass the test and obtain a diploma are
burdened by the Texas accountability regime, other black and Latino
students are clearly aided by the system and the resulting increase in
levels of academic success.
2. Massachusetts
In 1993, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held in
McDuffy v. Secretary of Executive Office of Education94 that the
89. Id.
90. Heubert, supra note 34.
91. GI Forum, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 675 (observing that "minority students [in Texas] have
continued to narrow the passing rate gap at a rapid rate" and that "these gains are reflected not
only on TAAS scores, but also on "other measures of academic progress, such as the National
Assessment of Educational Progress").
92. STUDENT ASSESSMENT DIV., supra note 88; see also TEX. EDUC. AGENCY, supra note 87
(noting that percentage of African-American students passing the exit-level TAAS exam went
from 28% in 1994 to 67% in 2000, and that the percentage of Latino students passing the exitlevel TAAS increased from 34% in 1994 to 70% in 2000).
93. STUDENT ASESSMENT DIV., supra note 88.
94. In McDuffy, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that "the Commonwealth
has a duty to provide an education for all its children" and that by allowing poorer school
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Commonwealth's educational financing system violated the education
provisions of the Massachusetts Constitution. 95 The decision served as
the catalyst for passage by the state legislature of the Massachusetts
96
Education Reform Act of 1993 (the "Massachusetts Reform Act"),
which not only increased the amount of money Massachusetts spent
on education, but also required the Commonwealth to conduct
statewide assessments of student competency in relation to standards
set by the Massachusetts Board of Education. 97 In addition, the
Massachusetts Reform Act made satisfactory performance on the state
98
assessment a condition of receiving a high school diploma.
The Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System
("MCAS"), the statewide testing program adopted by the
Massachusetts Board of Education pursuant to the Massachusetts
Reform Act, is one of the country's most ambitious exams and is
aligned with rigorous state academic standards. 99 The MCAS tests
Massachusetts students in various grades in four content
areas-English/language arts, mathematics, science and technology,
and history and social science-with a high school exit exam
administered in the tenth grade. 10 0 Students who take the MCAS
receive a scaled numeric score and a designation (based on the
numeric score) as "Advanced" (260-280), "Proficient" (240-259), or

districts to operate with significantly less money than middle class school districts, the
Commonwealth violated Section 2 in Chapter 5 of Part II of the Massachusetts Constitution. 615
N.E.2d 516, 548, 553-54 (Mass. 1993).
95. Id. at 553-54. The Massachusetts Constitution provides, "it shall be the duty of the
legislatures and magistrates in all future periods of this Commonwealth, to cherish the...
public schools and grammar schools in the towns ... " MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 5, § 2.
96. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 69, §§ 1-36 (West 1996).
97. Under the Massachusetts Reform Act, the Board of Education is empowered to establish
"curriculum frameworks"-that is, "academic standards for the core subjects of mathematics,
science and technology, history and social science, English, foreign languages and the arts ....
[for] grades kindergarten through twelve." MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 69, §§ 1D, 1E. These
frameworks "set forth the skills, competencies and knowledge expected to be possessed by all
students at the conclusion of individual grades or clusters of grades" and are designed "to set
high expectations of student performance and to provide clear and specific examples that embody
and reflect these high expectations." Id.
98. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 69, § 1D.
99. Heubert, supra note 34; REACHING HIGHER, supra note 64.
100. Massachusetts must annually test students in the fourth, eighth, and tenth grades. In
2001, Massachusetts added tests for third, fifth, sixth, and seventh grades. MASS. DEP'T OF
EDUC.,
OVERVIEW
OF THE MCAS
2001 TESTS
19 (2001),
at http://www.doe.mass.edu/mcas/2001/overview/complete.pdf (last visited May 13, 2002); Massachusetts
Department of Education, Overview of the MCAS: Frequently Asked Questions, at
http://www.doe.mass.edu/mcas/over-view-jag.html#jag2 (last visited Apr. 6, 2002).
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"Needs Improvement" (220-239). Prior to the tenth grade, students
who score below 220 receive an "Academic Warning."' 01
Beginning with the class of 2003, students in Massachusetts
are required to pass both the tenth grade English/language arts
section and the tenth grade mathematics portion of the test in order to
receive a high school diploma. 10 2 For the class of 2003, the Board has
set the passing score at 220 (the lowest score in the "Needs
Improvement" category) for each portion of the test. The Board
intends to raise the threshold scaled score required for passage of the
103
exit exams in future years.
Students who fail either the English or the mathematics
portion of the exit-level MCAS are provided remedial assistance 10 4 and
may retake the exam four additional times before their scheduled
graduation date. 0 5 Unlike the initial tenth "grade exit exam, which
classifies students by skill level, the MCAS retests are pass/fail exams
that focus only on the most essential skills and do not include the
toughest examination
questions. 10 6 In January
2002,
the
Massachusetts Board of Education instituted an appeals process to
allow-in compelling cases--students with good grades in school, but
failing MCAS scores, to prove through other means that they have

101. Linda Bock, Public Opinion Still Mixed over MCAS, WORCESTER TELEGRAM & GAZETTE,
Nov. 27, 1999, at A2; Greenberger, supra note 61.
102. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 69, § 1D ("Satisfaction of the requirements of the
competency determination shall be a condition for high school graduation."); MASS. BD. OF
EDUC., supra note 100, at 19. In the spring of 2001, all Massachusetts tenth graders (who are
scheduled to graduate in 2003) took the exit-level MCAS for the first time. Scott S. Greenberger,
For First Time, Students Take MCAS Test for Real, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 12, 2001, at B5, 2001
WL 3928726.
103. Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System and Standards for Competency
Determination, MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 603, § 30.03.
104. Massachusetts provides funding so that local districts can provide remedial help for
failing students. In 2000, the state legislature appropriated $20 million for additional instruction
for failing students. In 2001, the Massachusetts Legislature appropriated $40 million for the
same purpose. Local districts are free to spend this money in the manner in which they see fit.
See Editorial, The Importance of MCAS, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 15, 2000, at A26; REACHING
HIGHER, supra note 64; Massachusetts Department of Education, Fact Sheets on Public
Education in Massachusetts,Apr. 2001), at 1, at http:// www.doe.mass.edu/edre-form/erfacts/factsheet.01.pdf. Thus, in Boston, students who have not met the standards for their grades
participate in the Transition Services Program-a mix of before and after school, Saturday, and
summer school remedial classes. (All of these are programs that would not have been
implemented without the test). Editorial, supra;REACHING HIGHER, supra note 64.
105. MASS. DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 100, at 19; Greenberger, supra note 61; REACHING
HIGHER, supra note 64.
106. Greenberger, supra note 61.
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mastered the material tested by the MCAS, and thereby receive a
diploma.107
As in the case of Texas, the Massachusetts testing regime was
adopted as part of an overall reform package and in response to
litigation challenging the constitutionality under state law of the
state's public financing system.1 08 The Massachusetts Reform Act
requires the "Massachusetts Department of Education to evaluate
whether schools and districts are improving student performance
based on the learning standards contained" in state frameworks. 10 9
According to state regulations, each school district in which more than
twenty percent of the students score below "Proficient" on the MCAS
is required to submit an MCAS success plan to the state's Department
of Education describing the district's strategies for helping each
student to master the skills, competencies, and knowledge mandated
by the state frameworks. 110 Schools that fail to improve performance
may be deemed "under-performing." These schools are assigned
priority status for state assistance, are placed on Academic Warning
until the end of the following rating cycle, and are subject to
monitoring by a state-appointed fact-finding team. Moreover, "underperforming" schools are required to submit an improvement plan to
the Board of Education setting forth specific goals for improvement,
specific means for attaining such goals, and a timetable for
implementation. If an "under-performing" school fails to demonstrate
significant improvement in student performance within twenty-four
months after approval of a remedial plan by the Board, the Board may
107. Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System and Standards for Competency
Determination, MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 603, § 30.05 (performance appeals), available at
http://www.doe.mass.edu/lawsregs/a603cmr3O.html#05
(last visited
June
24,
2002);
Massachusetts Department of Education, Press Release, MCAS Appeals Process Unanimously
Approved (Jan. 23, 2002) ("[fln order to be considered, students will need to have: taken the
grade 10 level MCAS at least three times; scored at least a 216 on the exam at least once;
maintained a 95 percent attendance level during the previous school year and the year of the
appeal; and participated in [remedial] services made available by the school.... The appeal will
contain evidence of the student's knowledge and skills in the subject area, including teacher
recommendations, the student's grades..., work samples and scores on the standardized tests in
the subject areas."), at http://www.doe.mass.edulnews/news.asp?id=488 (last visited Feb. 8,
2002).
108. As in the case of Massachusetts and Texas, other states have implemented
accountability systems in response to lawsuits challenging as unconstitutional the states' system
for allocating money to the schools. See, e.g., MARC S. TUCKER & JUDY B. CODDING, STANDARDS
FOR OUR SCHOOLS: HOW TO SET THEM, MEASURE THEM, AND REACH THEM 230 (1998) (explaining
that the Kentucky legislature passed that state's accountability regime in response to a 1989
decision by the Kentucky Supreme Court holding the state educational system unconstitutional).
109. Massachusetts Department of Education, Background on the MCAS Tests of May 1998,
at http://www.doe.mass.edu/mcas/1998/bg/section9.html (last visited May 13, 2002).
110. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 69, § 11 (West 1996); Under-Performing Schools and School
Districts, MASS. REGS. CODE, tit. 603, § 2.03 (WESTIAW through Mar. 29, 2002).
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declare the school to be chronically "under-performing" and may
intervene or take over management of the school. 111
Consistent with the results in other jurisdictions, black and
Latino students in Massachusetts have failed the MCAS at higher
rates than students from other ethnic backgrounds. 11 2 The 2001 exitlevel exam was the first administration of the test to "count" vis-a-vis
the diploma sanction. On that exam, 40% of African-American tenth
graders and 48% of Latino tenth graders failed the English/language
arts portion of the exam, as compared to 20% of Asian-American tenth
graders and 12% of white tenth graders. Fifty-two percent of AfricanAmerican tenth graders and 58% of Latino tenth graders failed the
mathematics portion of the test, as compared to 15% of AsianAmerican tenth graders and 18% of white tenth graders. 1 3 Overall,
77% of white tenth graders earned a competency determination on a
single administration of the test in 2001 (meaning that they passed
both the English and mathematics portion of the exam), as compared
11 4
to 29% of Hispanics and 37% of African-Americans.
E. Political Opposition to High-Stakes Tests
Standardized tests have long been attacked by many on the
political left who instinctively charge racism whenever facially neutral
policies lead to different demographic outcomes. Indeed, as early as
1969, the Association of Black Psychologists issued a statement calling
for a complete moratorium on "all testing of Black people" until "more
equitable" tests could be developed. 11 5 In 1980, the NAACP was a
signatory to a "Statement to Urge a Ban on Standardized Testing of
111. MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 603, § 2.03.
112. See Karen Crummy, Minority Leaders Decry MCAS as Inequitable Testing Tool, BOSTON
GLOBE, Sept. 1, 2001, at A15.
113. Massachusetts Department of Education, Spring 2001 MCAS Tests: State Results by
Race/Ethnicity and Student Status, at http://www.doe.mass.eduMCAS/20O1/results/re-ss.pdf
(last visited Feb. 7, 2002). These results reveal a significant improvement since the previous year
when 60% of black tenth graders and 66% of Latino tenth graders failed Englishtlanguage arts,
and 77% of black tenth graders and 79% of Latino tenth graders failed mathematics. Id.
Nevertheless, the gap between the performance of non-Asian minorities and white students
remains relatively constant between 2000 and 2001. Id.
114. Id. On the first administration of the MCAS retest offered in December 2001, 48% of
students who previously failed the exam passed the English portion, and 31% passed the
mathematics retest. Anand Vaishnav & Sandy Coleman, Many Pass the MCAS Retest But
Thousands Must Try Again, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 1, 2002, at B1, 2002 WL 4114313. Added with
scores from the Spring 2001 MCAS, the results of the retest indicate that 14% of the class of
2003 still must pass English and 21% still must pass math. These students have three more
chances to pass the test. Id.
115. See GREGORY CAMILLI & LORRIE A. SHEPARD, METHODS FOR IDENTIFYING BIASED TEST
ITEMS 6 (1994) (mentioning the Association of Black Psychologist's resolution).
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Young Children."" 6 And in 1991, the NAACP and the Mexican
American Legal Defense and Educational Fund ("MALDEF") joined
with a coalition of antitesting organizations to protest federal
117
achievement testing proposed by President George H.W. Bush.
Such charges continue to be levied against the current wave of
high-stakes educational assessments, despite broad public support for
118
the exams among the public at large, including minority parents.
Indeed, in many of the states that have proposed making passage of
an exit exam a condition of receiving a high school diploma, activists
purporting to represent the interests of ethnic and racial minorities
have opposed the idea, arguing that such tests are "biased" or
"discriminatory" against blacks and Latinos. 1 9
In Massachusetts, for example, the high failure rates of
minority students have fueled calls from some civil rights activists to
suspend or eliminate the exams. 20 On the national level, Elaine
Jones, the President of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
Fund, has compared high-stakes testing to the literacy tests used in
12
the days of Jim Crow to prevent African-Americans from voting. '
And in November 1999, the National Urban League criticized
proponents of high-stakes testing for "using low-achievers as cannon
' 22
fodder in the education accountability wars.'

116. See THERNSTROM & THERNSTROM, supra note 8, at 363 (describing the resolution).
117. Cooper, supra note 31. Some teachers unions have also expressed strong opposition to
high-stakes graduation exams. For example, the National Education Association has passed a
resolution condemning the use of any standardized test whose "results are used to compare
students, teachers, programs, schools, communities, and states." See National Education
Association, NEA 2001-2002 Resolutions, at B-57, at http://www.nea.org/resolutions (last visited
May 13, 2002). The resolution also condemns the use of any standardized test for "high-stakes
decision making," i.e., any test with consequences. Id. In Massachusetts, the Massachusetts
Teachers Union in November 2000 launched a $600,000 advertising campaign designed to quash
public support for the test. See Scott S. Greenberger, Teachers Air Anti-MCAS Ad, BOSTON
GLOBE, Nov. 9, 2000, at B9; Frank Phillips, Cellucci Blasts Teachers on Tests, BOSTON GLOBE,
Nov. 9, 2000, at B1; see also Sara Mosle, Scores Count, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1996, § 6 (Magazine),
at 41.
118. See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
119. See Gary Orfield & Johanna Wald, Testing, Testing: The High-Stakes Testing Mania
Hurts Poor and Minority Students the Most, NATION, June 5, 2000, at 38, 39 (arguing that highstakes tests "both discriminate against poor and minority students and are educationally
unsound"); see also Alexakis, supra note 17, at 29 (describing such claims).
120. Crummy, supra note 112 (noting that the MCAS has been called the "new segregation").
Several years ago, the Justice Department threatened to sue the State of Massachusetts because
of the disparate racial outcomes of the MCAS exam. See Abigail Thernstrom, A Taboo Erodes:
The Truth About Blacks and Education, NAT'L REV., Dec. 20, 1999, at 22.
121. See Critics Target Wrong Culprit as Minorities' Test Scores Lag, USA TODAY, May 30,
2000, at A16; Whitmire, supra note 15.
122. Gail Russell Chaddock, Adverse Impact?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 30, 1999, at 14.
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Some Hispanic civil rights groups have been equally critical of
standardized exit exams. In a prepared statement on its web page, the
National Council for La Raza argues that "[s]tandardized tests contain
potential linguistic and cultural biases, and when used for 'high
stakes' purposes such as being promoted to the next grade level, they
can have disproportionately negative effects on disadvantaged, lowincome, and limited English-proficient students."'123 And, more
dramatically, MALDEF brought suit against the State of Texas in
1997, arguing that the TAAS exam unlawfully discriminated against
125
black and Hispanic students. 124 Although MALDEF lost the case, it
remains committed to the use of litigation to thwart the use of highstakes testing. 126 Other special interest groups and some legal
commentators also seek to use the courts to eliminate high-stakes
educational tests. 127 Indeed, in May 2001, the Harvard Civil Rights
Project (an antitesting group) sponsored a closed-door conference for
attorneys from various interest groups on potential litigation
strategies to block the implementation of such exams or their diploma
sanctions.128
123. See Roberto J. Rodriguez, In Search of High Academic Achievement: The Policy Drive to
End Social Promotion, at http://nclr.policy.net/proactive (last visited Jan. 16, 2001).
124. See, e.g., GI Forum v. Tex. Educ. Agency, 87 F. Supp. 2d 667 (W.D. Tex. 2000); Cooper,
supra note 19; see also Erik V. v. Causby, 977 F. Supp. 384, 389 (E.D.N.C. 1997) (denying
preliminary injunction in litigation alleging that minority students were more adversely affected
by the school district's requirement that students satisfy specific standards as a condition of
promotion from one grade to the next).
125. See discussion infra notes 244-50 and accompanying text.
126. See Press Release, Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Judge Errs
in Upholding Texas TAAS High School Exit Test, (Jan. 7, 2002), at http://www.maldef.org/news/press.cfm?ID=26.
127. See, e.g., Green, supra note 19 (promoting the use of disparate impact lawsuits to enjoin
educational institutions from relying on test scores with disproportionate racial results); Losen,
supra note 19 (arguing in favor of disparate impact litigation to eliminate "tracking' students by
ability); Silverstein, supra note 19 (arguing that disparate impact litigation should be mounted
against the use of tests on which the average male test-taker outperforms the average female
test-taker); Elul, supra note 16, at 495 (arguing in favor of disparate impact litigation to
challenge high-stakes educational assessments); Keith Ervin, NAACP, Schools Team Up to
Reduce Racial Gap, Group Puts on Hold Suit Against District, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 19, 2001, at
Bi (noting that the Seattle NAACP continues to contemplate a lawsuit against the Seattle school
district in response to racially disproportionate test results); see also ALFIE KOHN, THE CASE
AGAINST STANDARDIZED TESTING, RAISING THE SCORES, RUINING THE SCHOOLS (urging parents

and students to "consider filing a lawsuit" against tests which are "inherently discriminatory");
Chaddock, supra note 122, at 14 (quoting Gary Orfield of the Harvard Civil Rights Project as
suggesting that special interest groups were prepared to launch a number of lawsuits over the
use of high-stakes tests).
128. See Harvard Civil Rights Project, Template for Debating/EvaluatingMAS and Other
High-Stakes Policies (on file with the author); Harvard Civil Rights Project, Schedule of
Conferences, at http://www.law.harvard.edu/civilrights/conference/index.html (last visited Aug. 5,
2001).
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III. THEORIES OF DISCRIMINATION
The minority achievement gap has caused testing critics to
level sweeping public charges of "discrimination" against high school
graduation exams such as the TAAS and the MCAS, and has
prompted various activists and legal commentators to threaten
litigation against educational institutions that employ such exams. In
light of these significant, high-profile charges of discrimination, it is
necessary to recall and understand the prevailing theories of
discrimination and to outline the appropriate legal framework for
resolving claims of discrimination in educational testing. Part III.A
begins that analysis by outlining the two principal models for
addressing discrimination--disparate treatment and disparate
impact-and by explaining how the two approaches differ. Part III.B
then sketches the major theories that have been offered to justify the
disparate impact model. Lastly, Part III.C outlines the burdens of
proof in a typical disparate impact case, using Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which deals with discrimination in employment, as
the prototype for disparate impact litigation. Parts IV and V will then
explain how disparate impact litigation works in the educational
testing context and argue that its applicability to high-stakes
educational assessments is unsound as a matter of law and public
policy.
A. Two Models of Addressing Discrimination:
DisparateTreatment Versus DisparateImpact
There are two basic models for addressing claims of
discrimination: disparate treatment and disparate impact. The
disparate treatment model attempts to expose and punish intentional
discrimination. Under this model, proof of discriminatory motive is
critical. 129 Thus, a plaintiff in a disparate treatment case must
demonstrate that the defendant treated her differently from other
similarly situated individuals "because of" her race, sex, national
130
origin, or other protected status.
129. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) ("[Disparate
treatment occurs where the defendant] simply treats some people less favorably than others
because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is
critical, although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in
treatment.").
130. In cases of employment discrimination, motive can be proved by way of direct evidence
or proof of pretext. See Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-56 (1981);
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805, n. 18 (1973) (outlining the burdens of proof
in a disparate treatment case under Title VII).
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By contrast, the disparate impact model (or the "effects test,"
as it is sometimes called) seeks to eliminate policies that, while
neutral on their face, disproportionately harm members of a particular
protected class. 131 Under the disparate impact approach, proof of the
defendant's state of mind (i.e., illicit motive) is not required. 132 The
disparate impact model of discrimination was not sanctioned by
Congress in the original Civil Rights Act of 1964. Rather, it has been
133 and federal courts 134
adopted piecemeal by administrative agencies
seeking to extend the law's reach.135
Although there is a broad consensus favoring the use of the
disparate treatment model to eliminate purposeful discrimination in
all arenas, 136 the use of the disparate impact model to curtail practices
that are not intentionally discriminatory remains controversial1 37 and
is, therefore, limited in scope and reach.
131. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335-36 n.15 (the disparate impact model of
discrimination prohibits the use of "practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of
different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be
justified by business necessity"); see also George Rutherglen, Discriminationand Its Discontents,
81 VA. L. REV. 117 (1995) (describing the disparate impact model of discrimination); Willborn,
supra note 18 (similar).
132. Intl Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335-36 n.15 (stating that in the law of disparate
impact, "[p]roof of discriminatory motive ... is not required")
133. See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2) (2001) (applying the disparate impact model of
discrimination to claims against recipients of federal funds under Title VI of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act); Dept. of Housing and Urban Development, Policy Statement on Discriminationin
Lending, 59 Fed. Reg. 18,269 (Apr. 14, 1994) (applying the disparate impact model to claims of
housing and credit discrimination).
134. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (sanctioning the use of the
disparate impact model in employment cases under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act).
135. In 1991, after a series of court decisions curbed the application of the disparate impact
model in employment discrimination cases, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which
amended Title VII to provide explicitly for lawsuits based on the disparate impact model. See
generally ROGER CLEGG, DISPARATE IMPACT IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR: A THEORY GOING HAYWIRE
3 (2002) (explaining the origins of the disparate impact model).
136. See Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 244
(1971) ('"The ethical basis for a law seeking equal treatment seems clear: under the view that
race is an is an arbitrary criterion, unequal treatment ... is a form of unfair treatment, a
particularized wrong" (emphasis added)); David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of
Employment Discrimination:The Case for Numeric Standards, 79 GEO. L.J. 1619, 1623 (1991)
("[Alll of the various prohibitions against discrimination in American law-those that apply to
prohibitions against discrimination by government or by recipients of federal funds, in public
accommodations or in housing-forbid treating members of minority groups differently from
otherwise identical nonminorities."); Willborn, supra note 18, at 802-03 (noting that intentional
discrimination is widely regarded as immoral, as well as inefficient). But see generally RICHARD
EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS (1992) (arguing against laws which prohibit private intentional
discrimination on free association grounds).
137. See, e.g., Roger Clegg, The Bad Law of "DisparateImpact" PUB. INT., Winter 2000, at 79
(arguing against the expansion of disparate impact law generally); Michael Evan Gold, Griggs'
Folly: An Essay on the Theory, Problems and Origin of the Adverse Impact Definition of
Employment Discrimination and a Recommendation for Reform, 7 INDUS. REL. L.J. 429 (1985)
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For example, rather than apply a "pure" disparate impact
model, in which all policies with adverse racial or ethnic effects would
be viewed as per se illegal, courts, legislatures, and administrative
agencies invoking disparate impact analysis have generally limited its
scope by creating an affirmative defense to liability. 138 Under such a
defense, defendants are provided an opportunity to justify their use of
a policy with disproportionate demographic outcomes, and thereby
1 39
avoid liability, as long as such policies are deemed "necessary."
Moreover, unlike the disparate treatment model, the disparate
impact model is not automatically applied to all areas of
discrimination law. 140 In 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court held in
Washington v. Davis'4 ' that the disparate impact model cannot be
applied to claims of state-sponsored discrimination under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 142 In so holding, the
Davis Court emphasized that the disparate impact model cannot
provide a universal standard of discrimination, 143 but implied that
courts and legislatures are free to adopt the model by statute on a
(arguing against the use of the disparate impact approach in the employment setting and in
favor of an expanded intent standard under which statistical evidence would be afforded more
weight); cf. Fiss, supra note 136, at 244 (conceding that the ethical basis underlying a model that
requires equal achievement or equal outcomes remains uncertain).
138. See Michael Carvin, DisparateImpact Claims Under the New Title VII, 68 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1153, 1154 (1993) (noting that a "pure" disparate impact standard would prohibit any
practice that did not achieve absolute proportional representation and would require employers
to engage in hiring by quota); Willborn, supra note 18, at 802-03 (explaining that the use of a
"pure" disparate impact model would conflict with contemporary notions of fairness and would be
uneconomical in practice).
139. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(2)(k) (2000) (prohibiting employment practices with a
disparate impact unless employer can demonstrate that the practice is job-related and consistent
with business necessity).
140. Compare Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (holding that disparate
impact analysis is appropriate in the employment context under Title VII), § 2000(e)(2)(k)
(codifying Griggs and defining the burdens of proof in a disparate impact employment
discrimination case), and Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lending, 59 Fed. Reg. 18,269
(Apr. 14, 1994) (applying disparate impact standards to claims of discrimination under the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act and the Fair Housing Act), with Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242
(1976) (holding that discriminatory intent, not effects, is the touchstone for proving a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause), Mullin v. Raytheon, 164 F.3d 696, 701-02 (1st Cir.) (holding that
Griggs is inapposite in the context of age discrimination claims and that proof of discriminatory
intent is a prerequisite to liability under the ADEA), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 811 (1999), and
AFSCME v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401, 1406 (9th Cir. 1985) (rejecting the use of disparate
impact theory to prove pay discrimination in claims of comparable worth).
141. 426 U.S. at 246-48 (rejecting a claim brought by black applicants to the police academy
that a general literacy test had an unlawful disparate impact on African-American job seekers).
142. Id. (holding that the court of appeals erred in applying Title VII's disparate impact
standards to a constitutional claim).
143. See id.; see also Randall L. Kennedy, The State, the Criminal Law, and Racial
Discrimination:A Comment, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1270-77 (1994) (explaining the rationale
behind the Court's holding in Washington v. Davis).
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case-by-case basis after considering the theory's value in a particular
setting. 144 Indeed, five years earlier, in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the
Supreme Court approved the use of the disparate impact model in
cases of employment discrimination under Title VII of the 1964 Civil
45
Rights Act. 1
B. Theoretical Justificationsfor the DisparateImpact Model
For years commentators have sought to develop a coherent
justification for the disparate impact approach to claims of
discrimination. 146 These theories have generally been said to fall into
three broad categories: weak justifications, strong justifications, and
those that are in between. 147 So-called "weak" justifications for the
disparate impact model focus on its ability to ferret out covert, yet
intentional, discrimination. 148 In an influential article published in the
1980s, Professor George Rutherglen rationalized the disparate impact
model, not as an altogether separate cause of action, but as a different
method of proof under which statistical evidence is given substantial
144. 426 U.S. at 247-48; cf. Louis A. Jacobs, A ConstitutionalRoute to DiscriminatoryImpact
Statutory Liability for State and Local Government Employees: All Roads Lead to Rome, 41 OHIO
ST. L.J. 301 (1980) (advocating a piecemeal statutory approach to imposing disparate impact
liability). But see CLEGG, supra note 135, at 23 (arguing that Congress cannot act to enforce the

Fourteenth Amendment, which bans only intentional discrimination, by prohibiting practices
with an adverse racial impact). Clegg notes, however, that this argument applies only to statutes
enacted under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and not to those statutes, such as Title
VI, enacted under Congress's spending authority or those statutes aimed at the private sector
which are enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause. Id.
145. The plaintiffs in Griggs argued that the employer's hiring criteria (a diploma
requirement and passage of a standardized intelligence test) violated Title VII because of its
discriminatory impact on African-American workers and job applicants, and the Supreme Court
agreed. 401 U.S. at 431. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger explained that when a
hiring criterion has a disproportionately negative impact on members of a particular racial or
ethnic group, the employer cannot continue to use the criterion unless it is "job-related" and
consistent with "business necessity." Id. at 431, 436 ("The touchstone is business necessity. If an
employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job
performance, the practice is prohibited."). Today, the disparate impact model of employment
discrimination has been codified in Title VII. But neither Title VI nor Title IX of the Civil Rights
Act have been amended to incorporate this approach.
146. See Willborn, supra note 18, at 826 ("[T]here is no agreement on the [disparate impact
model's] underlying theory.'); see also Ramona L. Paezold & Steven L. Willborn, Deconstructing
DisparateImpact: A View of the Model Through New Lenses, 74 N.C. L. REV. 325, 328 n.6 (1996)
(describing various theories propounded by commentators to justify the use of the disparate
impact model).
147. See Rutherglen, supra note 131, at 138-39 (describing the various justifications for
disparate impact as ranging from weak to strong).
148. See George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII: An Objective Theory of
Discrimination,73 VA. L. REV. 1297, 1299 (1987) (stating that disparate impact theory provides
objective evidence of pretext and is thus an appropriate method for smoking out intentional
discrimination, which is difficult to prove).

1144

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:1111

weight, and plaintiffs' burden of proof is reduced in order to help them
149
prove pretextual discrimination.
According to this theory, the Supreme Court's approval in
Griggs of the disparate impact approach to claims of discrimination
under Title VII was to be interpreted in the context of the racial
segregation in which the case arose. Griggs involved a challenge to an
employer's requirement that all new employees or transfers to certain
divisions of the company have a high school diploma or have obtained
a certain score on a standardized general intelligence test. Prior to
1965, when Title VII became effective, the employer in Griggs openly
discriminated by segregating its black employees into the division of
the company with the lowest paying jobs. 15 0 On the day on which Title
VII took effect, the employer eliminated race-based classifications
from its hiring process, but instituted the hiring criteria at issue in
the case. 15 1 The effect of the new requirements was to exclude a higher
percentage of blacks than whites from certain highly coveted jobs.
Because these suspicious circumstances suggested-but provided no
direct evidence of-an intent to discriminate, some commentators,
such as Rutherglen, argued that the Griggs Court approved the
disparate impact model of employment discrimination as a means of
smoking out pretext in the absence of any clear evidence of illicit
52
motive.1
By contrast, other scholars have proffered "strong"
justifications in support of disparate impact theory, focusing on the
1 53
desire to achieve proportional representation or equal outcomes.

149. Id. at 1309; see also Rutherglen, supra note 131, at 138 ("In its weakest form, [disparate
impact] theory imposes only a light burden of justification upon the employer; it only extends the

central prohibitions against discrimination and segregation to root out hidden discrimination.").
150. 401 U.S. at 426-27.
151. Id. at 428.
152. See Rutherglen, supra note 148, at 1309. Although this justification found some support
in the language of the Court's opinion, see Griggs, 401 U.S. at 426 (framing the question as
whether an employer may properly use job requirements that disproportionately screen out
African-Americans for positions previously "filled only by white employees as part of a
longstanding practice of giving preference to whites"), since Congress amended Title VII in 1991
to outline explicitly the burdens of proof in disparate impact cases, it is clear that this
justification is no longer valid with respect to claims of discrimination in employment. See infra
notes 162-75.
153. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 136, at 1627 (arguing that the disparate impact model is
best justified as a means of achieving proportional representation); see also Martha Chamallas,
Evolving Conceptionsof Equality Under Title VII: DisparateImpact Theory and the Demise of the
Bottom Line Principle, 31 UCLA L. REV. 305, 365 (1983) (arguing that the disparate impact
theory was designed to produce equal outcomes and that it is "fundamentally results-oriented
and grounded on notions of group status"); Perry, supra note 18 (supporting the use of disparate
impact doctrine as a means of forcing the American workplace to accommodate otherwise
qualified individuals with different life perspectives).
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These justifications are entirely divorced from intent and are
generally concerned more with notions of compensatory justice than
with the principle of equal opportunity. For example, Professor David
Strauss has argued that the disparate impact model bests serves the
goals of Title VII by requiring proportional representation and equal
154
group outcomes.
In between these two contrasting justifications of the disparate
.impact model are several rationales that focus on the disparate impact
doctrine's ability to eliminate certain policies or practices that unfairly
harm minorities. These theories adopt the view that the disparate
impact doctrine provides substantive rights independent of the right
to be free from intentional discrimination, but limit the doctrine's
reach to only those practices that are deemed to be "unfair." Thus,
Professor Michael Perry has written that the disparate impact
approach can be justified as a means of eliminating the vestiges of
earlier intentional race discrimination. 1 55 According to Perry, in the
years following the dismantlement of de jure segregation in American
schools, an employer's use of a diploma requirement or general
intelligence exam to select employees unfairly penalized AfricanAmerican job applicants whose academic credentials and scores on
academic tests may have been artificially depressed as a direct
consequence of systemic intentional discrimination in America's
1 56
primary and secondary schools.
Professor Steven Willborn, on the other hand, justifies the
disparate impact approach in the employment context as a means of
eliminating "statistical discrimination."' 1 57 According to Willborn,
employers often lack the ability to evaluate a prospective employee's
potential for productivity at a reasonably low cost. Employers
therefore substitute readily available proxies such as race, sex,
marital status, past experience, recommendations, or test scores for
more precise, but more costly, information regarding productivity. 5 8
According to this rationale, fair employment laws are necessary to
prevent employers from using factors such as race and sex as proxies
for productivity. The disparate impact component of employment
154. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 136, at 1627.
155. Michael J. Perry, The DisproportionateImpact Theory of Employment Discrimination,
125 U. PA. L. REV. 540, 577 (1977). This view also finds support in the language of Griggs.
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432 ("Practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in
terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior
discriminatory employment practices.").
156. Perry, supra note 155, at 577.
157. Willborn, supra note 18, at 821.
158. Id. at 821-23 (rationalizing disparate impact as a mechanism to prohibit statistical
discrimination that is only weakly linked to productivity and that adversely affects minorities).
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discrimination laws operates as a mechanism to prevent employers
from using proxies which, while facially neutral, are closely correlated
with race and not sufficiently correlated with productivity or other
159
economic baselines.
In a similar vein, Professor Owen Fiss has argued that the
disparate impact model is sustainable in the employment setting
where the criterion that causes the disproportionate result is the
"functional equivalent" of race. 160 In order for reliance on a particular
criterion to be the functional equivalent of race, Fiss contends that: (1)
the criterion must be a poor predictor of productivity, and (2) there
must be a lack of individual control over the outcome.' 61 Fiss provides
the example of a company nepotism policy. Assume that a company
with an all-white workforce announces that in the future it will hire
only relatives of current employees. Although the policy is facially
neutral, it adversely affects nonwhite workers, through no fault of
their own. The practice of hiring only relatives of current workers is
unrelated to productivity and cannot be justified by reference to the
bottom line. At the same time, the use of such a policy is unfair to
minority applicants because the ability to satisfy the hiring criterion is
completely outside of their control. According to Fiss, then, the policy
is the "functional equivalent" of race. In such a context, the disparate
impact model would be an appropriate means of resolving a claim of
discrimination based on the policy. 162 By contrast, a requirement that
all candidates for secretarial positions pass a typing test would not be
the "functional equivalent" of a race-based test because the test would
measure a trait clearly relevant to productivity and not outside the
63
control of the applicants.'

159. Id.
160. Fiss, supra note 136, at 299.
161. Id. at 303. According to Fiss, both elements are necessary before the disparate impact
doctrine may appropriatly be applied.
162. Id. Consider also an example from the law of sex discrimination. Suppose an employer
adopts a policy prohibiting employees who work out of doors from coming inside to use the
bathrooms. This factual scenario was presented in the case of Lynch v. Freeman, 817 F.2d 380
(6th Cir. 1987). In Lynch, the Sixth Circuit found that the policy had an adverse impact on
female workers in a manner which was outside of their control. Id. at 387-88. Moreover, the
policy could not be characterized as important to the employer's productivity or its bottom line,
and was therefore held unlawful. Id.
163. Fiss, supra note 136, at 299; see also Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977,
987 (1988) (O'Connor, J.) ("[Tihe necessary premise of the disparate impact approach is that
some employment practices, adopted without a deliberately discriminatory motive, may in
operation be functionally equivalent to intentional discrimination.").
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C. Title VII as the DisparateImpact Prototype
In 1991, Congress codified the disparate impact approach to
employment discrimination and established with particularity the
burdens of proof that must be met in order to establish unlawful
disparate impact under Title VII.164 In passing the Civil Rights Act of
1991, Congress rejected the "weak" version of the disparate impact
model, which provides a means of proving intentional discrimination,
165
in favor of a version that looks primarily at a policy's effects.
Title VII now explicitly provides that, once an employment
discrimination plaintiff has established a prima facie case of disparate
impact (by demonstrating that the challenged employment practice
causes 166 a statistically significant1 6 7 workforce disparity), the burden
164. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(2)(k) (2000). The Civil Rights Act of 1991 is generally viewed as a
legislative response to the Supreme Court's 1989 decision in the case of Wards Cove v. Atonio,
490 U.S. 642 (1989) ("Wards Cove"), in which the Court held that, when proffering a business
reason for a challenged employment practice, the employer's burden is one of production, and not
of persuasion. Specifically, in Wards Cove, the Court held that a plaintiff retains the burden of
proving that the business justification proffered by the defendant is not valid. Id. at 658-59. The
1991 Act reverses this burden of proof, making proof of business necessity an affirmative
defense. § 2000(e)(k).
Some commentators have argued that, even after passage of the 1991 Act, employers need
not prove that a policy be linked to actual productivity, only that it be related to the job in some
sense. (Thus, for example, workplace rules about punctuality, drug use, and proper workplace
attire are all job-related even when they do not influence productivity). These commentators also
contend that, even after passage of the 1991 Act, the employer need not prove that the
challenged practice is "essential" or "indispensable," only that it serves "legitimate employment
goals." See, e.g., Carvin, supra note 138, at 1157; C. Boyden Gray, DisparateImpact: History and
Consequences, 54 LA. L. REV. 1487 (1994).
165. See Rutherglen, supra note 131, at 138 ("By rejecting Wards Cove, Congress presumably
rejected the weakest form of the theory, but it did not necessarily embrace the strongest. Instead,
it used equivocal language from both forms: an employer has the burden of proving that 'the
challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with business
necessity.' ").

166. A plaintiff in a Title VII disparate impact case must identify a specific policy, practice,
or standard as the cause of the different outcomes. A plaintiff cannot make out a prima facie
disparate impact claim where the evidence shows that the same disparate results would have
occurred even had the defendant not engaged in the challenged practice. See Watson, 487 U.S. at
994 (1988) ("[T]he plaintiff must ... show that the practice in question has caused the exclusion
of applicants for jobs or promotions because of their membership in a protected group.").
167. § 2000e-2(k); see also Watson, 487 U.S. at 995 (stating that in Title VII cases, plaintiffs
must show that the practice in question "select[s] applicants for hire or promotion in a racial
pattern significantly different from that of the pool of applicants" (emphasis added) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1973))). In
determining whether the complained of impact is statistically significant, courts generally apply
the "eighty percent rule" (otherwise known as the "four-fifths rule") established by the EEOC.
Under this rule, "[a] selection rate for any race ...which is less than [eighty percent] of the rate
for the group with the highest rate will generally be regarded ... as evidence of adverse
impact[.]" See Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D)
(1990).
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of proof shifts to the employer to justify its use of the challenged
practice. The 1991 Act requires employers defending against disparate
impact claims to prove that the challenged practice is "job related for
168
the position in question and consistent with business necessity."
The 1991 Act establishes the employer's burden as an affirmative
169
defense under which the defendant bears the burden of persuasion.
Should the employer meet this burden, plaintiffs may still prevail if
they can demonstrate that an alternative employment practice would
reduce the disproportionately adverse effects while also serving the
0
employer's legitimate business interests.17
With respect to standardized employment tests, some courts
interpret the statute's requirement that a defendant prove the
practice at issue is "job related" and "consistent with business
necessity" to require defendants to prove that the tests were properly
validated1 7 for the job or class of jobs in question. 172 Ordinarily, this
means that defendants must prove that the test is "predictive of or
significantly correlated with important elements of work behavior that
comprise or are relevant to the job or jobs for which candidates are
being evaluated."' 173 Specifically, some courts have required
defendants to: (1) specify the trait in question that the test seeks to
measure; (2) prove that the particular trait in question is an
important element of work behavior; and (3) prove by professionally
accepted standards that the test is predictive or significantly
correlated with the element of work behavior identified in step two.174
Even where a defendant succeeds in proving the validity of the
test, courts will nevertheless undertake to review a defendant's choice
of cutoff score (i.e., the minimum score required to qualify for
consideration) using the same framework of analysis. Thus, where a
defendant establishes a passing rate that tends to eliminate members

168. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii).
169. Id. § 2000e-2(k) (reversing the burdens of proof adopted by the Supreme Court in Wards
Cove Packing).
170. Id.
171. Validation is itself an extremely pliable term, easily manipulated to serve various
political goals. See infra Part V.B.1.
172. See, e.g., Ass'n of Mexican Am. Educators v. California, 231 F.3d 572, 585 (9th Cir.
2000). But see Carvin, supra note 138, at 1157 (arguing that the amended statute does not
require that companies professionally validate employment tests in order to withstand disparate
impact scrutiny).
173. Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(C) (1990); see
Ass'n of Mexican Am. Educators,231 F.3d at 585 (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S.
405, 431 (1975)).
174. Ass'n of Mexican Am. Educators, 231 F.3d at 585 (citing Craig v. County of L.A., 626
F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1980)).
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of protected groups, courts will consider whether the cutoff score is
175
itself consistent with business necessity.
For better or worse, the theory that the disparate impact
doctrine should guarantee substantive group rights apart from the
right to be free from purposeful discrimination is now firmly
entrenched in the law of employment discrimination. 176 Indeed, the
employment law version of the doctrine has become the template from
which courts, legislatures, and administrative agencies craft disparate
impact standards for other bodies of law. Although advocates of a
blanket effects test continue to press courts and administrative
agencies to import Title VII's disparate impact regime reflexively to
other settings, including education, 177 the lack of consensus as to the
theoretical basis of disparate impact law requires that each attempt to
transfer the model to a body of law outside of the employment arena
178
be judged separately and on its own merits.

175. See, e.g., Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 630 F.2d 79, 105 (2d Cir. 1980) ("[A]
cutoff score unrelated to job performance may well lead to the rejection of applicants who were
fully capable of performing the job. When a cutoff score unrelated to job performance produces
disparate racial results, Title VII is violated."), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 940 (1981); Richardson v.
Lamar County Bd. of Educ., 729 F. Supp. 806, 882 (M.D. Ala. 1989) (holding that where cutoff
scores on teacher certification test were found to bear no "rational relationship" to minimum
teacher competence, the test could not withstand disparate impact scrutiny under Title VII),
affid, 935 F.2d 1240 (11th Cir. 1991); Lanning v. SEPTA, 181 F.3d 478, 488 (3d Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, 528 U.S. 1131 (2000) (ruling that facially neutral requirement that transit officers be
able to run twelve-minute miles was not properly validated and that defendant must prove that
cutoff score measures minimal qualifications necessary for successful job performance).
176. See Paezold & Willborn, supra note 146, at 326-27 (noting the centrality of disparate
impact in employment law and explaining that it is in the employment arena where the doctrine
has been most fully developed); see also Rutherglen, supra note 131, at 126 (noting that, in the
employment setting, "the principle [of disparate impact] develop[ed] from an evidentiary rule
into a redefinition of the concept of discrimination").
177. See 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2) (1990) (prohibiting policies of fund recipients which have the
"effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination"); see also Paezold & Willborn, supra note 146,
at 328 n.2 and accompanying text (noting that advocates of the effects test have succeeded in
convincing courts to adopt various forms of the disparate impact approach in housing
discrimination, lending discrimination, and voting rights cases).
178. See, e.g., Douglas C. Herbert & Lani Schweitzer, A Pragmatic Argument Against
Applying DisparateImpact Doctrine in Age Discrimination Cases, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 625, 632
(1996) (arguing against the mechanical transfer of Title VII's disparate impact regime to the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act); Earl M. Maltz, The Expansion of the Role of the Effects Test
in Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Analysis, 59 NEB. L. REV. 345, 357-62 (1980) (arguing
against the wholesale transfer of disparate impact theory from employment law to laws
regarding housing and lending discrimination); Perry, supra note 155, at 563-86 (describing
disparate impact doctrine as "contextually limited" and arguing in favor of applying the doctrine
to constitutional claims relating to public employment, education, and land use planning, but not
to constitutional claims regarding jury selection or legislative districting). But see Peter E.
Mahoney, The End(s) of DisparateImpact: Doctrinal Reconstruction, Fair Housing and Lending
Law, and the Antidiscrimination Principle,47 EMORY L.J. 409 (1998) (endorsing the use of Title
VII's disparate impact standards to prove discrimination in lending).
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IV. CLAIMS OF DISCRIMINATION IN EDUCATIONAL TESTING

How has the law actually responded to claims that
standardized educational tests are discriminatory? And what models
have courts relied upon in determining whether a testing policy
violates legal prohibitions on discrimination in education? Part IV.A
explains the statutory framework of Title VI-the law that prohibits
discrimination
in education-and
explains how claims of
discrimination in educational testing are resolved by the use of the
disparate treatment model. Part IV.B then considers the use of the
disparate impact model under Title VI, explains how the model was
applied to educational testing prior to the Supreme Court's landmark
decision in Alexander v. Sandoval, 79 and considers the relevance of
the disparate impact doctrine in the post-Sandoval era.
A. Title VI's Prohibitionon Purposeful Discriminationin Education
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination
on the basis of race, color, or national origin by recipients of federal
funds.18 0 Specifically, Title VI provides:
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.1sl

As a result of federal financial support, most schools are covered by
18 2
Title VI and subject to its prescriptions.
What does Title VI's prohibition on discrimination mean in the
context of high-stakes educational tests? Clearly, the plain language of
Title VI prohibits the use of standardized tests for the purpose of
screening out or segregating students on the basis of race, color, or
national origin. For example, a state board of education or school
board that adopted an exit exam requirement with the goal of denying
diplomas to minority students would violate Title VI. Likewise, an

179. 525 U.S. 275 (2001).
180. Although Title VI is widely regarded as an education statute, it applies to all recipients
of federal funds, not just schools. Accordingly, the legal standards for adjudicating claims of
discrimination under Title VI apply broadly and can cover a wide range of entities including,
inter alia, charitable institutions, job training programs, state departments of environmental
protection, and state departments of motor vehicles.
181. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000).
182. Title VI was enacted pursuant to Congress's power to attach conditions to grants of
federal money under the Spending Clause of the U.S. Constitution. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 599 (1983). Title VI thus imposes contractual obligations on
recipients of federal funds-in consideration of federal financing, recipients agree not to
discriminate. Id. (citing 110 CONG. REC. 6546 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey)).
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exam adopted for purposes of "tracking" students into racially
identifiable classrooms would violate Title VI.
Title VI also prohibits the inconsistent use of a test or test
scores with respect to members of different racial or ethnic groups. A
school that required only black students to pass an exam as a
condition of graduating would clearly violate Title VI. Similarly, a
school that required all students to pass an exam, but that required
Latino students to obtain a higher passing score than that required of
other students would violate Title VI,183 as would a school that
granted diplomas to some white students with scores just below the
passing mark but not to Latinos with identical scores.18 4 Such conduct
would constitute unlawful disparate treatment-in other words,
intentional discrimination.
Individuals who believe that they have been the victims of
intentional discrimination in violation of Title VI can file an
administrative complaint with the Office for Civil Rights at the U.S.
Department of Education18 5 or bring suit in federal court for injunctive

183. Interestingly, many commentators read Title VI's prohibition of disparate treatment on
the basis of race to apply only where the educational institution requires more of minority
students than of white students. Thus, while a school may not require minority students to
obtain higher test scores than whites in order to obtain some benefit or privilege, these
commentators endorse the practice of affirmative action, whereby colleges and universities
routinely admit minority students with test scores that are lower than those which would be
considered acceptable if presented by white applicants for admission. See generally Grutter v.
Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (documenting the disparity between the scores
of white students admitted to the University of Michigan Law School and those of minority
admittees), rev'd, 288 F.3d 732 (2002); WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE
RIVER:

LONG-TERM

CONSEQUENCES

OF

CONSIDERING RACE

IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY

ADMISSIONS (1998) (defending the practice of affirmative action). But see Stephan Thernstrom &
Abigail Thernstrom, Reflections on the Shape of the River, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1583 (1999)
(criticizing this approach). Defenders of affirmative action find support in Title VI's regulations,
which provide apparent legal authority for the proposition that that educational institutions may
voluntarily implement affirmative action programs to "overcome the effects of prior
discrimination" due to "race, color, or national origin." Even in the absence of past
discrimination, the regulations provide that educational institutions may implement voluntary
measures aimed at overcoming "the effects of conditions which resulted in limiting participation
by persons of a particular race, color, or national origin." 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(6)(i)-(ii) (1990).
184. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 15, at 52; cf. People Who Care v. Rockford Bd.
of Educ., 851 F. Supp. 905, 958-1001 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (holding that unequal application of
standards violates Title VI), remedial order rev'd in part, 111 F.3d 528 (7th Cir. 1997).
185. Title VI authorizes administrative agencies that dispense federal funds to conduct
investigations and engage in fact finding. If the agency determines that there has been a
statutory violation, it may seek to resolve the matter informally or can seek compliance by
terminating the institution's federal financing after an administrative hearing. § 2000d-1.
Compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this section may be effected (1)
by the termination of or refusal to grant or to continue assistance under such program
or activity to any recipient as to whom there has been an express finding on the
record, after opportunity for hearing, of a failure to comply with such requirement,...
or (2) by any other means authorized by law: Provided, however, that no such action
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or monetary relief.'8 6 But how exactly does a Title VI plaintiff go about
proving that an educational test was adopted for a discriminatory
purpose? Generally, the question of whether a Title VI fund recipient
has committed intentional discrimination is resolved by examining the
totality of the circumstances.18 7 As in the Fourteenth Amendment
context, 88 evidence of a disproportionate adverse impact can support
an inference of discriminatory intent where no legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason exists for the practice or where other
evidence indicates that the proffered reason is a pretext for
discrimination. In examining claims that public policies violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme
Court has identified criteria to assist courts in determining whether a
public policy was adopted with discriminatory intent. 8 9 As applied to
the educational testing context, relevant factors include, but are not
limited to: (1) whether the test produces a disproportionate, adverse
impact on the group that alleges discrimination; 190 (2) whether the
shall be taken until the department or agency concerned has advised the appropriate
person or persons of the failure to comply with the requirement and has determined
that compliance cannot be secured by voluntary means. In the case of any action
terminating, or refusing to grant or continue, assistance because of failure to comply
with a requirement imposed pursuant to this section, the head of the Federal
department or agency shall file with the committees of the House and Senate having
legislative jurisdiction over the program or activity involved a full written report of
the circumstances and the grounds for such action. No such action shall become
effective until thirty days have elapsed after the filing of such report.
Id. Fund recipients may seek judicial review of agency actions. Id. § 2000d-2.
186. Private individuals may sue to enforce section 601's prohibition on intentional
discrimination and may obtain both injunctive relief and monetary damages. See Alexander v.
Sandoval, 523 U.S. 275, 280 (2001) (citing Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schools, 503 U.S
60, 72, 78 (1992)).
187. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977) (holding
that each claim of discrimination "demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and
direct evidence of intent as may be available").
188. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits intentional
discrimination by state actors, including public school officials. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No
state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.").
Title VI prohibits intentional discrimination by federally funded entities, including most
schools, and has been interpreted to track the contours of the Equal Protection Clause. See
Sandoval, 523 U.S. at 275; United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 732 n.7 (1992). Accordingly,
claims of disparate treatment by educational institutions are often brought under both the Equal
Protection Clause and Title VI, but are analyzed only under the constitutional standard.
189. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266.
190. Disparate impact may sometimes provide "an important starting point" of analysis in
claims of disparate treatment, see id., although courts must take care to analyze all the objective
evidence carefully so that they do not "reduce the 'discriminatory purpose' requirement to a
disparate impact test by another name." Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 509-10
(1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

20021

KILLING THE MESSENGER

1153

test's disproportionate impact was reasonably foreseeable or actually
foreseen by policymakers, 191 and, if so, whether defendants have
attempted to reduce the test's adverse impact by providing
remediation and additional opportunities to retake the exam; (3)
whether adoption or administration of the test can be explained on
grounds other than an intent to discriminate (i.e., whether there exist
legitimate pedagogical reasons for the challenged policy); (4) whether
the historical background of the decision to adopt the test supports a
claim of intentional discrimination (e.g., was the policy adopted in
response to a desegregation order or was it adopted as part of a
comprehensive reform plan intended to equalize educational
opportunities, as in Texas and Massachusetts?); (5) whether the
sequence of events leading up to adoption of the policy appears
suspicious; and (6) whether there is direct evidence of intent to
193
19 2
discriminate, such as statements of discriminatory animus.
Thus, where there is direct evidence of discriminatory animus
or where the circumstances support an inference that the challenged
policy is a pretext for discrimination, courts have found intentional
discrimination. For example, in People Who Care v. Rockford Board of
Education, 94 a federal district court in Illinois held that a school
district's use of standardized testing to "track" students into classes
for different ability levels was, in fact, a pretextual means by which to
segregate children on the basis of race. In that case, the district court
found that test results were used inconsistently to support essentially
subjective and racially motivated decisions, 95 and that the tracking
standards were developed in conjunction with a reorganization plan

191. The foreseeability of the test's consequences may constitute one of several kinds of proof
of intentional discrimination, but cannot provide the sole touchstone of intent. Columbus Bd. of
Educ., at 509-10 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
192. Isolated remarks by nondecisionmakers should not suffice to support such a claim. To
the contrary, the record evidence must provide an inference of system-wide bias or intent to
harm a particular racial or ethnic subgroup. Cf. Speen v. Crown Clothing Corp., 102 F.3d 625
(1st Cir. 1996) (holding that in claims of employment discrimination, isolated remarks are
insufficient, standing alone, to prove discriminatory intent).
193. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 268; see also NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra
note 15, at 53 n.2 (applying the Arlington Heights factors to educational testing).
194. 851 F. Supp. 905 (N.D. Ill. 1994), remedial order rev'd in part, 111 F.3d 528 (7th Cir.
1997).
195. Specifically, the court found that black students whose test scores qualified them for
more than one track were more likely to be placed in lower track classes than white students
whose test scores qualified them for more than one track. The court also found that "high track"
classes included a number of exceptionally low-scoring white students but no black students with
similar low scores. Id. at 914.
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that the court found was an attempt to resegregate the district's
196
elementary schools.
In finding intentional discrimination in the Fourteenth
Amendment context, courts have placed great weight on a history of
segregation or discrimination by the district implementing the tests,
and have been willing to infer discriminatory purpose in the
educational context where the challenged practice is found to carry
197
forward or preserve the effects of prior illegal discrimination.
Anderson v. Banks is illustrative. 98 In Anderson, a federal district
court in Georgia enjoined school officials from implementing, during
the 1978 school year, a diploma sanction for failure to pass a ninth
grade skills test. In finding that the school district's action violated
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the court
noted that the school district had strenuously resisted integration
until the 1970-1971 school year (and, even then, had maintained a
segregated transportation system).1 99 Moreover, the year that the
school district dismantled its dual system, it instituted a tracking
system that quickly created racially identifiable classrooms. 20 0 In light
of these facts, the district court held that, although the diploma
sanction was not per se illegal, the diploma sanction could not be
constitutionally imposed upon students who had attended school
during de jure segregation. 20 ' The court therefore enjoined the school
district from making passage of the test a graduation requirement
until 1983, the first year in which graduating students would not have
20 2
been exposed to the dual system.
Another notable case, Debra P. v. Turlington,20 3 involved a
court challenge to Florida's "functional literacy examination," the

196. Id. at 958-1001 (holding that unequal application of tracking standards constitutes
intentional discrimination).
197. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 15, at 52.
198. 520 F. Supp. 472 (S.D. Ga. 1981), rev'd in part on reh'g, 540 F. Supp. 761 (S.D. Ga.
1982), appeal dismissed sub. nom. Johnson v. Sikes, 730 F.2d 644 (11th Cir. 1984).
199. Anderson, 520 F. Supp. at 479-80.
200. Id. at 480-81.
201. Id. at 490-91.
202. Id. at 503; see also McNeal v. Tate County Sch. Dist., 508 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1975)
(holding that academic groupings in previously segregated school system are presumptively
invalid unless the district can prove either that its assignment method was not based on the
"present results" of prior de jure segregation or that the assignment system would remedy such
results through better educational opportunities). But compare Ga. State Conference of Branches
of NAACP v. Georgia, 570 F. Supp. 314 (S.D. Ga. 1983) (holding that a school grouping system
that disproportionately placed black students in lower groups did not perpetuate prior
discrimination because none of the students involved had ever attended a segregated school).
203. 474 F. Supp. 244 (M.D. Fla. 1979), aff'd in relevant part, 644 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1981),
on remand, 564 F. Supp. 177 (M.D. Fla. 1983), affl'd, 730 F.2d 1405 (11th Cir. 1984).
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passage of which was required in order to graduate from high school.
On the test's first administration, seventy-eight percent of AfricanAmerican students failed, as compared to twenty-five percent of white
students.2 0 4 The district court held that, although the exam was not
"biased" against minorities, the timing of the policy's implementation
was suspicious. Because requiring students educated under de jure
segregation to pass the exam as a condition of graduation perpetuated
the effects of prior intentional discrimination, the court held that the
testing requirement violated the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection. 205 Significantly, however, the court held that the school
could constitutionally implement the exit exam requirement after
students educated during legalized segregation had left the school
206
system.
In finding equal protection violations, both the Anderson and
the Debra P. courts relied heavily upon lack of academic opportunities
within school districts still under desegregation orders. In the absence
of a history of intentional discrimination, however, claims that the use
of educational tests constitutes purposeful discrimination have rarely
been successful. In Parents in Action on Special Education ("PASE") v.
Hannon, for example, a federal district court in Chicago held that the
use of tests to place students in special education classes did not
violate Title VI's prohibition against intentional discrimination
because: (1) the tests used by the district were not "biased" against
minority test-takers; (2) the erroneous placement of black children in
special education classes occurred infrequently and for reasons other
than racial animus or bias; and (3) the district implemented the
testing and special education program with the goal of helping
20 7
students.
Likewise, in GI Forum v. Texas Education Agency, the recent
challenge to Texas's high-stakes testing regime, plaintiffs argued that
the state had purposefully discriminated against minority test-takers
when it set the test's pass rate at seventy percent, knowing that a

204. Id. at 248. Because of these significant disparities, the court closely analyzed the
accuracy of the exam and concluded that the test conformed to scientific concepts of test validity.
205. Id. at 255. The Debra P. court also held that the implementation of the test and the
inadequacy of the notice provided prior to invocation of the diploma sanction violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding with respect to Title VI and the Equal
Protection Clause, but remanded the due process claim, ordering the district court to consider
whether defendants had proved "curricular validity"-in other words, whether the state could
demonstrate that the test "covered things actually taught." Debra P. v. Turlington, 644 F.2d 397,
405 (5th Cir. 1981).
206. DebraP., 474 F. Supp. at 269.
207. 506 F. Supp. 831, 875 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
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substantial number of black and Hispanic students would fail an exam
with this cutoff score. As circumstantial evidence of intent to
discriminate, plaintiffs also cited procedural irregularities in the rush
to adopt the testing regime. 20 8 Defendants responded that the testing
regime was established to help equalize educational opportunities
among students of all races and ethnicities. Far from acting with
discriminatory purpose, defendants argued that they acted out of a
desire to help poor and minority students obtain a meaningful
education. The district court summarily dismissed plaintiffs' claim of
intentional discrimination, holding that the plaintiffs had proffered
insufficient evidence of intentional discrimination to warrant a trial. 20 9
In one outlier case, Larry P. v. Riles, a federal district court in
California held that California's use of an IQ test to track children into
classes for the educable mentally retarded ("EMR") violated Title VI's
ban on intentional discrimination. 2 10 In so concluding, the district
court relied upon a number of factors, including: (1) the "profound"
disproportionate impact on black students 2 11 that was not only
foreseeable, but actually foreseen; (2) the timing of the decision to
adopt the testing requirement in the midst of "controversy" and
expressed legislative concern over the number of black students in
EMR classes and so-called cultural bias 212 in IQ tests; and (3) the fact
that, in the court's view, EMR classes were "dead end" classes that
provided little remedial assistance for students. The district court's
finding of intentional discrimination was appealed by only one of the
many defendants in the case: the superintendent of schools, who was
an African-American. Although the court of appeals upheld the lower
208. See Order Granting, In Part, and Denying, In Part, Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment, GI Forum v. Texas Educ. Agency, CA' No. SA-97-CA-1278-EP (W.D. Tex. July 27,
1999) [hereinafter Order for Summary Judgment], available at http://www.nysd.uscourts/courtweb/Default.html; see also Moran, supra note 31, at 123 (describing the court's unpublished
opinion).
209. See Order for Summary Judgment, supra note 208. The court's resolution of plaintiffs'
claims of disparate impact are discussed infra notes 240-45 and accompanying text.
210. 495 F. Supp. 926, 926 (N.D. Cal. 1979), affd. in part and rev'd in part, 793 F.2d 969, 984
(9th Cir. 1984).
211. Disproportionate adverse racial or ethnic results can contribute to the mix of evidence
supporting a finding of intentional discrimination although it is insufficient standing alone to
support such a finding. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) ("Disproportionate
impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of invidious racial discrimination
forbidden by the Constitution.").
212. Unlike the PASE court, the Larry P. court did not undertake to determine whether the
tests were, in fact, "culturally biased." Rather, in absence of evidence to the contrary, the court
assumed that the tests were "biased" and held, in essence, that where an educational institution
that employs a high-stakes test fails to investigate rumors of test bias it is responsible for
intentional discrimination. Larry P., 495 F. Supp. at 947, 956-60. The legal relevance of so-called
test bias is discussed infra Part V.A.2.
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213
court's finding of a Title VI violation on grounds of disparate impact,
the appellate court reversed the finding of intentional discrimination
with respect to the superintendent, holding that the pervasiveness
and foreseeability of a policy's adverse impact is insufficient, in and of
214
itself, to establish discriminatory motive.
The cases described above reveal a pattern in which claims of
intentional discrimination in educational testing are unlikely to
succeed in the absence of a history of state-sponsored discrimination
or segregation. Moreover, although Title VI does not differentiate
between tests used for tracking and tests used to make promotion and
graduation decisions, a review of the case law reveals a pattern of
stricter judicial scrutiny for tests used to "track" students by
ability-perhaps because they can lead to racially identifiable
classrooms that evoke memories of de jure segregation-than for tests
used to determine who will graduate or be promoted. Because, in the
absence of prior de jure segregation or other state-sponsored
discrimination, lawsuits against high-stakes tests on the basis of
intentional discrimination are unlikely to succeed, testing critics have
turned to the disparate impact model of litigation as a means of
eliminating such tests.

B. The Use of the DisparateImpact Doctrine to Challenge
High-Stakes Educational Tests
What can be said of the claims that the disparate impact model
should be applied to high-stakes educational assessments? Unlike
Title VII, which now specifically provides for disparate impact
lawsuits against employers, 21 5 Title VI provides no such cause of
action. To the contrary, the U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that
Title VI extends only as far as the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment 21 6 and that, accordingly, the statute bans only
intentional discrimination, not policies or procedures that create

213. See discussion infra notes 225-27 and accompanying text.
214. Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 984 (9th Cir. 1984). Because the other defendants did
not appeal the intentional discrimination portion of the district court's ruling, the district court's
finding of intentional discrimination with respect to the other defendants remained intact.
215. See supra notes 164-78 and accompanying text.
216. United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 732 n.7 (1992) ("Our cases make clear.., that
the reach of Title VI's protection extends no further than the Fourteenth Amendment."); Regents
of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 463 U.S. 265, 287 (1978) ("Title VI must be held to proscribe only
those racial classifications that would violate the Equal Protection Clause or the Fifth
Amendment.").
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adverse results for racial or ethnic communities. 217 Nevertheless, the
U.S. Department of Education has expanded the reach of Title VI by
regulation, forbidding federally funded entities from utilizing "criteria
or methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting
individuals to discrimination. '218 In other words, Title VI's
implementing regulations, adopted in 1980 by the Carter
Administration,
prohibit
institutions
receiving
federal
assistance--which includes most American schools and colleges--from
implementing policies with a disproportionate adverse impact on
minorities.
In practice, this means that the federal government may
withdraw funding from any educational institution that employs tests
with unequal demographic outcomes. Until recently, it also meant
that private parties could bring federal lawsuits against schools that
employed such tests, provided that the cases were properly pled under
Title VI's implementing regulations, rather than under the statute
alone. 219

217. The Supreme Court has long held that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits only
intentional discrimination, and not adverse racial effects. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro.
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270-72 (1977) (holding that official action will not be held
unconstitutional simply because it results in a disproportionate racial impact and that invidious
discriminatory purpose must have been a motivating factor); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,
242 (1976) (holding that disproportionate impact cannot be "the sole touchstone" in claims of
state-sponsored discrimination brought under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment). Accordingly, Title VI prohibits only intentional discrimination and not policies or
practices which have adverse racial or ethnic consequences. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S.
275, 280-81 (2001); Fordice,505 U.S. at 732 n.27; Bakke, 463 U.S. at 287.
218. 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(2) (1980) (emphasis added).
219. In Sandoval, the Supreme Court held that private litigants may not sue to enforce Title
VI's adverse impact regulations. 532 U.S. at 293. Previously, it had been widely assumed that
private parties could bring disparate impact lawsuits for injunctive relief pursuant to Title VI's
regulations, although not pursuant to the statute itself. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 645 (1983) ("Guardians")(White, J.) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (Brennan,
Blackmun & Stevens, JJ., dissenting) (arguing that irrespective of whether Title VI itself
provides a private right of action arising from a policy's disparate racial or ethnic impact, a
plaintiff nevertheless can pursue a private right of action on grounds of disparate impact under
Title VI's implementing regulations); see also Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387, 396 (3d Cir.)
(adopting this view), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1046 (1999); Elston v. Talladega Co. Bd. of Educ., 997
F.2d 1394, 1406 (11th Cir. 1993) (concerning private lawsuit regarding school reorganization
plan brought, inter alia, pursuant to Title VI's regulations which proscribe actions having a
racially disparate impact); Larry P., 793 F.2d at 982 (upholding injunctive relief for private
plaintiffs who challenged California's use of an IQ test to track children into classes for the
educable mentally retarded under, inter alia, Title VI's disparate impact regulations); GI Forum
v. Tex. Educ. Agency, 87 F. Supp. 2d 667 (W.D. Tex. 2000) (concerning private lawsuit against
Texas's graduation exam brought pursuant to Title VI's implementing regulations); Cureton v.
NCAA, 37 F. Supp. 2d 687, 689, 697 (E.D. Pa.) (holding that, under Guardians,private plaintiffs
may bring suit to enforce Title VI's disparate impact regulations), rev'd on other grounds, 198
F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 1999).
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1. The Resource Guide: Importing Title VII's Disparate
Impact Regime to Title VI
In 2000, the Clinton Administration issued a manual entitled
The Use of Tests as Part of High-Stakes Decision-makingfor Students:
A Resource Guide for Educators and Policymakers.220 The Resource
Guide grafted Title VII's disparate impact regime directly onto Title
VI and effectively put schools on notice that relying on standardized
test scores to make important educational decisions could place them
221
in legal jeopardy.
According to the Resource Guide, once the complaining party
has made out a prima facie case of disparate impact (by identifying a
specific policy or practice that caused a statistically significant
disparity in the award of benefits or services to students based on
race, national origin, or sex) 222, the burden of proof shifts to the

educational institution to demonstrate that the testing practice is
"educationally necessary." 223 As in the employment context, the
Resource Guide states that even where the defendant establishes that
its policy is "necessary," the party challenging the test has the
opportunity to demonstrate that there exists "a feasible alternative
practice that is effective in meeting the institution's goals and that
would eliminate or reduce the adverse impact." 224 If the plaintiff can

demonstrate that such an alternative exists, the Resource Guide
contends that the institution is in violation of the statute.
220. See U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, THE USE OF TESTS AS PART OF
HIGH-STAKES DECISION-MAKING FOR STUDENTS: A RESOURCE GUIDE FOR EDUCATORS AND
POLICYMAKERS (2000) [hereinafter RESOURCE GUIDE], available at http://www.ed.gov/offices/OCR/testing/TestingResource.pdf. Interestingly, the Clinton Administration did not speak
with one voice on the question of accountability and high-stakes tests. In his 1997 State of the

Union Address, President Clinton announced a "national crusade for education standards." See
President Clinton, Message to Congress on the State of the Union, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1997, at
A20. Calling for an end to social promotion, Clinton stated, "no child should graduate from high
school with a diploma he or she can't read" and proposed establishing voluntary national tests to
assess the proficiency of fourth and eighth graders in reading and math. Id. Yet, despite
Clinton's resounding endorsement of standards-based reform, critics of educational standards
and tests found an ally in Clinton's own Department of Education, which published the Resource
Guide encouraging lawsuits against school districts that employ high-stakes testing with
disparate racial results. See RESOURCE GUIDE, supra; see also RAVITCH, supra note 2, at xx
(noting that, even as President Clinton praised Arkansas's requirement that every student pass
an eighth-grade exam before entering high school, his own Department of Education was
threatening to launch a federal investigation into Ohio's use of a high school graduation exam).
221. RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 220, passim; see Clegg, supra note 137, at 1.
222. RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 220, at 37 (incorporating as well claims of disparate
impact on the basis of sex under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §
1681(a)).

223. Id. at 38.
224. Id. at 40.
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2. Case Law
Although the Clinton Administration's Resource Guide claimed
merely to summarize existing law, in truth very few cases have
actually considered the question of whether the disparate impact
model is appropriately applied to tests used to make promotion and
graduation decisions. 225 Indeed, most of the cases cited by the Resource
Guide (and most of the cases that have considered the application of
Title VI's disparate impact regulation to educational testing) have
involved the use of tests to make decisions regarding "tracking" or the
eligibility of students for certain benefits or privileges.
In Larry P., for example, a divided panel of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld on grounds of unlawful disparate
impact a district court's injunction barring the State of California from
assigning students to classes for the educable mentally retarded on
the basis of their performance on a standardized IQ test. 226 Affirming
findings entered by the district court, the majority held that the tests
were not "educationally necessary" because they were not separately
validated for use with black children and because the EMR classes
were
educational
"dead-ends" that provided no
academic
227
remediation.
Dissenting from the majority's determinations on disparate
impact, U.S. District Judge William B. Enright (sitting by designation)
wrote separately to make clear his view that the district court had
erred in assuming, based on the raw disparities in the racial
composition of EMR classes, that black children were erroneously
placed in EMR classes; the trial court, in Judge Enright's view, had
failed to determine whether, and to what extent, school officials
actually erred in making placement decisions. Judge Enright
emphasized that, before educational tests can be found to
discriminate, there must be, at a minimum, a finding that the tests

225. Most of the cases involving challenges to high-stakes exit exams have focused largely on
the question of whether such exams, or the implementation of such exams, violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment-in other words, whether the exams were
enacted for a discriminatory purpose, whether the exams are themselves "biased" and thus
discriminatory, or whether the exams preserve the effects of prior intentional discrimination.
226. 793 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1984). The district court had previously enjoined the policy on the
grounds that it was intentionally discriminatory under the Fourteenth Amendment as well as on
grounds that it had an unlawful adverse racial impact under Title VI's disparate impact
regulations. See Larry P. v. Riles, 495 F. Supp. 987, 993 (N.D. Cal. 1979); see also supranote 212
(discussing case). The court of appeals, however, affirmed on regulatory grounds of disparate
impact only. Larry P., 793 F.2d at 970.
227. Larry P., 793 F.2d at 973.
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were invalid in that they produced improper placements in EMR
228
classes.
A second line of cases involves claims that tests used to
determine an individual's eligibility for certain benefits or privileges
result in an unlawful disparate impact. In Groves v. Alabama,229 for
example, a federal district court in Alabama held that the State's
reliance on a minimum cutoff score on the ACT to determine eligibility
to enter an undergraduate teacher training program had an unlawful
disparate impact on African-American students in violation of Title
VI's disparate impact regulation. After finding that plaintiffs had
made out a prima facie case of disparate impact, the court rejected
defendants' claim that the minimum required score was "educationally
necessary" to ensure that students entering the teaching program
possess a certain level of knowledge and academic attainment. The
court held that defendants failed to demonstrate that the level of
achievement designated by the cutoff score was required in order to
ensure that program participants would turn out to be minimally
230
competent teachers at the completion of the program.
In Sharif v. New York State Education Department, a federal
district court in Manhattan held that the State of New York's reliance
on SAT scores to determine eligibility for state merit scholarships had
an unlawful disparate impact on female students. 231 In particular, the
court held that the SAT: (1) "underpredicts" female performance in
college; and (2) has never been validated as a measure of prior
academic achievement. 232 Accordingly, the district court held that the
practice of using SAT scores to award merit scholarships did not bear
even a "reasonable relationship," much less a "manifest relationship"
(which the court held to be the requisite threshold), to the stated goal
233
of rewarding high academic achievement.
234
Similarly, in Cureton v. NCAA, a case later reversed on other
grounds, a federal district court in Pennsylvania held that the

228. Id. at 989.
229. 776 F. Supp. 1518 (M.D. Ala. 1991).
230. Id. at 1531-32. But see United States v. LULAC, 793 F.2d 636 (5th Cir. 1986) (rejecting
a claim that a similar entrance exam was instituted with a discriminatory purpose and reversing
a district court's order preliminarily enjoining, on Fourteenth Amendment grounds, the State of
Texas's requirement that any student wishing to enroll in more than six hours of education
courses first pass a preprofessional skills test).
231. 709 F. Supp. 345, 346 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (Walker, J.). Because the disparate impact claim
presented in Sharif dealt with claims of sex discrimination, it was decided under Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1631-1688 (2000). 709 F. Supp. at 360-61.
232. 709 F. Supp. at 353-54.
233. Id. at 362.
234. 37 F. Supp. 2d 687 (E.D. Pa.), rev'd on other grounds, 198 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 1999).
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National Collegiate Athletic Association's ("NCAA") "initial eligibility"
rule had an unlawful disparate impact on minority students in
violation of Title VI. The plaintiffs in Cureton sought to enjoin the
NCAA from enforcing Proposition 16, which prevents students who
have not obtained a minimum score on either of two standardized
tests (the SAT or the ACT) from participating in intercollegiate
athletics or receiving athletically related financial aid during their
freshman year. 236 The NCAA defended Proposition 16 on the grounds
that the rule is necessary in order to: (1) raise student-athlete
graduation rates; and (2) close the gap between white-athlete and
236
black-athlete graduation rates.
In ruling for the plaintiffs, the district court first considered
whether the NCAA's proffered justifications constituted substantial
and legitimate educational goals and next considered whether the test
score policy bore a "manifest relationship" 237 to achieving the stated
goals. While the court approved of the first of the NCAA's stated
goals-raising the graduation rate for all student-athletes--it rejected
as illegitimate and insufficiently substantial the organization's goal of
closing the black-athlete/white-athlete graduation gap. 238 Moreover,

the Cureton court held that the NCAA failed to demonstrate a
manifest relationship or nexus between Proposition 16 and the
legitimate goal of raising graduation rates of all athletes because the
SAT-while a valid predictor of freshman grades---had not been
scientifically validated as an accurate predictor of who will
23 9
graduate.
3. GI Forum v. Texas EducationAgency
The first case in many years to confront directly the question of
whether and how the disparate impact doctrine might apply to highstakes educational assessments is GI Forum v. Texas Education
Agency. 240 In GI Forum, the Mexican American Legal Defense and
Educational Fund sought an injunction barring the Texas Education
Agency from using failure on the TAAS as a basis for denying high
school diplomas. The complaint, filed by MALDEF on behalf of the GI
Forum, Image de Tejas, and seven minority students, alleged that by
making passage of TAAS a graduation requirement, the State of Texas
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Id. at 701.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 701-03.
See 87 F. Supp. 2d 667 (W.D. Tex. 2000).

2002)

KILLING THE MESSENGER

1163

"denies diplomas to Mexican-American and African-American
241
students at a rate significantly higher than that of Anglo students.
After a bench trial on the merits, the district court rejected the
plaintiffs' claim that the State's use of TAAS scores to determine
which students should earn a high school diploma violated Title VI's
disparate impact regulation and the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 242 With respect to plaintiffs' disparate impact
claim, the court held that: (1) the test was validly constructed (i.e.,
that the test is an accurate measurement of students' mastery of skills
and knowledge that the state has deemed important); (2) the State's
chosen passing score was not arbitrary or unjustified; and (3) the use
of the TAAS exam as a graduation criterion bore a "manifest
243
relationship" to the "legitimate" educational goal of accountability
244
by "guarantee[ing] that students will be motivated" to learn.

Moreover, the court rejected as factually unsupportable plaintiffs'
contention that the State's use of the exam was causing minority
dropout rates to rise as well as plaintiffs' argument that other
educational measures would motivate students and teachers as
245
effectively as the TAAS.

Although GI Forum was widely regarded as good news for
high-stakes educational assessments across the country, the case's
actual relevance to standardized tests other than TAAS remains
unclear. The uncertainty stems in part from the court's acceptance of
the State's assertion that the test "guarantees" motivation. 246 In a

241. Complaint, GI Forum v. Tex. Educ. Agency, C.A. No. SA-97-CA-1278EP (W.D. Tex. Oct.
14, 1997), reprinted in Testing in Texas: Accountability for Bilingual Students, READ
PERSPECTIVES, Fall 2000, at 15.
242. GI Forum, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 668. Earlier in the litigation, the court dismissed on
summary judgment plaintiffs' claim of intentional discrimination. See Order for Summary
Judgment, supra note 208; see also supra notes 208-09 and accompanying text.
243. In particular, the court reasoned that the State had the right to expect schools and
students to be held accountable for their performance. GIForum,87 F. Supp. 2d at 679.
244. Id. at 681.
245. Id. at 682. In rejecting the plaintiffs' procedural due process claim, the district court
held that the TAAS meets currently accepted standards for curricular validity and that students
have had a reasonable opportunity to learn the subjects covered on the exam. The district court
also rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the test violated their rights to substantive due process,
noting that the test did not constitute a "substantial departure from accepted academic norms."
Id.
246. In GI Forum, the court did not require defendants to offer any statistical proof that the
diploma sanction motivates learning, and instead simply accepted at face value the State's
contention that the policy motivates learning. Id. at 681. Another court might be less deferential
and, indeed, might even question whether "accountability" is itself a legitimate educational goal.
See, e.g., Cureton v. NCAA, 37 F. Supp. 2d 687, 701-06 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (questioning the
legitimacy of the educational goals before considering whether the policy is "manifestly related"
to said goals).
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different case, however, a court could reach a contrary result if
evidence presented at trial indicated that the diploma sanction had
less than a "guaranteed" influence on student motivation. And,
although the court rejected plaintiffs' assertions that TAAS caused
minority students to drop out of school at higher rates than they
ordinarily would have, the language of the opinion suggests that if
plaintiffs could prove a connection between dropout rates and high247
stakes testing, they might prevail on their Title VI claim.
4. Alexander v. Sandoval
In April 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court dealt a significant blow
to proponents of disparate impact in general, and foes of standardized
tests in particular, when it held that Title VI provides no private right
of action to enforce the statute's disparate impact regulations. In
Alexander v. Sandoval, the Court considered a challenge to Alabama's
policy of administering state driver's license examinations only in
English. 248 In December 1996, Martha Sandoval (a native Spanish
speaker) filed a class action lawsuit seeking relief from the state's
English-only rule. Among other things, Sandoval alleged that the
Alabama policy discriminated on the basis of national origin in
violation of Title VI's implementing regulations. 249 In particular, the
complaint alleged that defendants' refusal to administer the drivers'
examination in languages other than English or to allow for the use of
translators or interpretive aids had a disproportionate, adverse impact
on foreign-born residents and that this disparate impact rendered the
250
policy unlawful.
The question presented to the Supreme Court in Sandoval was
whether private plaintiffs can pursue a cause of action to enforce Title
VI's disparate impact regulations. By a vote of five to four, the Court
251
held that they cannot.
247. GI Forum, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 676. No doubt seizing on this language from GI Forum,
antitesting groups such as the Harvard Civil Rights Project have sought to commission research
into these very issues with the goal of establishing a record that the tests fail to motivate
learning and in fact lead to increased dropout rates. See Harvard Civil Rights Project, supra note
128.
248. 532 U.S. 275 (2001). Because the Alabama Department of Public Safety accepts grants
of financial assistance from the U.S. Department of Transportation, it is a covered entity under

Title VI. See id. at 278.
249. See Sandoval v. Hagan, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1234 (M.D. Ala. 1998), afl'd, 197 F.2d 484 (11th

Cir. 1999), rev. sub. nom. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001); see also 34 C.F.R. § 100.3
(1990) (prohibiting federally funded institutions from utilizing "criteria or methods
administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination").
250. Sandoval, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 1244 (citing the plaintiffs complaint).
251. 532 U.S. at 293.

of
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In rejecting Sandoval's claim, the Court, in an opinion by
Justice Antonin Scalia, acknowledged that individuals may sue to
enforce their statutory right to be free from intentional discrimination
under Section 601 of Title VI.252 The Court assumed, for the sake of
argument, that the administrative regulations promulgated pursuant
to Section 602 of Title VI may lawfully prohibit policies with
discriminatory effects. 253 The Sandoval majority noted, however, that
because Section 602 is phrased as a directive to administrative
agencies engaged in the distribution of public funds and makes no
mention of the individuals protected by the Act or of the recipients of
federal funds, there was no reason to infer that Congress intended to
254
allow private plaintiffs to enforce the administrative regulations.
The Court thus held that private parties cannot bring disparate
impact lawsuits against recipients of federal funds under Title VI or
25 5
its implementing regulations.
Sandoval's reach remains unclear. In his dissenting opinion,
Justice John Paul Stevens argued that private parties may still sue to
enforce Title VI's disparate impact regulations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983, which authorizes suits for deprivation, under color of state law,
of rights secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United
States. 256 At least one federal court of appeals has rejected this
approach, holding that Sandoval precludes all private actions to
enforce Title VI's disparate impact regulations. 25 7 But other courts
may decide otherwise. Thus, while Sandoval may present some
252. Id.
253. For purposes of deciding the Sandoval case, the Court assumed the validity of the
disparate impact regulation itself. Id. at 281-82.
254. Id. at 289 (citing Univs. Research Ass'n, Inc. v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754 (1981)).
255. Id. at 293. The Court left open, however, the questions of whether the disparate impact
regulations (which proscribe activities permissible under the Act alone) are themselves valid and
whether the federal government may properly deny federal funding to educational institutions
that utilize polices with an adverse racial or ethnic impact.
256. Id. at 299 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
257. S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771, 774 (3d Cir.
2001). South Camden Citizens in Action involved a challenge to the New Jersey Environmental
Protection Agency's decision to grant certain air permits to a new cement plant in a
predominantly minority neighborhood. Pointing to an already high rate of asthma and other
respiratory problems among the largely black and Hispanic residents of the community,
plaintiffs argued that the EPA's decision to grant the permits would create an adverse
environmental impact on blacks and Hispanics in violation of Title VI's implementing
regulations. In holding that the case could proceed even in the advent of Sandoval, the district
court accepted the suggestion of Justice Stevens in his Sandoval dissent that lawsuits to enforce
Title VI's disparate impact regulation be allowed to proceed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. S. Camden
Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 145 F. Supp. 2d 505 (D.N.J. 2001). On appeal, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that Sandoval precludes all private
rights of action to enforce Title VI's disparate impact regulations. S. Camden Citizens in Action,
274 F.3d at 774.
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obstacles to disparate impact challenges to standardized tests, it is by
258
no means the final word on the matter.
Furthermore, in the long run, it is quite possible that Congress
will seek to amend Title VI to authorize disparate impact lawsuits
explicitly. 259 And, even if Congress refrains from amending the
statute, schools that utilize high-stakes tests nevertheless remain
subject to investigation by the U.S. Department of Education and risk
losing federal financial assistance if they administer exams that
exhibit a disparate racial or ethnic impact. Thus, a significant
normative question remains-namely, whether it makes sense to
apply the disparate impact model of employment discrimination to the
education context in general and to the testing arena in particular.
V. ARGUMENTS REGARDING THE APPLICATION OF DISPARATE IMPACT
THEORY TO EDUCATIONAL TESTING

Should federal discrimination law prohibit those tests, such as
the Texas Assessment of Academic Skills and the Massachusetts
Comprehensive Assessment System, that (at least in the short term)
may have the effect of preventing disproportionately large numbers of
blacks and Latinos from earning a high school diploma? This part
considers whether the disparate impact model of discrimination
should be applied to educational policies in general and educational
assessments in particular. After analyzing arguments for and against
the importation of the disparate impact model to the education
setting, I conclude that the use of the disparate impact model in the
context of high-stakes educational tests is inappropriate. Instead,
legal claims of discrimination in the educational testing arena should
be limited to claims of intentional discrimination. This does not mean,
of course, that evidence of disproportionate adverse impact is
irrelevant. To the contrary, evidence of disparate impact may be
considered as part of the totality of the circumstances in claims of
purposeful discrimination 260 and may be politically relevant to
determinations regarding test use and consequences. But absent
additional evidence of purposeful discrimination, a disparate racial or
ethnic impact should not provide a legal barrier to legitimate efforts to

258. See Bradford C. Mank, Using Section 1983 to Enforce Title VI's Section 602 Regulations,
49 KAN. L. REV. 321 (2001) (advocating use of § 1983 to enforce disparate impact regulations).
259. This is precisely what happened after the Supreme Court acted in Wards Cove Packing
Co. v. Atonio. 490 U.S. 642 (1989), to cabin the disparate impact approach to proving
employment discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2.k (2000); 137 CONG. REC. S15,273, S15,276
(daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991) (introducing the 1991 Civil Rights Act and interpretive memorandum).
260. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
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improve the educational system for all students, including those who
are disadvantaged.
A. Rationales for Applying the DisparateImpact Model
to High-Stakes Tests
Scholars and special interest groups have suggested a variety
of rationales for using the disparate impact model to prevent the use
of high-stakes educational tests.261 These advocates, and accounts in
the popular press, have sometimes conflated and confused these
various rationales. Nevertheless, it is possible to discern three distinct
arguments for applying the doctrine of disparate impact to high-stakes
educational tests: (1) claims that the disparate impact approach will
help smoke out covert, intentional discrimination by educators or
educational policymakers; (2) claims that the disparate impact model
is necessary to eliminate so-called "biased" tests; and (3) claims that
the disparate impact approach is necessary to screen out tests that,
although technically unbiased, lead to troubling social outcomes or
otherwise entrench existing inequalities. In the following pages, each
of these arguments is examined in turn and rejected. In addition, I
consider more generally why theories supporting the use of disparate
impact in the employment setting are inapplicable in the educational
testing arena.
1. Disparate Impact as Objective Evidence of Purposeful
Discrimination
Claims that the disparate impact model should be applied to
high-stakes educational assessments in order to smoke out covert
intentional discrimination have their roots in Professor George
Rutherglen's "objective theory of discrimination." 262 According to this
theory, the disparate impact model serves as a mechanism for
identifying intentional discrimination in the absence of direct evidence
of racial or ethnic animus. Such arguments are indeed compelling.
After all, who could possibly oppose an improved method of uncovering
and punishing intentional discrimination?
This justification is fatally flawed, however, in both the
employment and educational settings. To begin with, federal
discrimination laws do not, in fact, require plaintiffs to provide direct
evidence--that is, "smoking gun" evidence-of discrimination. Indeed,
261. See, e.g., KOHN, supra note 127, at 60; NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 15; Moran,
supra note 31, at 111; Elul, supra note 16, at 518.
262. See supra notes 148-52 and accompanying text.

1168

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:1111

the Supreme Court has stressed repeatedly that circumstantial proof
263
can be sufficient to support a finding of intentional discrimination.
Thus, the argument that the disparate impact cause of action is the
only way for a plaintiff who lacks direct evidence of discrimination to
recover for injuries suffered due to racially motivated decisions holds
26 4
little weight.
In addition, the disparate impact model cannot be justified as
an objective method of proving intentional, covert discrimination
because the model is too often inaccurate. As Professor Steven
Willborn has noted in the employment law context, the disparate
impact model is an imprecise mechanism for identifying purposeful
discrimination because it elevates one form of evidence of
discriminatory intent (statistics) over all others (e.g., a history of
discrimination by the defendants). At the same time, the model
elevates one form of evidence of innocent motive (the relationship
between the test and legitimate business or educational objectives)
over others (such as contemporaneous statements or legislative
history).265 As such, the disparate impact model underdeters illmotivated, purposeful discrimination and overdeters well-intended
practices with disproportionate racial or ethnic consequences.
In other words, the disparate impact model is unable to
eliminate an exam policy enacted with covert racial animus where the
exam can be defended on legitimate pedagogic grounds. Suppose, for
example, that a local school board is comprised entirely of bigots who
seek to prevent black and Latino students from receiving high school
diplomas in order to keep them from qualifying for certain jobs in the
local economy. 266 Suppose further that the racist board members do
not publicly admit their motives or otherwise outwardly demonstrate
their bigotry. The board members approve a new policy requiring
students to pass a standardized exit exam in order to receive a high
school diploma. The test they select is educationally sound and linked
to the curriculum. During the first few years of the test's
administration, the policy results in a disproportionate number of
263. See, e.g., Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000) (holding that
jury may infer intentional discrimination from the plaintiffs prima facie case combined with
disbelief of defendant's proffered nondiscriminatory justification for its action).
264. Roger Clegg has also pointed out the absurdity of justifying disparate impact as a
means of proving intentional discrimination. See CLEGG, supra note 135, at 9 ("[The fact that an
offense is difficult to detect would not in any other context justify redefining the offense.").
265. Willborn, supra note 18, at 808.
266. It is unclear how often a situation such as this will actually occur. Nevertheless, the
objective evidence theory is premised on its occurrence with some regularity. The scenario thus
provides a useful illustration for testing the value of the objective evidence theory as a
justification for the disparate impact model.
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minorities failing to graduate. Nevertheless, the use of the test also
results in improved academic achievement by students of all
backgrounds. In this situation, the use of a neutral exam was
approved with a discriminatory purpose. Because the motives of board
members are well disguised, direct evidence of intentional
discrimination is lacking. In this hypothetical, the disparate impact
model would fail to "smoke out" an intent to discriminate because the
policy itself is pedagogically sound and sufficiently correlated with
267
legitimate educational goals.
Conversely, the model overdeters in that it can result in the
elimination of policies which were adopted without racial
animus-indeed, it can eliminate policies adopted in order to help
students of color-but that cannot be proved to result in the
attainment of a particular educational goal. For example, suppose that
a state legislature enacts a high-stakes testing regime with the
intention of equalizing educational opportunities across racial and
ethnic lines and across various regions of the state. The legislative
history indicates that the policy's sponsors hoped that the testing
regime would achieve this goal by: (1) providing incentives for
teachers in disadvantaged communities to focus on a uniform, core
curriculum; (2) motivating teaching and student learning; and (3)
targeting scarce resources toward the most disadvantaged schools.
Suppose further that, despite the state's best efforts to provide
remedial assistance to failing students and increase financial support
for disadvantaged school districts, after five years the policy has
resulted in only minor improvements in student achievement overall
and across racial and ethnic groups. Moreover, the policy has had no
measurable effect upon student or teacher motivation. Finally,
suppose that during the first five years of the policy's implementation,
the policy has led to falling graduation rates among African-American
and Hispanic students. There is evidence that the falling minority
graduation rates are due not only to high failure rates on the test, but
also to increased dropout rates among black and Hispanic students in
response to the threat of the diploma sanction.

267. Some commentators have argued that if an educational policy proves beneficial, then
the fact that those who sponsored the measure were motivated by discriminatory animus should
be irrelevant. See, e.g., THERNSTROM & THERNSTROM, supra note 8, at 20-21 (criticizing the
reasoning of United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 733-34 (1992), in which the U.S. Supreme
Court held that a current and valid educational justification cannot cleanse a policy originally
enacted for a discriminatory purpose). Irrespective of the merits of this position, the objective
theory of discrimination is clearly premised on the notion that the law should prohibit those
actions motivated by racial or ethnic animus, and as a tool for achieving this objective, the
disparate impact model fails.
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Given these facts, courts applying the disparate impact model
of discrimination would probably strike down the testing regime as
violative of Title VI. A policy that has not measurably improved
overall student achievement or narrowed the racial achievement gap,
and which can be causally linked to rising minority dropout rates, can
hardly be said to be "educationally necessary," as courts have thus far
defined the term. Yet, whatever one thinks of this result, it is
inconsistent with the notion that the disparate impact model is a
vehicle for eliminating policies enacted with actual racial or ethnic
animus.
The hypothetical scenario offered above may indeed be
politically and socially unacceptable. After five years, policymakers
might reasonably conclude that, despite their best intentions, the
testing regime has failed to begin the process of equalizing educational
opportunities between various demographic groups. They may
therefore conclude that the policy should be abandoned. But while the
hypothetical raises legitimate concerns about the policy's social
impact, 26 8 it certainly does not implicate concerns regarding
purposeful discrimination, which, after all, is the basis for the
objective evidence rationale. Thus, the objective evidence theory fails
to provide a coherent theoretical justification for applying the
disparate impact model to educational testing.
2. The Bias Rationale
Some commentators argue that the disparate impact model
should be applied to the education setting not so much to root out
purposeful discrimination by those who enacted or implemented the
testing regimes, but rather to eliminate so-called biased tests.269 This
view is rooted in the notion that disproportionate demographic
outcomes on standardized tests are a product of faulty tests, rather
than the result of an actual academic gap.2 70 According to this view,
standardized exams fail to measure accurately the actual skill level or
268. See infra notes 300-14 and accompanying text.
269. See, e.g., Elul, supra note 16, at 517.
270. Id. ("Disparate impact analysis in the education context ... rejects the belief that group
test score differences reflect actual differences in test-takers' abilities. Rather, the disparate test
scores would reflect discrimination in the tests themselves."); see also Regents of Univ. of Calif. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 306 n.43 (1978) (Powell, J.) (noting the possibility, but lack of record
evidence indicating, that tests are "culturally biased" and thus inaccurate with respect to
minority test-takers); Lani Guinier & Susan Sturm, The Future of Affirmative Action:
Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REV. 953, 987 (1996) (arguing that affirmative action
is just a band-aid solution to the problem of biased tests that fail to predict or measure
accurately the abilities of people of color); White, supra note 16, at 90 (arguing that test scores
mask the true ability of minority test-takers).
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knowledge base of minority test-takers vis-A-vis their white
counterparts. 27 1 The argument is thus that the exams themselves
"discriminate."
a. Bias Defined
Before discussing whether claims of test bias provide a
coherent rationale for the use of disparate impact litigation against
high-stakes educational tests, it is necessary to define the term briefly.
Although in recent years "test bias" has become a popular catchphrase often used by lay persons to explain racial or ethnic differences
on test scores, the term "test bias" actually has a precise, scientific
meaning. Psychometricians define "bias" as technical flaws in an
examination that lead to incorrect measurements for one or another
subgroup of test-takers. 272 In other words, test bias refers to the
failure of a test to assess accurately the abilities of examinees from a
particular demographic group. This problem often arises when
language barriers prevent one or more groups of test-takers from
understanding the questions asked by a test. Consider, for example, a
test administered in English to Latino students who speak only
Spanish. If the test seeks to measure a trait, such as IQ, which is
unrelated to the ability to speak English, the test will inevitably
underestimate the abilities of the Spanish-speaking children. 273 In
other words, the test would be "biased" against non-English-speaking
Latinos. If, however, the test actually aims to measure the students'
English language proficiency or the ability to solve problems using the
dominant language of our culture (i.e., English), then the source of the
271. White, supra note 16, at 95-106 (arguing that low minority test scores are "the results of
defects in the measurement processes themselves").
272. See GREGORY CAMILLI & LORRIE A. SHEPARD, METHODS FOR IDENTIFYING BIASED TEST
ITEMS 8 (1994). Camilli and Shepard have analogized test bias to "clocking individuals to
measure their running speed, but using a stopwatch that runs too slowly for black runners." Id.
Accordingly, relative comparisons between black runners would remain accurate, while
comparisons between whites and blacks or between group averages would be distorted by bias.
The test would be biased with respect to blacks because the scores obtained by the black runners
do not mean the same thing as the identical score obtained by a white runner. Id.; see also ANNE
ANASTASI, PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING (4th ed. 1976) ("In the psychometric sense, test bias refers to
over prediction or under prediction of criterion measures. If a test consistently under predicts
criterion performance for a given group it shows unfair discrimination or 'bias' against that
group.").
273. This was the scenario in Diana v. Board of Education, No. C-70-37RFP (N.D. Cal.,
settled 1973), in which an IQ test administered in English to Spanish-speaking children was
used to place Latino students in classes for the mentally retarded. See id. (cited in CAMILLI &
SHEPARD, supra note 272, at 7-8); see also Christopher Jencks, Racial Bias in Testing, in THE
BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP 55, 56 (Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips eds., 1998)
(drawing a similar analogy).
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Latino students' difficulty with the exam is relevant to the trait being
measured, and the test is not "biased."
Some commentators and lay persons reflexively assume that
any group test score difference must have been caused by a flawed and
discriminatory exam. 274 But this view confuses the analytically
distinct concepts of "disparate impact" and "test bias."275 Although a
biased test (or test question) may result in disparate demographic
outcomes, it also is possible for a biased test (or question) to yield
demographically proportional results. 276 Moreover, while a biased test
(or question) can yield statistically significant disparities in outcome,
such disparities plainly can be caused by factors other than bias.
Thus, while differences in the mean scores of demographic groups
could theoretically occur because of test bias, different group outcomes
might just as easily be understood as reflecting actual differences
between the groups in the area measured by the test.277 Absent
additional evidence, a finding of disparate impact points nowhere. It
simply begs the question: Are racial or ethnic differences in average
test scores caused by defects in the exam (in which case the exam is
properly said to be "biased") or are such differences indicative of actual
educational gaps (in which case the test is not "biased")?

274. See, e.g., Elul, supra note 16, at 517.
275. See, e.g., CAMILLI & SHEPPARD, supra note 272, at 7; Irving Lorge, Difference or Bias in
Tests of Intelligence, in TESTING PROBLEMS IN PERSPECTIVE (Anne Anastasi ed., 1966)
(explaining as faulty the notion that where there are group differences, there is bias, and where
there are no group differences, there is no bias).
276. Jencks, supra note 273, at 67 (describing research by McGurk in which the black-white
test score gap was found to be twice as large on items deemed "least cultural" than on those
rated "most cultural"). Despite widespread claims that so-called "culturally biased" test questions
are to blame for uneven demographic test results, evidence suggests that "cultural bias" is not
the source of disproportionate outcomes on most tests. Indeed, empirical evidence indicates that
African-Americans perform equally or better on questions deemed to be "culturally loaded" than
those deemed to be culturally neutral. See, e.g., LEE J. CHRONBACH, ESSENTIALS OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING 336 (1990) (noting that the black-white gap is virtually nonexistent on
many items that critics regard as unfair); Flaugher, supra note 1, at 671 (describing research by
Bianchini in which eliminating thirteen items judged to be "culturally biased" from a test of
eighty-two items did not improve the performance of schools with high minority populations
relative to their performance on the original "biased" version); see also Janice Dowd Scheuneman
& Thomas Oakland, High Stakes Tests, in TEST INTERPRETATION AND DIVERSITY: ACHIEVING
EQUITY IN ASSESSMENT 85 (Sandoval et al. eds., 1998) (conceding that the evidence is
"substantial" that tests are unbiased and valid across cultures). This does not mean, of course,
that exams containing so-called "culturally biased" test questions can never produce adverse
racial or ethnic outcomes. To date, however, evidence of such a phenomenon is lacking.
277. Indeed, there are a variety of factors (including income, level of educational resources,
family structure, and cultural differences in family emphasis on education), that might cause, or
contribute to, the creation of real educational deficits among different demographic groups that
are then reflected in test scores.
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The concept of so-called test bias is also frequently confused
with that of test "invalidity." Test "invalidity" refers to the inaccuracy
of an exam across subgroups. 278 A test that is an inaccurate
measurement of the abilities of all test-takers (irrespective of race,
ethnicity, sex, etc.) is invalid, but not biased. 27 9 Although a biased test
is invalid with respect to those subgroups it fails to measure
accurately, a test that is an invalid measurement device for all
subgroups does not suffer from test bias.
A third set of issues that are often incorrectly referred to as
involving "bias," but which do not technically fall into the realm of
bias, are those sociopolitical difficulties that may result from improper
test naming and from public misperceptions that a test reflects
evidence of something other than that which it was designed to
measure. When an achievement test (like a high school exit exam) is
mislabeled or misinterpreted (by test administrators, policymakers, or
the public at large) as a test of innate ability, certain groups may
suffer adverse public policy consequences. 28 0 For example, as Ronald
Flaugher has pointed out, when a test is viewed as a measure of
achievement, low performance can appropriately create public
pressure for an increase in resources to improve performance. If, on
the other hand, the test result is improperly understood to be a
measure of inherent ability, then a low score might be wrongly viewed
as a basis for withholding additional resources on the ground that
spending more money on those who lack the ability to improve is
wasteful. 28 1 The fear of these adverse policy consequences, along with
a fear of the stigma 282 that may result when an achievement test is
improperly perceived or portrayed as an ability test,28 3 has led many
284
civil rights activists to call for elimination of the tests altogether.

278. CIZEK, supra note 33.
279. CAMILLI & SHEPARD, supra note 272, at 8. Modifying Camilli and Shepard's analogy
regarding runners, invalidity-but not bias-would be present if the same broken stop watch
were used to clock the times of all runners, irrespective of race. Thus, in the educational testing
context, when a high school exit exam administered to students statewide is found to contain
flaws which create measurement errors among all demographic groups, the test is invalid, but
not biased.
280. See Flaugher, supra note 1, at 672; Jencks, supra note 273, at 55-56; Christopher
Jencks & Meredith Phillips, THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP: AN INTRODUCTION, in THE

BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP, supra note 273, at 1, 13.
281. Flaugher, supra note 1, at 672.
282. See Jencks, supranote 273, at 56 (explaining this concern).
283. Flaugher, supra note 1, at 672-73 (noting that some people view low test scores "not as a
diagnosis that will lead toward attempts to cure the illness, but rather.., as an official
certification that no help is possible").
284. See id. But see Jencks, supra note 273, at 56 (arguing that the proper way to eliminate
this problem is to change the names of the tests).
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But while the failure of policymakers or the public to understand the
purpose of a test certainly poses a sociopolitical problem, it is not a
problem of "bias" (defined as a measurement error with respect to
certain subgroups of test-takers). 285 Unfortunately, the tendency to
confuse problems of impact, validity, or labeling with problems of
"bias" muddies the public discourse and confuses the legal landscape.
In the context of high-stakes achievement tests, it is unclear
exactly what testing critics mean when they attack tests as "biased."
The educational assessments that are the topic of this paper
necessarily measure, among other things, a student's ability to read,
write, and analyze problems in standard English and, therefore, are
not biased simply because those who have not mastered the English
language underperform in comparison with others. Nor has credible
evidence been presented that any particular test fails to measure
accurately the achievement of minority students. To the contrary,
there is a consistent body of evidence that indicates that disparate
demographic test scores on high school exit exams reflect real and
persistent educational gaps between ethnic groups and are not simply
measurement errors. For example, the achievement gap between black
and Latino students, on the one hand, and their white peers, on the
other hand, has been found to be present across tests and across
assessment devices. Thus, data from the National Assessment of
Educational

Progress

("NAEP"),286

the

National

Educational

285. Harvard social scientist Christopher Jencks refers to this set of problems as "labeling
bias." Jencks, supra note 273, at 58. In my view, the term "bias" is not appropriate to describe
this set of concerns; it appears, rather, that Jencks has identified an important, yet distinct,
sociopolitical problem of mislabeling. See id. at 55-56, 88.
286. The NAEP is a federally mandated series of tests, often referred to as the "nation's
report card," which reports on academic achievement of fourth, eighth, and twelfth grade
students across the country. Administered every two years through the U.S. Department of
Education's National Center for Education Statistics, the NAEP is currently the only assessment
that provides information on the level of achievement of a representative sample of American
students. The NAEP does not provide individual student or school-specific results. (Students who
are tested are selected randomly and their names are not collected.) Rather, it provides a
composite picture of American students' strengths and weaknesses in basic and higher-order
skills; comparisons of achievement by race/ethnicity, gender, type of community, and region; and
trends in performance across the years. See THERNSTROM & THERNSTROM, supra note 8, at 352;
Krista Kafer, A Guide to the NAEP Academic Achievement Test, HERITAGE FOUND.
BACKGROUNDER (Heritage Found., Washington, D.C., Mar. 15, 2002); Georgia Department of

Education, Research, Evaluation, & Testing, National Assessment of Educational Progress, at
http://www.doe.kl2.ga.us/sla/ret/naep.html (last visited May 14, 2002).
On the 1999 NAEP, for example, the average black seventeen-year-old was able to read only
at the level of the average white thirteen-year-old. In the same year, the average black
seventeen-year-old demonstrated the math skills of the average white thirteen-year-old. In other
words, NAEP data indicates that by the age of seventeen, the typical black student lags four
years behind his or her white counterparts. THERNSTROM & THERNSTROM, supra note 7; see also
NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., NAEP 1998 READING REPORT CARD:

2002]

KILLING THE MESSENGER

1175

Longitudinal Survey ("NELS"),28 7 and the SAT 288 all confirm the result
of state educational assessments: African-American and Latino
students lag behind their peers from other ethnic groups at every
educational level. 289 And it is not just standardized test scores that
NATIONAL & STATE HIGHLIGHTS 8-9 (1999), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/pubsinfo.asp?-pubid=1999479; NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., NAEP 1999
TRENDS IN ACADEMIC PROGRESS: THREE DECADES OF STUDENT PERFORMANCE 33 (2000),
available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/pubsinfo.asp?pubid=2000469.
287. The NELS is a large-scale longitudinal study of high school students conducted by the
U.S. Department of Education's National Center for Education Statistics ("NCES"). Begun in
1988, it provides trend data about critical transitions experienced by eighth grade students as
they progressed through high school, secondary school, and/or the workforce. See Center for
Health & Wellbeing, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, National Education
Longitudinal Survey-1988, at http://www.wws.princeton.edul-kling/surveys/NELS88.html.
Data from the NELS confirms that black and Hispanic high school seniors lag behind their white
counterparts in both reading and math. See NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
EDUC., STATISTICAL ANALYSIS REPORT-NATIONAL EDUCATION LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF 1988:
TRENDS AMONG HIGH SCHOOL SENIORS, 1972-1992, at ii, 25-27 (1995) [hereinafter NCES,
TRENDS AMONG HIGH SCHOOL SENIORS], available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs95/95380.pdf. (noting
that in 1992, the effect size of the difference between black and white reading scores was 0.74;
the effect size of the difference between Mexican-American and white reading scores was 0.61,
the effect size of the difference between Puerto Rican and white reading scores was 0.45, and the
effect size of the difference between other Hispanic and white reading scores was 0.43); id.
(noting that in 1992, with respect to math scores, the effect size of the difference between black
and white seniors was 0.97; the effect size of the difference between Mexican-American and
white seniors was 0.70; the effect size of the difference between Puerto Rican and white students
was 0.58; and the effect size of the difference between other Hispanic and white students was
0.38).
288. The SAT I is a test that measures verbal and mathematical reasoning abilities.
Educational
Testing
Service,
Complete
Test
Directory: Test
Directory-S, at
http://www.ets.org/tests/stest.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2002). Among students who planned to
enter college in the fall of 1999, the average score of African-Americans students on the SAT I
Verbal was ninety-three points below that of the average white student. Blacks scored, on
average, 106 points below whites on the SAT I Math. Frontline: Secrets of the SAT-The Test
Score Gap (PBS television broadcast), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/sats/etc/gap.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2002).
289. See generally THERNSTROM & THERNSTROM, supra note 7; see also Jencks & Phillips,
supra note 280, at 1 (noting that the average African-American student scores below seventy-five
percent of whites on most standardized tests). There is some data that indicates that the racial
achievement gap has begun to close since the 1970s. Thus, comparing data from the NELS with
data from two other longitudinal studies (the National Longitudinal Study of the Class of 1972
and High School and Beyond) seems to indicate that the achievement gap between white high
school seniors and black and Latino seniors has narrowed, although disparities still remain. See
NCES, TRENDS AMONG HIGH SCHOOL SENIORS, supra note 287, at ii, 25-27 (noting that with
respect to reading scores, the effect size of the difference between black and white seniors
decreased from 0.97 in 1972 to 0.74 in 1992 and that during the same time period the effect size
of the difference between Mexican-American and white students decreased from 0.89 to 0.61, the
effect size of the difference between Puerto Rican and white students decreased from 0.93 to
0.45, and the effect size of the difference between other Hispanic and white students decreased
from 0.91 to 0.43); id. (noting that with respect to math scores, the effect size of the difference
between black and white seniors decreased from 1.09 in 1972 to 0.97 in 1992, and that during
the same time period the effect size of the difference between Mexican-American and white
seniors decreased from 0.86 to 0.70, the effect size of the difference between Puerto Rican and
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reveal this learning deficit. Grade point averages, graduation rates,
and class rankings of students across the country are, regrettably, also
consistent with this pattern, 290 indicating that claims of bias are, at
291
best, exaggerated.

white students decreased from 1.1 to 0.58, and the effect size of the difference between other
Hispanic and white students decreased from 0.86 to 0.38). However, as Abigail Thernstrom and
Stephan Thernstrom explain in their forthcoming book, since 1988 the trend has been toward a
widening achievement gap in reading. THERNSTROM & THERNSTROM, supra note 7.
290. See, e.g., Fredrick E. Vars & William G. Bowen, Scholastic Aptitude Test Scores, Race,
and Academic Performance in Selective Colleges and Universities, in THE BLACK-WHITE TEST
SCORE GAP, supra note 273, at 457, 461, 465. In a survey of eleven selective colleges and
universities, African-American students were found to have lower college graduation rates than
whites at every level of SAT score and lower average GPAs than their white counterparts (2.80
versus 3.30). Id. An even larger difference in GPAs was found when other differences including
gender, athletic participation, institution, and field of study were controlled. Id. Pedro A.
Noguera and Antwi Akom have written that "[flor years, African-American, Latino and Native
American students have lagged far behind their white and Asian peers on most standardized
tests. The gap is also present in [high school] graduation and dropout rates, [high school] grades
and most other measures of student performance." Pedro A. Noguera & Antwi Akom, Disparities
Demystified: Causes of the Racial Achievement Gap All Derive from Unequal Treatment, NATION,
June 5, 2000, at 29, 29. Unlike critics who refuse to recognize that the test gap represents an
actual achievement gap, Noguera and Akom openly and refreshingly recognize that the problem
of minority underachievement is real. They blame this problem, however, on discrimination in
the K-12 education system itself. Id.
291. Although the reasons why black and Latino students lag behind their white and AsianAmerican peers is beyond the scope of this Article, some discussion is required. For years
education experts argued that differences in test scores could be traced to differences in
resources between minority schools and white schools. Recent studies, however, indicate that
funding differences, more than likely, are not the reason for the disparities, as most school
resources are, in fact, equally distributed between blacks and whites. As Christopher Jencks and
Meredith Phillips have explained, "the average black child and the average white child now live
in school districts that spend almost exactly the same amount per pupil." Jencks & Phillips,
supra note 280, at 9. Instead, Jencks and Phillips argue, "the most important resource difference
between black and white schools seems to be that teachers in black schools have lower test scores
than teachers in white schools." Id. at 10. It is therefore reasonable to hypothesize that a
significant cause of poor minority performance on standardized tests is less academically
prepared teachers. Id. With respect to factors outside of the school itself, research by Jencks and
Phillips suggests that the attitude of a student's parents toward learning and education may be a
significant factor in the achievement gap. Id. at 24. Indeed, Jencks and Phillips have found that
parenting practices and the value placed on education in the home is more closely correlated
with a student's test scores than household income or even the parents' own level of educational
attainment. Id. For further discussion of the academic achievement gap, see generally
THERNSTROM & THERNSTROM, supra note 7 (explaining some of the cultural bases for the gap),
and John McWhorter, Why the Black-White Test Gap Exists, 5 AM. EXPERIMENT Q. 45 (2002)
(rejecting the notion that the average black student underperforms vis-a-vis the average white
student because of underfunding, poverty, or discrimination in the educational system, and
arguing that the performance gap is a result largely of the "acting-white syndrome"-that is, the
phenomenon whereby many black students pejoratively label blacks who succeed academically
as "acing white").
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Test Bias as Rationale for Applying the DisparateImpact Model to
High-Stakes EducationalTests

The fact that the average black or Hispanic student lags behind
the average white student on all accepted measures of educational
achievement strongly suggests that no one measurement device is
aberrational or "biased."292 Yet the disparate impact model enshrines
the opposite presumption into law: tests with disproportionate
demographic results are presumed unlawful unless the educational

292. Scheuneman & Oakland, supra note 276, at 85 ("Overall, the evidence is substantial
that tests are unbiased and valid for use with both sexes and with minority populations.").
When faced with this consistent body of evidence, antitesting commentators often respond
that all measurement devices are biased or that the domains that tests seek to measure are
themselves biased. These scholars and advocates have sought to vastly expand the definition of
bias to include consideration of so-called "unfairness" in the underlying criterion measured by
the tests as well as global claims of societal discrimination. For example, William Kidder has
argued that conventional models of test bias mask the bias of the Law School Admissions Test
("LSAT') because they consider the ability of the test to predict law school grades-a criterion
that Kidder believes is also infected with gender and racial bias. Kidder, supranote 19, at 169-70
n.6 (arguing that validity cannot be established merely by correlating test scores with outcomes
and that the outcomes must also be evaluated for bias). Other commentators have even argued
that standardized tests are biased because they seek to measure areas of knowledge that are
familiar to students from white-European backgrounds and fail adequately to assess the alleged
separately acquired knowledge base of minority students. See THERNSTROM & THERNSTROM,
supra note 8, at 364-65 (describing this critique). This view is expressed in claims that a test of
American history is biased because it seeks to assess students' knowledge of historical figures
who are predominantly white and male as well as in claims that science exams are biased
because they seek to measure a student's ability to think linearly, a trait which some radical
scholars claim is itself "white." Id.
These critiques are rooted in broader attacks on traditional definitions of merit, which
contend that merit and standards are themselves subjective concepts-mere social constructs
created by those in power as a means of protecting their place in society. See, e.g., PATRICIA A.
WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 99 (1991) (adopting the radical view of merit and
bias); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Tenth Chronicle: Merit and Affirmative Action, 83 GEO. L.J.
1711, 1719, 1740-45 (1995) (similar); Robin West, Constitutional Fictions and Meritocratic
Success Stories, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 995, 1018 (1996) (similar); Daria Roithmayr,
Deconstructingthe DistinctionBetween Bias and Merit, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1449 (1997) (similar); see
also DANIEL FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL ASSAULT ON
TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAw (1997) (describing the radical critique of merit and bias). Radical
critiques posit that merit standards, in general, and standardized tests, in particular, can never
be fair or objective and that the entire enterprise of testing is pernicious because it fails to
consider principles of distributive justice. See, e.g., Delgado, supra, at 1719, 1740-45.
Because the radical critiques reject the concepts of merit and testing altogether, they are not
helpful in determining the validity of the disparate impact approach in the educational testing
context. Indeed, the very premise of the bias rationale for the disparate impact model is that this
model can help to separate out those tests that are biased against certain subgroups from those
that are unbiased in a way that the disparate treatment model cannot. If, however, one
subscribes to the view that all tests are inherently biased and unfair, or that the criteria or
standards a test seeks to measure are culturally unfair, then disparate impact litigation becomes
unnecessary. We need only eliminate all standardized tests.
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system can affirmatively prove their value. This approach is not only
counterintuitive, it is ineffective.
Indeed, the application of the disparate impact model fails to
shed light on the question of whether disproportionate test results are
due to test bias, test invalidity, actual gaps in knowledge, or some
other set of factors. That is so because the disparate impact doctrine
does not expressly require consideration of whether the objectionable
disparate impact was actually caused by bias in the exam itself. It
requires only that the educational institution prove that the test bears
a substantial relationship to a legitimate educational objective.
Depending on how this legal standard is applied, disparate impact
litigation could prove to be both underinclusive and overinclusive in
achieving the professed goal of the bias rationale-i.e., eliminating
tests that inaccurately measure minority achievement.
Suppose, for example, that a court accepts as offered in good
faith a school district's goal of accountability. Assume further that
defendants proffer testimonial and statistical evidence demonstrating
that the test and the threat of the diploma sanction help to motivate
students to study and teachers to focus on particular aspects of the
curriculum. The court could then plausibly find that the school district
had demonstrated the "educational necessity 2 93 for the testing
regime, even if the test is actually biased against minority test-takers.
Even where a test is deemed "educationally necessary,"
plaintiffs may argue that there are less discriminatory assessment
devices that can achieve the same goal. But suppose that the
alternatives cited by the plaintiffs fail to motivate learning in the
same manner as the test. Or suppose that other assessment devices
have a similar adverse impact as the challenged test. Under the
disparate impact model, a court could very well uphold this exam,
even though it is technically biased. In this scenario, the disparate
impact model fails to eliminate a biased exam; it is therefore
underinclusive.
More likely, however, is the opposite scenario, in which use of
the disparate impact model results in the elimination of a fair and
unbiased test. Suppose that the plaintiffs proffer statistical evidence
demonstrating that over a five-year period the requirement that
students pass an exit exam in order to receive a diploma has failed to
motivate learning and, indeed, has caused the dropout rate among
minority students to increase significantly. In these circumstances,
the school district could be found liable for disparate impact
discrimination even if the testing policy was well intentioned and the
293. See supra Part V.B.1.
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exam proved bias free (and even, it should be noted, if the test might
have improved outcomes in the long run).294 Thus, the disparate
impact model fails to achieve the stated goal of the bias
inaccurate
that
are
tests
is, eliminating
rationale-that
measurements of minority performance due to "cultural bias." "Bias,"
therefore, cannot be a viable basis for applying disparate impact
doctrine to standardized tests.
c. Reformulating the DisparateImpact Model to Conform to
the Bias Rationale
Several recent proposals for reform appear, on their face, to
address the underinclusiveness and overinclusiveness of the bias
rationale. In 2000, the Resource Guide developed by the Clinton
that
suggested
of Education
Department
Administration's
"educational necessity" be redefined to require proof of the test's
scientific validity (in other words, a test's accuracy and reliability for
measuring the constructs that it purports to measure across
demographic groups). 295 Defining "educational necessity" to mean
"scientific validity" would indeed reduce the disparate impact model's
potential for underinclusiveness under the bias rationale. Requiring
proof of scientific validity would eliminate those tests whose adverse
impact and invalidity result from bias. At the same time, however, the
problem of overinclusiveness would be exacerbated. This is so because,
as explained previously, 296 while all biased tests are invalid tests, not
all invalid tests underestimate the skills or knowledge of particular
subgroups of test-takers vis-A-vis the entire group. To the contrary, a
test can be invalid for a host of reasons that affect all examinees.
Thus, even a disparate impact model that requires proof of scientific
validity in order to prove educational necessity would be overinclusive
from the perspective of the bias rationale in that it would screen out
exams that, while perhaps flawed with respect to all test-takers, are
not racially or ethnically biased. 297 And while eliminating flawed
294. As previously stated, this scenario is indeed troubling and may give educators and
policymakers cause to reconsider or reformulate the testing policy. But a test's undesirable social

impact does not call into question the legality of the test itself.
295. See RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 220, ch. 2. This approach is also favored by Professor
Jay Heubert who advocates giving binding authority to the American Educational Research
Associations' Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing. See NAT'L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, supra note 15, at 226.
296. See supra Part V.A.2.a and text accompanying notes 280-81.
297. It is perhaps for this reason that, with respect to employment testing, the Supreme
Court has expressed a reluctance to require proponents of standardized tests to introduce formal
validation studies demonstrating that the exams predict actual performance. See, e.g., Watson v.
Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 997, 998 (1988).
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exams is, indeed, a worthy educational goal, it is not the role of
antidiscrimination law to do so.
The critical normative question, then, is this: Why must we go
through the whole disparate impact charade of trying to prove
"educational necessity," or even scientific validity, if what really
concerns us as a matter of antidiscrimination law is test bias? Federal
disparate impact litigation seems a costly and imprecise means of
attacking this problem (if, indeed, the problem exists at all). To be
intellectually honest, to avoid confusion in the law, and to achieve a
fairer testing regime, those who are concerned with test bias should
promote reforms that would require explicit consideration of test
bias-either through regulation to eliminate unfair questions (but not
the testing regime itself)298 or as part of the "totality of the
299
circumstances" inquiry under a claim of intentional discrimination.
3. The Social Impact/Inequality Rationale
Distinct from the intentional discrimination and bias rationales
is the argument that disparate impact litigation is a necessary
mechanism for the elimination of barriers to social progress. According
to this rationale, the crux of the issue is not whether the tests are
biased or otherwise flawed (most of them are not), but rather the
social impact and harm that such policies cause to vulnerable
demographic groups. 300 Many of the commentators who support the

298. In fact, concerns of so-called test bias are already being addressed by test makers and
local regulatory agencies, which today go to great lengths to make sure that test questions are
appropriate to a wide range of cultural backgrounds. Indeed, testing companies and state
regulatory agencies already employ high level "sensitivity reviews" in order to remove test items
that may prove offensive or insulting to certain demographic subgroups. In Massachusetts, for
example, state law requires that "assessment instruments ... be designed to avoid gender,
cultural, ethnic or racial stereotypes." MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 69, § 11 (West Supp. 2002).
And in Texas, each question on the TAAS exam is screened nine times for any racial or ethnic
bias by a special committee. Reviewers are responsible for considering whether a test question
with an adverse demographic outcome is culturally contingent and unrelated to the skills or body
of knowledge the test aims to measure. Where a biased question produces an inaccurate result,
the offending question is eliminated. Significantly, however, the testing regime itself remains in
place. See GI Forum v. Tex. Educ. Agency, 87 F. Supp. 2d 667, 672 (W.D. Tex. 2000); Texas
Education Agency, Test Development Process, at http://www.tea.state.tx.us/student.assessment/develop/devproc.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2001); Jeff Webb, Litmus Tests for Racial Bias, TEX.
A & M BATTALION, 1999.
299. See, e.g., Parents in Action on Special Educ. v. Hannon, 506 F. Supp. 831, 875 (N.D. Ill.
1980); Larry P. v. Riles, 495 F. Supp. 926, 959-66 (N.D. Cal. 1979). In both of these cases, the
courts considered claims of test bias in conjunction with plaintiffs' claims of intentional
discrimination.
300. See, e.g., Chamallas, supra note 153, at 377 n.334 (citing former EEOC Chairman
Eleanor Holmes Norton as arguing that the concept of validity, or technical accuracy, provides an
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use of disparate impact theory on this basis acknowledge that group
differences in test scores reflect an actual achievement gap, but they
worry that penalizing such students by withholding a diploma will
have a negative social outcome, thus further entrenching current
inequalities.3 0 1 According to this argument, high short-term failure
rates in minority communities will unfairly disadvantage students
who have not been afforded an equal educational opportunity to
master the material on the test and will result in a caste-like system
in which the majority of students from the dominant class receive a
diploma credential while large numbers of students from
disadvantaged communities are forced to navigate life without it.
This argument mirrors Professor Michael Perry's argument in
favor of applying the disparate impact model to public employment
policies so as not to "reinforce social evils" created by a racist state in
the first instance. 30 2 Yet the two contexts-employment and
educational testing-are different. In the employment context, the
concept of harm to a disadvantaged job seeker is obvious: not being
hired. Such outcomes may directly serve to entrench existing
inequalities. While the employer may benefit, there is no
corresponding direct benefit to the individuals affected, either
immediately or in the long run. On the other hand, in the educational
arena it is quite possible that a testing regime will operate not to
entrench inequalities, but to alleviate them, both in the short term
and in the long run.

"out" for those who create and/or administer tests with a racially harmful effect and, thus, avoids
the more significant question of social harm).
301. See Jay P. Heubert, Nondiscriminatory Use of High-Stakes Tests: Combining
Professional Test-Use Standards with Federal Civil-Rights Enforcement, 133 EDUC. L. REP. 17,
27 (1999). In the Executive Summary to the National Research Council's study on the use of
high-stakes tests, editors Jay Heubert and Robert Hauser implicitly recognize that the lower test
scores of racial and ethnic minorities reflect a real educational deficit. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
supra note 15, at 4 (noting that disparate racial outcomes on high-stakes tests "reflect persistent
inequalities in American society and its schools"). Heubert and Hauser, nevertheless, object to
the use of high-stakes tests to make determinations regarding graduation on the ground that
such policies simply "reinforce these inequalities." Id.; see also White, supra note 16, at 95
(describing as separate from the bias rationale the view that test scores, while accurate, are
nevertheless unfair because the poor performance of disadvantaged groups is caused by current
inequality and/or past discrimination).
302. Perry, supra note 155, at 558-59. Significantly, in early testing cases concerning testing
of students who began their education under de jure segregation, courts have had little trouble
enjoining on the grounds of intentional discrimination the use of a test where the test's use
would entrench inequality. See Anderson v. Banks, 520 F. Supp. 472 (S.D. Ga. 1981); Debra P. v.
Turlington, 474 F. Supp. 244 (M.D. Fla. 1979); see also supra note 35 and accompanying text
(discussing Anderson and Debra P.). These results indicate that the disparate impact model is
not necessary to root out policies that carry forward the legacy of discrimination.
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With respect to educational testing, and, indeed, with respect
to educational policies in general, notions of harm and benefit are less
clear-cut than in the employment context. Although the failure to
receive a diploma may cause harm to disadvantaged students, an
equal or greater harm may be caused by receiving an inadequate
30 3
education that does not meet some minimal standards.
Accountability proponents argue that the absence of strict
accountability measures has contributed significantly to the minority
achievement gap and current inequalities. From this perspective,
high-stakes exams, far from hurting minority students, actually help
to break the cycle of failure by allowing policymakers to target scarce
resources where they are most needed and by forcing schools to ensure
that a greater percentage of students achieve at least minimal levels
30 4
of competency.
Significantly, while critics of standardized testing in the
employment arena rarely recognize any benefit to employees or
potential employees from standardized employment tests, critics of
educational testing are likely to concede that high-stakes educational
30 5
exams create both costs and benefits for minority students.
Instead of simply creating a "disparate impact"--that is, a
purely adverse racial or ethnic outcome-such high-stakes educational
assessments create a "dual impact" on both minority communities and
individual students. 30 6 Thus, those African-American and Hispanic
303. See GI Forum, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 674 ("The receipt of an education that does not meet
some minimal standards is an adverse impact just as surely as failure to receive a diploma.");
Taylor, supra note 12 ("[A]rguments [that denying diplomas to students who fail graduation
exams will entrench social inequalities] confuse the symbol of the diploma with the level of
education it represents. It misses the central point that the real high stakes are imposed not by a
test, but by educational neglect.... Students who receive a bad education are penalized whether
or not they receive a diploma.").
304. Because the Texas accountability system requires the collection of data on the passage
rates of each ethnic or racial group within a school district, the Texas plan forces school districts
to focus on assisting disadvantaged students. See Order for Summary Judgment, supra note 208;
see also GIForum,87 F. Supp. 2d at 667.
305. See, e.g., Heubert, supra note 34 (noting that both arguments are "plausible" and that,
in reality, "high-stakes testing present[s] both opportunities and risks for students of color").
Professor Heubert has also noted that, in the tracking context, courts often split on whether lowtrack educational placements are "remedial," and thus educationally beneficial, or educationally
harmful "dead ends." See Heubert, supra note 301, at 27.
306. My position regarding education policies that result in disparate racial outcomes
complements the view of those scholars who have analyzed the concomitant positive and
negative effects of the criminal laws on communities of color. Professor Randall L. Kennedy, for
example, has written that facially neutral criminal statutes often harm some members of the
African-American community while simultaneously assisting other segments of that same
community. Kennedy, supra note 143. Professor Kennedy writes that
[a]lthough blacks subject to relatively heavy punishment for crack possession are
burdened by it, their black law-abiding neighbors are presumably helped by it (insofar
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students who fail the MCAS or the TAAS will be burdened by the
testing policy if they are ultimately unable to earn a high school
diploma. At the same time, however, many of the minority students
who fail the exam in the first instance will be benefited by the
academic assistance and remedial services they receive as a result of
the their initial failure-and many of these students may ultimately
pass the exam and receive diplomas. In some cases, a student who
repeatedly fails the exit exam, but who participates in all of the
available remedial classes, may not receive a diploma, but may,
nevertheless, benefit from improving his reading and writing skills.
Even those African-American and Hispanic students who pass the
exam on the first attempt may benefit from the policy if, as a result of
the testing regime, they graduate from high school with skills or
knowledge they might otherwise not have obtained.
On a broader community level, many primarily black and
Hispanic communities benefit from the increased resources that may
flow to their schools as a result of testing regimes. 30 7 And standardized
tests establish an incentive for school systems to recruit and promote
better teachers.
In addition to these contemporaneous dual impacts, high school
exit exams with disparate racial or ethnic results in the short term
may actually eliminate or reduce racial or ethnic disparities in the
long run, as the beneficial disparate impact has the consequence of
reducing the harmful impact over time. Minority communities, and
society as a whole, may therefore conclude that the short-term racial
or ethnic disparities are acceptable if the testing policy eventually

as the statute deters and punishes drug trafficking that typically takes place in their
midst). Although black youngsters who wish to stay out late are burdened by a
curfew, blacks who feel more secure because of the curfew are benefited. Although
black members of violent gangs are burdened by police crackdowns on such gangs,
blacks terrorized by gangs are aided. Although some black women who use illicit
drugs harmful to unborn babies are burdened by prosecutions that punish them for
this conduct, it is at least plausible to suppose that the deterrent effect of such
prosecutions will help other black unborn children.
Id. at 1273-74. Because criminal laws can simultaneously "help" and "harm" members of the
same community, Professor Kennedy concludes that-in the absence of evidence of purposeful
discrimination-courts "should refrain from condemning a state criminal policy as violative of
the Equal Protection Clause." (Professor Kennedy leaves open, however, the possibility that
policies with a racially disparate impact may be prohibited through regulation or legislation.) Id.
at 1274; see also Gary S. Becker, Tough Justice Is Saving Our Inner Cities, BUS. WK., July 17,
2000, at 26 (arguing that minorities are the major beneficiaries of "tough on crime" policies and
that the focus on the disproportionate number of blacks and Hispanics in the U.S. prison
population ignores the disproportionate number of black and Hispanic victims of crime).
307. See Alexakis, supra note 17 (explaining that MCAS has helped Massachusetts target
resources to disadvantaged communities and noting the related support for high-stakes testing
policies in disadvantaged communities).

1184

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:1111

helps to narrow the, achievement gap. 308 Thus, at worst, high-stakes
exams can be said to create not a disparate impact but a "dual
impact" 309 -both positive and negative-on minority communities and
310
individual minority students.
Because education policies will always affect different
segments of minority communities differently, it is inappropriate to
generalize and claim that a policy with disparate racial or ethnic
outcomes favors the interests of white students over the interests of
minority students.3 1 1 To the contrary, where a policy creates both costs
and benefits for minorities, both courses of action-the
implementation of the policy and the failure to institute the
policy--can plausibly be described as entrenching inequality. 312 Thus,
if, as testing proponents argue, testing is an important means of
ensuring that black and Latino students, poor students, and students
308. See GI Forum, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 671 (holding that the disproportionate short-term effect
on minority graduation rates is outweighed by the concomitant long-term societal results).
309. Examples of "dual impact" educational policies abound. For example, the practice of
teaching classroom lessons in English necessarily makes it more difficult for immigrant students
from non-English speaking countries to compete with native English speakers. Yet, using
English also benefits such students by teaching them to navigate the language of the dominant
culture and benefits all students and, indeed, society at large, by fostering a society united by a
common language.
Consider, also, the "zero tolerance" disciplinary policies promulgated by a number of schools
in recent years. Some civil rights activists argue that such policies are discriminatory because
they have resulted in a disproportionate number of African-American students being expelled
from school. See Chaddock, supra note 122, at 14 (discussing high-stakes tests and zero-tolerance
policies). But a plausible argument can also be made that such policies actually help those who
are expelled by giving them a "wake-up call" and forcing them to take responsibility for their
lives. Even if one rejects the argument that strict disciplinary measures are a benefit to those
who are disciplined, it is difficult to dismiss the argument that such policies may benefit other
members of the same demographic community by removing troublemakers from the learning
environment. Cf. Kennedy, supra note 143, at 1255 (arguing that criminal laws may burden
black lawbreakers while simultaneously benefiting the majority of the black citzens who are law
abiding).
310. A similar argument can be made with respect to public employment. Thus, while
minority applicants to the police academy might be disproportionately burdened by a
requirement that applicants pass a written exam, the public, and the minority community in
particular, might be better served by a better-educated police force. The same is true of teacher
certification exams. While black and Latino prospective teachers might be heavily burdened by
the certification requirement, students-particularly poor or otherwise disadvantaged
students-would be better served by teachers who (at a minimum) understood the material they
are required to teach than by those who do not. See generally Michael A. Rebell, Disparate

Impact of Teacher Competency Testing on Minorities:Don't Blame the Test-Taker--or the Tests, 4
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 375 (1986). As strong as this argument is in the public employment
context, it is even stronger in the education setting where dual impact can be felt not only across
the community but within individuals.
311. Cf.Kennedy, supra note 143, at 1253 (advancing similar argument with respect to drug
sentencing policy).
312. Cf. id (explaining how arguments about black genocide are used both in favor of and
against drug legalization).
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from inner-city schools receive the same educational opportunities as
their white suburban counterparts, then it is the failure to hold
schools accountable, not the attempt to do so, that causes the more
3 13
pernicious harm.
Any determination as to whether the costs of high-stakes tests
outweigh the benefits to a particular subgroup necessarily involves
both empirical predictions and value judgments. The empirical
questions involve the extent to which the negative disparate impact
(i.e., greater failure rates among black and Latino students) will be
reduced over time due to the positive impact (greater accountability,
remediation, and resources) or mitigated by other circumstances (i.e.,
the extent to which even those who fail to graduate have improved
their knowledge and skills as a result of the accountability system).
The value judgment involves deciding which negative externality-a
short-term drop in graduation rates for minority students or the
continued failure of schools to educate minority students
properly-constitutes the greater evil. This decision-as to who (both
at a point in time and over time) should bear the burden of the
educational policy-belongs in the realm of local policymaking and not
in the realm of the courts or federal administrative agencies that
generally consider the viewpoints of only two parties to an adversary
314
process.
The notion that high-stakes tests will inevitably entrench
social inequality is by no means obvious or universally accepted.
Therefore, the use of federal antidiscrimination laws to halt or
interfere with well-intentioned education reforms is inappropriate.
4. Other Rationales
The previous subsection sought to demonstrate that the three
most commonly offered rationales for using disparate impact litigation
313. High Standards: Giving All Students a Fair Shot, supra note 10, at 2 (arguing that
without tests, inequities between black and white and rich and poor will likely persist beneath
the radar).
314. Those who file administrative claims or federal lawsuits over the use of high-stakes
tests are usually concerned only with the negative impact the test may have on a narrow class of
individuals. Indeed, the nature of the adversarial system necessarily focuses advocates single
mindedly on the short-term cost of testing policies borne by minority students who fail the exam
and ignore the beneficial impact on minority students who are better educated as a result of the
policy. Because the adversarial system (whether played out at an administrative agency or in
federal court) inevitably obscures the forest for the trees, it is not an appropriate forum for
resolving educational policy disputes. Cf. Lambert, supra note 27, at 1186 (warning that a
regime that permits private plaintiffs to bring suit every time a public policy affects groups of
students differently inappropriately gives individuals from the adversely affected group the
power to override state policy and legitimate efforts at governmental reform).
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against standardized tests (the objective evidence theory, the bias
rationale, and the social impact theory) fail to support the model's use
in the educational testing context. Other theoretical bases are also
unpersuasive.
a. "StatisticalDiscrimination"
As explained above, statistical discrimination in the
employment context occurs when employers, lacking perfect
information regarding a job applicant's potential for success on the job,
rely upon proxies that are closely correlated with race and only loosely
correlated with productivity. 315 Because employers face economic
incentives to engage in practices that may result in statistical
discrimination,3 16 this theory posits that the disparate impact
approach is a necessary mechanism to prevent the use of illegitimate
proxies and the compounding effects of discrimination in the labor
31 7
market.
The statistical discrimination rationale is not transferable to
the education arena. In the employment context, proponents of the
statistical discrimination rationale for disparate impact reject the use
of tests or other policies that are only marginally helpful in predicting
future "success" on the job. In the educational assessment context,
however, this model fails-both because the concept of future "success"
is more difficult to define with respect to education than with respect
to employment, and because high-stakes educational assessments are
not, in fact, used as predictive devices.
Although it may be reasonable to link workplace "success" with
productivity, in the education arena productivity has no appropriate
analog. The concept of educational success cannot be cabined by
economic baselines and, indeed, can be defined any number of ways by
any number of entities. Legal scholars, primary and secondary school
teachers, college professors, parents, and students themselves may all
have different conceptions of what counts as educational "success" and
hence what measure of future performance is appropriate in
determining the predictive validity of a test.3 18
315. See supra notes 157-59 and accompanying text.
316. See supra Part III.B.
317. As articulated by Professor Steven Willborn, the "statistical discrimination" theory
tracks the first prong of Professor Owen Fiss's "functional equivalence" theory, discussed supra
notes 160-63 and infra notes 320-25, in that it views with suspicion employment criteria which
are poor predictors of productivity and which are strongly correlated with race.
318. See, e.g., Kidder, supra note 19, at 190-95 (arguing that when measuring the validity of
the LSAT, the appropriate analog to productivity is not success in the first year, but completion
of the degree program or passage of the bar exam).
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How, then, should courts determine whether a test accurately
predicts educational success? Should courts look to the correlation
between performance on the test and performance at the next
educational level as measured by grades? (If so, should courts compare
test scores with cumulative grades or only with grades in courses
substantively related to the test itself?) Or should courts look to see
whether test scores correlate with "success" in the "real world" as
measured by future earnings? The lack of consensus as to how
precisely we should measure future success in this context renders the
disparate impact model highly problematic in the educational setting.
Moreover, while employers generally control the workplace and
prescribe the tasks to be performed by various employees, secondary
schools and colleges exert limited control over a student's academic
choices, making future "success" impossible to predict accurately. The
statistical discrimination rationale may therefore provide a useful
rationale for the disparate impact model in the employment context,
but, where, as in the case of high-stakes educational assessments, the
definition of future success is both disputed and variable, the
approach loses its utility.
More importantly, unlike standardized exams utilized by
employers to select employees, high-stakes educational tests that are
used to make promotion and graduation decisions do not in fact aim to
predict anything. Rather, they are used to measure levels of
achievement and to certify that students at each educational level
have gained the minimal skills and knowledge that educators and
policymakers have determined to be appropriate. In view of this
assessment purpose, it is inappropriate to use future success (however
defined) as a benchmark for validity in educational testing. Indeed, in
an educational setting, it is entirely appropriate to measure general
knowledge and skills for their own sake, even if an examinee's score on
the challenged test correlates with nothing else. In other words, in the
education setting, there is only one relevant question: Does the test
measure that which it purports to measure? If so, the fact that the test
fails to correlate with success at some other point in time on some
other benchmark is simply irrelevant. Because the failure to predict
future performance should not render an educational assessment
invalid, the statistical discrimination rationale cannot properly justify
the use of the disparate impact model in cases involving educational
tests used solely as a means of assessment.
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b. FunctionalEquivalence
Under the functional equivalence theory advanced by Professor
Owen Fiss, the disparate impact model is appropriately used where
the test in question proves to be a poor or weak predictor of
productivity and the criterion that the test measures is one over which
examinees lack individual control. 319 As explained above with respect
to the statistical discrimination rationale, because educational success
is easily manipulated and difficult to quantify, and because
standardized promotion or graduation exams are generally used to
measure prior achievement, not future performance, the functional
equivalence rationale is not an appropriate basis on which to justify
the use of disparate impact theory with respect to high-stakes
320
educational assessments.
Even putting aside these problems with the first prong of the
functional equivalence rationale, additional problems with the second
prong
of
the
functional
equivalence
analysis--individual
control-would render the disparate impact model inappropriate with
respect to educational testing. This is because knowledge and
academic skills-unlike inheritance (as in the nepotism example used
by Professor Owen Fiss) 32 1 --are in large part within the control of the
students themselves.
Writing in 1971, Professor Fiss argued that, in some places,
intentional racial discrimination in the public education system might
provide an explanation for poor test performance by minorities. 322 In
such circumstances, a person's performance on a general intelligence
battery or achievement test might be said to be outside of his or her
own control. For instance, where, as in Griggs,323 a black job

319. See supra Part III.B and notes 162-65 and accompanying text.
320. Some states have proposed making students who do not pass the state-mandated high
school exit exam ineligible for admission to that state's public colleges and universities. See, e.g.,
Scott S. Greenberger, MCAS Required for State Colleges: Local Certificates Not Acceptable,
BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 28, 2000, at B1. This use of test results does not change the analysis
because the tests are still not intended to predict anything; rather, they are intended to certify
mastery of a previous course of study.
Even where high-stakes tests such as the SAT or LSAT are used to predict future
performance, the "statistical discrimination" and "functional equivalence" rationales fail to
justify the use of disparate impact theory to challenge such tests. In the employment setting,
these rationales rely on the fact that some exams (and other selection devices) only weakly
correlate with success as measured by productivity. But, as explained previously, see supra Part
V.A.4.a, the concept of "educational success" cannot be cabined by measurable productivity or
any other economic baselines.
321. Fiss, supra note 136, at 303.
322. Id.
323. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. at 424, 427 (1971).
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applicant's lack of a high school diploma or poor performance on an
employment examination was due to systemic intentional
discrimination in the educational system, the use of such a hiring
criterion would be appropriately subject to rigorous disparate impact
analysis.
According to Fiss, it is appropriate to infer a lack of individual
control over one's ability to learn if the racial discrimination in the
educational system is of "a unique, systematic character"--as in the
case of de jure segregation.3 24 Yet this inference seems implausible in
the year 2002. Today our educational institutions do not practice the
sort of "unique, systematic" discrimination of which Fisk wrote. 325 And
it would be outrageous, if not outright racist, to conclude that black
and Latino students lack all control over their ability to learn. Indeed,
the implementation of high-stakes tests rests on the premise that
academic achievement can be improved through the efforts of teachers
and students. To insist, instead, that black and Hispanic students are
uniquely unable to exert some control over their ability to learn would
be an absurd claim of inability and inferiority and would do nothing to
326
ameliorate the achievement gap that now exists.
To be sure, we can expect that some students who hail from
impoverished family backgrounds and who attend schools in highpoverty areas will have a more difficult time passing the MCAS or the
TAAS than will students from wealthier suburban districts. But, in
this regard, poor white students will be as disadvantaged as poor
black students; as a general matter, black students attending
suburban schools will be as privileged as white students attending
suburban schools. To the extent that economically disadvantaged
students "lack individual control" over their ability to pass
standardized tests, this is not due to their race, but rather to the fact
that they have received an inadequate education from a dysfunctional
school system.
c.

Strong Theories of DisparateImpact

As explained previously, "strong" justifications for the
disparate impact model of employment discrimination presume that

324. Fiss, supra note 136, at 299.
325. But see Noguera & Akom, supra note 290, at 29 (arguing that racial and ethnic
discrimination infects all aspects of the educational system).
326. Professor Fiss does not argue that all students who attend inferior schools lack
individual control over their ability to learn, only that those who have suffered intentional
discrimination in the school system lack control over their ability to learn. Fiss, supra note 136,
at 303.
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the model can compensate minorities for past injustices by forcing
employers to distribute jobs on the basis of race, or at least in
proportion to the racial makeup of the labor market. 327 But the notion
of compensatory justice--that is, the idea that societal goods, such as
jobs, should be distributed in a way that compensates for past
injustice--makes little sense with respect to educational testing. The
notion that a black or Hispanic student deserves a high school
diploma, not because he may have earned it, but because society owes
it to him, makes the concept of a diploma (which, after all, is supposed
to be a certificate of mastery) meaningless. Proponents of the
compensatory justice rationale might argue that individuals who are
denied a high school diploma will be disadvantaged in the job market
and, thus, the awarding of a diploma is equally as important as the
awarding an actual job. There is little empirical evidence, however,
that those students who are unable to obtain a high school diploma
are worse off after leaving school than those students who obtain a
diploma but who, nevertheless, have failed to master basic skills. It is
a lack of skills-not the absence of a piece of paper-that prevents
individuals from succeeding in the workplace. Giving someone a
worthless diploma cannot, therefore, provide compensation for
previous societal wrongs.
B. Normative Arguments Against Applying the DisparateImpact
Model to Education
Part V.A argued that none of the proffered theoretical bases for
the disparate impact model justifies its use with respect to educational
testing. This section offers other reasons why the disparate impact
model should not be used to thwart high-stakes educational tests. On
a doctrinal level, the concept of "business necessity" is not easily
transmuted into a coherent concept of "educational necessity." At a
more basic level, the underlying enterprises of businesses (on the one
hand) and schools (on the other) are very different. Given the different
organizing principles of these two types of activity, the use of testing
in the educational context cannot be directly analogized to testing in
the employment context. Although the disparate impact doctrine
might be coherently applied to private sector employment, the
doctrine cannot be coherently applied to educational testing.

327. See supra text accompanying note 154.
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1. The Failure of the "Educational Necessity" Standard
By what objective standard are courts supposed to evaluate
educational testing policies? We are told by proponents of the
disparate impact model that courts should apply the standard of
"educational necessity,"3 28 although this standard is ambiguous, if not
opaque. Under Title VII, the necessity of an employer's policy is
generally judged by its relationship to productivity, profit margins, or
other economic baselines-all of which are arguably quantifiable.
These guideposts, however, cannot help ascertain the "necessity" of an
educational policy or practice. That is because, as difficult as it might
be to identify accurately the connection between a specific employment
policy and productivity, it is even more difficult to identify the
connection between a particular educational practice (e.g., testing) and
an educational institution's purported goal (e.g., student motivation).
And it is nearly impossible to identify accurately the connection
between a particular educational goal (e.g., mastery of ninth-grade
level mathematics) and "productive citizenship."
In the employment setting, proponents of the disparate impact
model have argued that even where a test is generally consistent with
"business necessity," a high cutoff score that results in
disproportionate demographic outcomes should be considered
unlawful if the threshold score does not marginally increase
productivity over other potential cutoff scores. 329 Once again, however,
this argument is meaningless when educational achievement, not
productivity, is the issue. Unlike the skills measured by employment
tests, which are supposed to correlate with success on the job, the
domains measured by educational tests-levels of achievement--are
not necessarily intended to correlate with anything other than
mastery of the areas tested and current academic skills. Hence, the
appropriate cutoff score on a test in the school setting cannot be
determined by reference to factors other than the educational
objectives of the curriculum itself. Educational policymakers should
have the right to set the bar for academic achievement as high (or as
low) as they deem reasonable. The selection of a cutoff score in this
context is entirely a policy choice, and thus-by definition-cannot be
an "educational necessity." Any attempt to apply the "educational
necessity" standard to cutoff scores in the education setting

328. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 15, at 59.
329. See, e.g., Willborn, supra note 18, at 821.
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transforms an antidiscrimination law into a device for establishing the
33 0
educational standards themselves.
In the absence of clear and objective criteria by which to judge
the "necessity" of a particular educational policy, courts have, not
surprisingly, developed a variety of approaches for measuring a test's
legality. 33 1 Some courts have required proof that the objective
underlying the challenged policy is "substantially legitimate," 332 while
others require proof that the educational objective is "legitimate,
333
important, and integral" to the institution's mission.
Even when courts accept the legitimacy of the educational
objectives underlying a particular testing policy or practice, there is no
clear or obvious legal standard that courts can apply to decide whether
the policy or practice is sufficiently tailored to meet these objectives.
Some courts have adopted a stringent standard, while others have
been more permissive. Some courts require proof that the test (or
other policy or practice) bears a "manifest relationship" to the
educational goal. 334 At the other extreme, at least one court has held
that a defendant fails to meet its burden of proving educational
necessity "only if the evidence reflects that the test falls so far below
acceptable and reasonable minimum standards that the test could not
'3 35
be reasonably understood to do what it purports to do.

330. Cf. Groves v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 776 F. Supp. 1518 (M.D. Ala. 1991). In Groves, a
federal trial court held unlawful Alabama's requirement that students seeking admission to
undergraduate teaching programs at state universities have received a certain minimum score
on the ACT. Id. at 1519. The Groves court reasoned that the passing score set by the state was
insufficiently correlated with minimal competence as a teacher. In so holding, the court
inappropriately applied the productivity theory used in the employment setting to an educational
test, the goal of which was to measure general knowledge and skills, not productivity or
competence. See Maltz, supra note 178, at 360-61 (noting that in the credit context, application of
the disparate impact model would turn antidiscrimination laws into vehicles for controlling
profit margins).
331. See Elul, supra note 16, at 518 (noting that courts have reached mixed results in
disparate impact challenges to educational policies); see also Heubert, supra note 301, at 27
(describing the varying approaches to "educational necessity" adopted by different courts).
332. See Cureton v. NCAA, 37 F. Supp. 2d 687 (E.D. Pa.) (rejecting as neither legitimate nor
substantial defendant's proffered educational objective), rev'd on other grounds, 198 F.3d 107 (3d
Cir. 1999).
333. See Elston v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1413 (11th Cir. 1993).
334. See, e.g., Ga. State Conference Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1418
(11th Cir. 1985) (requiring a "manifest demonstrable relationship"); Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d
969, 982 n.9 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that test must bear a "manifest relationship" to the
educational goal); Sharif v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep't, 709 F. Supp. 345, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(requiring a "manifest relationship").
335. Richardson v. Lamar County Bd. of Educ., 729 F. Supp. 806, 822-23, 825 (M.D. Ala.
1989) (holding that Alabama's teacher certification test was not educationally necessary under
Title VII because it failed to measure that which it claimed to measure).
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In sum, the "educational necessity" standard provides a factfinding court with broad latitude in the exercise of its discretion-from
a heightened deference to educational policy choices to virtually no
deference to such policies. Yet the goals and policies adopted by
educational institutions are based on a variety values that are difficult
to quantify, and it is manifestly within the province of our political
and democratically elected branches of government-not the
judiciary-to determine what those values are or what those values
should be. 336 Recognizing that courts possess neither the expertise nor
the political mandate to support unwarranted intrusions into
education policy, the U.S. Supreme Court has cautioned that federal
courts should not overrule state or local education policy absent a
clear-cut violation of the law. 337 The application of the "educational
necessity" standard to public education in disparate impact litigation
flies in the face of the Court's instruction and invites courts to usurp
the role of state and local governments and second-guess their efforts
to establish educational goals and methods for achieving them.
Moreover, even if we could be certain that courts could resist
the temptation to second-guess educational policymakers, use of the
disparate impact model with respect to educational testing would be
inappropriate. Disparate impact cases, by their nature, do not involve
clear-cut violations of the law-those cases are brought under the
disparate treatment model of discrimination. Accordingly, courts that
adhere to the Supreme Court's admonition to defer to local educational
decisions absent clear legal violations will tend almost invariably to
uphold educational policies from disparate impact challenges,
rendering the model a useless exercise and a waste of scarce judicial,
administrative, and educational resources.
2. Recent Efforts to Refine and Codify the Definition of
"Educational Necessity"
Some commentators have claimed that the concept of
"educational necessity" is unworkable precisely because Congress and
the U.S. Department of Education have failed to define the term by
336. See Maltz, supra note 178, at 359 (making a similar argument regarding the application
of the disparate impact model to zoning laws).
337. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42 (1973) (stating that the
judiciary's lack of specialized knowledge in the area of education counsels against its interference
with informed educational judgments made at the local level); see also GI Forum v. Tex. Educ.
Agency, 87 F. Supp. 2667, 683 (W.D. Tex. 2000); cf. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104
(1968) (noting in the context of the First Amendment that "U]udicial interposition in the
operation of the public school system of the Nation raises problems requiring care and
restraint").
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statute or regulation. 33 8 They argue that the creation of legally
binding statutory or regulatory standards would ensure that lower
courts respond consistently in cases involving high-stakes educational
tests. 33 9 Professor Jay Heubert, for example, recommends that the
U.S. Department of Education adopt standards issued by the
American Educational Research Association in its Standards for
Educational and Psychological Testing.340 The adoption of such
standards would require courts to consider, among other things: (1)
the "[c]onsequences resulting from the uses of the test, both intended
and unintended" (including the dropout rate among students who do
not pass the test, the narrowing of the curriculum, and the use of
other practices designed to raise test scores rather than teach);34' (2)
the consistency between test scores and other performance indicators
(such as grades); 342 and (3) the "relationship among particular test
scores, the instructional programs, and desired student outcomes
[including] ...evidence about whether students, in fact, benefit from
the differential [or remedial] instruction." 343 The Resource Guide
issued by the Office for Civil Rights in the Clinton Administration's
Department of Education takes a similar approach, arguing that the
"educational necessity" of a high-stakes test should be assessed by
examining test validity, reliability, and fairness, as well as the
institutional goals and objectives of the school, the educational
consequences to students, and the relationship of the educational
344
institution to the student.
Yet such approaches hardly cabin the concept of educational
necessity. To the contrary, by demanding consideration of a host of
inherently subjective factors (including goals, relationships, and
fairness) and factors that are ordinarily left to the discretion of local
policymakers (such as a policy's social consequences), the proposed
standards greatly complicate the task of courts, while holding no
promise of greater clarity or consistency in the law.
Even the scientific concept of test "validity" has become
confused and the subject of much disagreement and, thus, an
338. Heubert, supra note 301, at 27 (complaining that "neither Title VI nor its current
regulations provide standards that would help define the circumstances under which it is
'educationally necessary' to use a high-stakes test that has a disproportionate, adverse impact by
race or national origin").
339. See, e.g., id.
340. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 15, at 266; Heubert, supra note 301, at 27.
341. AM. EDUC. RESEARCH ASS'N ET AL., STANDARDS FOR EDUCATIONAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL

TESTING, Standard 13.1, at
342. JOINT STANDARDS,
343. Id. Standard 13.9,
344. RESOURCE GUIDE,

145 (1999) [hereinafter JOINT STANDARDS].
supra note 341, Standard 13.3, at 146.
at 147.
supra note 220, at 34, 39.
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improper basis for determining the necessity of an educational test.
Recall that "validity" generally refers to a test's accuracy-that is, its
ability to predict accurately future performance (as in the case of the
SAT) or its ability to measure accurately the knowledge and skill level
that the test purports to measure (as in the case of educational
assessments).3 45 In recent years, however, other less rigorous theories
of test validity have infiltrated the field of educational measurement.
For example, the "instructional validity" theory asserts that a test can
be valid only if it measures students' knowledge of curriculum actually
taught. 46 As Michael Rebell has noted elsewhere, it is impossible to
use instructional validity as a legal benchmark in the context of
district-wide or statewide assessments because any attempt to
measure precisely what students across schools and classrooms have
actually been taught is impossible. Rebell explains:
In order to establish that every student has had a fair opportunity to learn each of the
many subjects covered by an examination, the practices of every school district, perhaps
even of every school and classroom in the state over the twelve year span of a public
school education would have to be analyzed [by the court].347

Moreover, because the experts disagree as to how "instructional
validity" can be measured with respect to a statewide testing program,
348
this species of validity is particularly subject to manipulation.
Equally malleable 349 and subject to manipulation is the
"consequentialist" approach to test validity, which maintains that a
345. See supra Part V.A.2.a. As explained previously, in the case of educational assessments,
predictive validity is not particularly important because such tests are not designed to predict
anything, but rather seek to measure achievement. Id.
346. Rebell, supra note 310, at 386. The concept of "instructional validity" was first given
legal weight by the Fifth Circuit in Debra P. v. Turlington, the lawsuit challenging Florida's
minimum competency exam. 644 F.2d 397, 405 (5th Cir. 1981). On appeal, the court held that, in
order to satisfy constitutional requirements of due process, the state must prove that the
graduation exam "covered things actually covered in the classroom." Id.
347. Rebell, supra note 310, at 387; see also Anderson v. Banks, 540 F. Supp. 472, 765 (S.D.
Ga. 1981) ("[T]o require school officials to produce testimony that every teacher finished every
lesson and assigned every problem in the curriculum would impose a paralyzing burden on
school authorities."); cf. Debra P. v. Turlington, 564 F. Supp. 177, 186 (M.D. Fla. 1983) (ruling
that, as long as the curriculum includes basic objectives of which teachers are aware, the court
will not intervene in educational policy under the guise of the Due Process Clause).
348. Rebell, supra note 310, at 387.
349. As evidence that the concept of validity is too pliable to provide a legal rule for
determining the educational necessity of a test, one need look no further than an essay written
by Arthur L. Coleman, a former Clinton Administration Deputy Assistant Secretary for Civil
Rights at the U.S. Department of Education. Coleman approvingly notes that the concept of
validity is fluid and ever-changing. He writes that "a conclusion that a test was valid yesterday
may yield to information suggesting that it may be invalid tomorrow." Coleman, supra note 19,
at 103 (citing Samuel Messick, Validity, in EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT 13, 13 (Robert Linn ed.,
3d ed. 1989) for the proposition that validity is an evolving property and validation is a
continuing process).
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determination as to whether a test is valid cannot be made without
considering whether the use of a test is socially just.3 50 This politically

charged, scientifically dubious, approach has recently ascended in
importance in the psychometric literature. 351 Consequentialist
theories of test validity, however, conflate the concept of validity with
that of raw adverse impact, and are thus circular. Upon close
examination, consequentialist arguments can be distilled into the
following set of propositions:
1) A test should not survive disparate impact scrutiny if it is
not valid.
2) In order for a test to be valid, the test's use must be socially
just.
3) In order for the use of a test to be socially just, it must not
adversely burden particular minority groups.
4) Where the result of test failure is denial of some
educational benefit (such as a diploma or advancement to
the next grade), a lower mean score for minority students
than for white students constitutes proof that the lower
scoring minority group will be adversely burdened by the
test.
5) Because minority groups are disproportionately burdened
by the consequences of the test, use of the test is unjust,
invalid, unnecessary, and, therefore, illegal.
In other words, under the consequentialists' circular approach,
where a test has high-stakes consequences, disparate racial outcomes
are per se illegal. This approach thus conflates the analytically
distinct concepts of technical accuracy and social impact. Accordingly,
350. Linda F. Wightman, An Examination of Sex Differences in LSAT Scores from the
Perspective of Social Consequences, 11 APPLIED MEASUREMENT IN EDUC. 255, 273 (1998) (arguing
that the social consequences of standardized testing must be incorporated into any assessment of
a test's validity). See generally Messick, supra note 349, at 13 (arguing that validity cannot be
divorced from social outcomes).
351. See CAMILLI & SHEPARD, supra note 272, at 154 (warning that "test developers should
never claim on the basis of [technical measures of test bias] that a test has been guaranteed free
of bias and valid for all possible uses" without considering a test's sociopolitical impact).
According to this view, validity can be determined only by considering the social and political
consequences of test use. See id. at 153 (contending that questions regarding whether a test is
accurate, reliable, and technically bias free cannot answer the larger normative question about
whether test use is reasonable and fair).
The Clinton Administration's Resource Guide implicitly adopts the consequentialist
approach, stating that, in addition to considering whether a test is accurate, reliable, and biasfree, courts evaluating a test's scientific validity must also consider: (1) the purpose for which the
test is used; (2) whether an individual's score on the test is the sole criterion for the educational
decision; (3) the nature and quality of the opportunity provided to students to master required
content; and (4) the educational bases for establishing passing or cutoff scores. RESOURCE GUIDE,
supra note 220.
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statutorily
defining
"educational
necessity"
to
mean
"validity"-without limiting the concept of validity to scientific
accuracy (as opposed to fairness)--would serve only to confuse the law
and to eviscerate a defendant school system's affirmative defense and
adopt, through the back door, a per se ban on high-stakes tests with
disparate racial effects.
3. Adversarial Versus Cooperationist Models
An additional fundamental difficulty with applying to
educational tests the disparate impact model developed in the
employment context is that employers and educational institutions,
serving fundamentally different interests, are organized around
different operational models. While employers act out of self-interest,
public educational institutions operate, by definition, in the public
352
interest.
The adversarial model of employment relations posits a tension
between the objectives of management-which seeks to maximize
profits--and the needs of the employees--for whom profit
maximization is generally secondary to wage maximization and other
aspects of individual self-interest. 353 For example, the National Labor
Relations Act ("NLRA") is premised on the idea that there is "a
fundamental conflict of interest between labor and management-a
chasm-that is thought to require structural guarantees to keep
separate their respective spheres of influence." 354 In order to preserve
352. This is true even when we consider the role of private schools. The decision by a private
school to require students to pass a test before graduating, while not a public action, is
nevertheless closer to the realm of policy than to the realm of production, and thus the interests
of public and private schools are not analytically distinct in this regard.
353. See, e.g., Charles B. Craver, The Vitality of the American Labor Movement in the
Twenty-First Century, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 633, 673-74 (describing the view that conflict of
interest is inherent in the employment relationship).
354. Samuel Estreicher, Labor Law Reform in a World of Competitive Product Markets, 69
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 11 (1993); see also Packard Motor Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 494-95 (1947)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (stating that the National Labor Relations Act is based on a strict labor.
management dichotomy). Recently, some scholars have begun to question the assumption that
the NLRA is a strictly adversarial statute that discourages cooperation between management
and labor. See, e.g., Mark Barenberg, The PoliticalEconomy of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbol,
and Workplace Cooperation, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1492 (1993) (arguing that the adversarial
interpretation of the NLRA evolved over time and is not inherent in the statute); Thomas C.
Kohler, Models of Worker Participation:The Uncertain Significance of Section 8(a)(2), 27 B.C. L.
REV. 499, 549-50 (1986) (same). Nevertheless, the prevailing view remains that the drafters of
the Act intended to create an adversarial framework. See Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, "Labor's
Divided Ranks": Privilege and the United Front Ideology, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1542, 1555 (1999);
Shannon Browne, Note, Labor-Management Teams: A Panacea for American Businesses or the
Rebirth of a Laborer's Nightmare?, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 241 (1997) (finding continued historical,
statutory, and policy support for the adversarial model).
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these separate spheres, the NLRA creates a legal wall between
managers and employees. It thus prohibits employers from interfering
with or in any way assisting a labor organization, prohibits
supervisors and managers from unionizing, and defines the scope of
mandatory bargaining strictly so as to keep the domains of labor and
3 55
management separate and distinct.
Judicial interpretations of the NLRA likewise reflect
adversarial assumptions about the workplace. Thus, in NLRB v.
Insurance Agents' International Union,356 the Supreme Court noted
that "[employers and employees] still proceed from the contrary and to
an extent antagonistic viewpoints and concepts of self-interest." 35 7 The
NLRA and judicial interpretations of the NLRA, therefore, not only
reflect adversarial assumptions about employer-employee relations,
358
they enshrine those assumptions firmly in American law.
Title VII is also premised on the assumption that an employer's
unfettered self-interest will often cause it to act in ways that
disadvantage certain employees or potential employees. According to
economic models of employment discrimination, a rational employer
may discriminate, even in the absence of racial animus, if its
customers or clients prefer that it do so. 3 59 Similarly, a rational
employer might discriminate if it concludes that a potential
employee's status is a useful proxy for job qualifications. 360 Because

355. 29 U.S.C. § 152(a)(5) (2000); id. § 158(a)(2); Estreicher, supra note 354, at 11; see also
Note, Collective Bargainingas an Industrial System: An Argument Against Judicial Revision of
Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1662, 1679-80 (1983)
(arguing that the National Labor Relations Act is premised on the dichotomy between labor and
management).
356. 361 U.S. 477, 488 (1960).
357. Id.
358. See Crain & Matheny, supra note 354, at 1555 ('The NLRA cements the adversarial
model by mandating a united front on labor's side of the table: it obligates the employer to
bargain with the duly certified labor organization representing a majority of its employees.").
359. Economists refer to this as "taste-based discrimination" since it is caused by a
customer's preference (or taste) for dealing with people from certain backgrounds. See Strauss,
supra note 136, at 1621 (citing GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed.
1971)).
360. Economists refer to this as "statistical discrimination." See Strauss, supra note 136, at

1621; Willborn, supra note 18, at 821. For example, assume that women, on average, take more
time out of the paid labor market than men for the purpose of bearing and raising children. If
this is so, it might make economic sense for a company concerned with the continuity of its
workforce and reducing employee absences to hire only men. In other words, in the absence of
Title VII, many employers might "rationally" decide to discriminate against women of childbearing age. Yet Title VII rightly forbids this. Similarly, it might make good business sense for a
company to dismiss employees who have brought lawsuits against them. Employees embroiled in
ongoing litigation against their employers may be insubordinate, may encourage other workers
to sue the company, and may become less productive employees. Yet Title VII prohibits
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employers lack perfect information to evaluate the productivity of
prospective employees, it is argued that they may use race or ethnicity
as a proxy for other traits even if they harbor no dislike for members
of a particular race. 36 1' Fair employment laws are therefore necessary
to prevent employers from taking those actions that, while
economically rational, are socially undesirable.
In sum, both Title VII and the NLRA embody the notion that
employers and employees operate from separate vantage points and
that, absent government intervention, employers will often act in
ways that fundamentally disadvantage employees (or prospective
employees), particularly racial and ethnic minorities and women.
Viewed through this lens, the use of disparate impact litigation
to challenge employment tests with a disparate racial or ethnic
outcome may appear to make sense. In the business context, tests are
used as a screening device. An employer may be able to hire or
promote only a small subset of the workers who apply for a particular
job, and so may rely on tests to streamline the pool of candidates. In
doing so, the employer is not attempting to help the applicants; rather,
it is serving its own institutional interests in efficiently sorting the
applicants so as to be able to differentiate between them. Particularly
where the number of candidates far exceeds the number of available
positions, an employer may set a particularly high cutoff score on an
employment test as a threshold to eliminate all but a small group of
top qualifiers. In this situation, the argument in favor of the disparate
impact approach is that the use of a cutoff score unfairly eliminates
from consideration a disproportionate number of candidates from
particular demographic groups who did not meet the threshold score
but who, nevertheless, could perform the functions of the job
adequately. At the same time, use of the cutoff score may only
marginally
advance the employer's legitimate
interest in
362
productivity.
The assumption underlying the use of the disparate impact
model in the employment setting is that, at some point, an employee's
(or potential employee's) interest in obtaining a job that he is capable
employers from retaliating-however rationally-against employees who exercise their statutory
rights.
361. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 136, at 1621.
362. Some commentators have argued that the willingness of courts to scrutinize the cutoff
score for an otherwise valid test unfairly limits an employer's ability to select "the best and the
brightest" and leads to forced mediocrity. See, e.g., Brian W. Jones, The U.S. Department of
Education and Two Court Decisions Probe the Limits of "DisparateImpact" Theory, 3 CIVIL
RIGHTS PRACTICE GROUP NEWSL. (The Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy, Washington,
D.C.),
available
at
http://www.fed-soc.org/Publications/practicegroupnewsletters/civilrights/decisionscivv3i2.htm (last visited June 28, 2002).
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of performing outweighs an employer's interest in any incremental
increase in productivity, particularly when identifiable minority
groups are disproportionately affected. Thus, where an employment
policy or practice results in harm to a particular demographic group of
workers (or prospective workers) an employer may not continue that
practice absent proof that the practice is job related and consistent
363
with business necessity.
The adversarial model on which American labor and
employment law are based clearly do not apply to education. State
boards of education, local school boards, principals, teachers, and
students all share a common goal: the education of the children
entrusted to the school system. Unlike businesses that operate out of
self-interest, public schools are intended to serve the public interest
and are judged by their ability to educate all students safely and
effectively. Indeed, schools and students are not so much adversaries
as they are partners in a common enterprise. And, unlike employment
tests, which are adopted in order to serve the interests of the
employer, legitimate educational assessments are adopted in order to
improve educational opportunities for the students. Educational
assessments are, therefore, a form of pedagogic practice. And while
educators and policymakers may disagree about which practices best
achieve the objective of educating students, the overarching
purpose-education-is never in doubt. Thus, if educational
policymakers adopt testing policies to ensure that all students
graduate from school with a mastery of certain subjects and skills, the
law should not distrust such tests on the basis of disproportionate
demographic outcomes, unless, of course, circumstances suggest an
intent to discriminate.
4. Rewarding Willful Blindness
Ironically, application of the disparate impact model to
educational testing would mean that states or school districts that
implement high-stakes testing as part of an effort to equalize
educational opportunities would open themselves to the risk of federal
lawsuits or investigations by the federal government, while those
educational institutions that do nothing to improve the educational
opportunities of disadvantaged youth would remain immune from
costly lawsuits and government inquiries. 364 In other words, the use of
363. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2000); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
364. See James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Labaratory Dewey Barely Imagined:
The Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
(forthcoming 2002) (unpublished manuscript at 104), available at http://www.law.colum-
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the disparate impact model with respect to educational testing
rewards willful blindness and punishes those who dare to announce
that the emperor is wearing no clothes.
Some scholars have argued that the solution to this problem is
not to eliminate the use of Title VI disparate impact claims altogether,
but rather to alter the presumptions governing such cases. Thus,
rather than view testing regimes with disparate racial consequences
as inherently suspect, Professors James Liebman and Charles Sabel
argue that courts and administrative agencies should view
institutions that fail to implement accountability regimes as
presumptively in violation of Title VI.365
While this approach is certainly better than the current model,
it fails to address--and indeed highlights--the central problem with
the disparate impact model as applied to education policy: namely,
that there is no obvious answer to the question of which negative
impact-the failure of schools to test students and provide remedial
assistance where necessary or the failure of schools to award diplomas
to large numbers of minority students--produces the greater evil. By
simply taking an opposing normative viewpoint, the Liebman and
Sabel approach fails to resolve the inherent tension in Title VI
disparate impact policy, while still requiring that the federal
government usurp local decisionmaking.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have sought to demonstrate that the disparate
impact model of discrimination should not be applied to challenges to
educational tests under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Application of the disparate impact model to educational testing fails
to achieve any of the stated goals of the disparate impact doctrine and
is unsustainable on grounds of public policy.
After decades of poor academic achievement in our public
schools-particularly those that are urban and those that are
poor-policymakers have finally begun serious efforts at educational
reform through accountability. A critical component of such reform
efforts is the testing of primary and secondary school students and the
attaching of consequences to those test results. High-stakes testing

bia.edu/sabel/papers.htm (last visited May 14, 2002) ("Districts that scrutinize themselves
carefully in the interest of the new reforms are disproportionately likely to become the target of
Title VI suits. Conversely, obstinate ignorance of the details of local conditions, manifest, for
example, in the unwillingness to collect data or set standards, can immunize schools and
districts from Title VI liability." (footnote omitted)).
365. See id.
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regimes seek not only to obtain critical information in order to help
policymakers target corrective and remedial services, but also to
create incentives for success and consequences for failure that will
motivate teaching and learning.
The primary objectives of the reform movement are the
improvement of student achievement across the board and the
equalization of educational opportunities across class and race.
Ironically, however, reform efforts that include regular student
assessments with actual consequences for repeated failure have been
greeted by threats of legal action from activists and commentators
who claim that standardized academic tests "discriminate" against
racial and ethnic minorities and who seek, in the name of minority
students, to use federal antidiscrimination laws to block creative and
well-intended efforts at reform. While this approach may in the short
term help more African-American and Latino students to obtain
diplomas or advance to the next educational level, the use of federal
antidiscrimination laws to block education reform will do nothing to
help improve educational opportunities for these students or the next
generation of minority youth.
The decision to adopt, reject, discontinue, or modify an
educational testing policy should, of course, be based on careful
consideration of the educational and social science literature,
empirical evidence regarding the success or failure of the policy or
other like policies, evidence regarding the policy's social impact, and
political realities. 366 These considerations are best weighed by
legislative bodies, state boards of education, local school boards, and
state or local regulatory agencies that are institutionally positioned to
balance competing social and political interests and to assess the
relevance of social science research.
The adversary system is ill-suited to these tasks. Asking courts
to apply complicated psychometric concepts and social science
principles will inevitably create inconsistency and confusion in the
law. Perhaps most importantly, however, the use of disparate impact
litigation to resolve concerns regarding high-stakes testing requires
courts to choose between two compelling notions of justice, and thus,
in the end, to set educational policy, which is not their role in our

366. It is here that evidence of disparate impact is most relevant. That is, policymakers may
very well determine that establishing a graduation requirement that results in large numbers of
Latino and African-American students failing to graduate or be promoted is unwise public policy.
But this is not a problem that our antidiscrimination laws can or should resolve. Absent a
showing that the test is being purposefully used to subjugate minorities, local education officials
should be able to weigh the costs and benefits of educational policy and determine, without
judicial interference, whether a testing regime should be implemented or maintained.
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constitutional regime. Accordingly, courts should reject attempts to

thwart education reform under the guise of enforcing our nation's
antidiscrimination laws.
For the same reasons, Congress should reject calls to codify the
disparate impact model of discrimination in the text of Title VI.
Should Congress nevertheless decide to amend the statute in the wake
of the Supreme Court's Sandoval decision, it should exempt school
accountability efforts from any provision authorizing disparate impact
lawsuits. Such an amendment would create a safe harbor for states
and school districts that attempt to equalize educational opportunities
and improve educational outcomes through accountability regimes.
To be sure, the current wave of reforms may not succeed in
improving student achievement or closing the minority achievement
gap. Perhaps even where such policies succeed, policymakers may,
nevertheless, decide that the short-term social costs are too high to
continue the testing policy. But until we can agree not to ask our
nation's courts to kill the messengers that bring us the news of poor
student achievement, we will be unable to engage in a productive
dialogue on education reform and thereby begin to eliminate the
chronic instructional failures that afflict so many of the schools
attended by poor and minority students.

*

*

*

